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PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSING
AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
By

GERALD

W.

GRANDEY*

INTRODUCTION

Governmental licensing of private developments such as
broadcasting stations and power production facilities is not a new
phenomenon; nor is public intervention into those proceedings.
Given this background one would think that a rational, wellsettled approach toward the allocation of the burdens of proof
between the applicant and intervenor would have been developed. Unfortunately such is not the case. In the almost 100-year
history of administrative law neither the agencies themselves nor
reviewing judicial bodies have been able to agree upon an allocation which achieves the proper balance between fairness to all
parties and administrative efficiency.
This article begins with the assumption that the public intervenor has already been admitted as a party to the licensing proceeding-a status which is not always easily attained. Once the
obstacle of admittance has been hurdled, the applicant and intervenor each raise those issues they wish considered. The agency
must then decide which party will present evidence first and who
will have the ultimate burden of proof with respect to the various
issues presented.
This article will focus primarily upon present practice before
the Atomic Energy Commission. The sheer number of administrative agencies precludes an inclusive overview. The wealth of
experience reflected in the practice before other agencies, however, will not be ignored. The AEC was chosen because it provides
a topical example of the difficulties a federal agency faces when
it is confronted by an intervenor intending to oppose the grant of
a license.
* Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; Professional Engineer, Geophysical
Engineering, 1968, Colorado School of Mines; J.D., 1973, Northwestern University.
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The Atomic Energy Act of 1954' was enacted to encourage,
among other things, the development and utilization of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.' Normally such development and
utilization would be left to the private sector in accordance with
the theories of a capitalistic economy. But because of the hazardous nature of the source, byproduct, and special nuclear material,
Congress determined that it was in the national interest to regulate not only the material, but also the facilities using the material." Pursuant to this determination, a Commission was established and given the authority to regulate the use of atomic energy.' Concomitantly it was empowered to issue licenses to qualified persons who made application to construct and operate commercial nuclear power reactors.5
Under provisions of the Act an application must be in writing
and contain sufficient information to permit the Commission to
make a determination that the utilization of the nuclear material
will be consonant with the common defense and provide adequate
protection to the health and safety of the people.' Thus utilization
of nuclear fuel is not a fundamental right, but rather a privilege
specifically granted by statute to a qualified applicant.
Once the Commission receives an application for the construction or operation of a nuclear facility it is under a statutory
duty to make findings with respect to the applicant's technical
qualifications; the impact of the reactor's location, design, and
operation upon the public's health and safety;' and the deleterious effects, if any, of the facility's presence and operation upon
the environment2 To resolve these issues public hearings are held
upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by
the grant of an application. 9 Any person demonstrating the requisite interest is entitled to be admitted to the proceeding as a
party."'
142 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).

'Id. § 2013(d).
3
d. §§ 2012(c)-(d).
'Id. § 2031.
5
/d. § 2132.
6
Id. § 2232(a).
'Id.
'Id. §§ 4321-35.
'Actually, the licensing of a commercial facility involves two stages: (1) a mandatory
construction licensing hearing, and (2) a post-construction operational licensing hearing
upon the request of an interested person.
"'42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970).

PUBLIC INTERVENTION

Recently, as the number of applications for nuclear facilities
has proliferated, members of communities affected by the proposed facility have sought to intervene in the proceedings as interested parties. Primarily their purposes have been to represent
and protect their own health and safety and to preserve the endangered local environment. On several occasions the Commission has permitted organizations and citizens representing the
public interest in this way to intervene to the extent that they
were able to raise reasonably specific allegations about the facility and furnish a factual basis for their contentions."
When an interested person successfully intervenes he does so
on the basis of the contentions that he raises in his petition.
During the prehearing phase these contentions are frequently
amended and revised and in some cases satisfactorily answered
by the applicant or the Commission. Those contentions remaining are presented to the licensing board'2 which then decides
whether they are meritorious enough to become issues in the licensing hearing. Depending upon the success of prehearing negotiations between the Commission and the applicant, the staff
may or may not have issues of its own to raise.
Under the Act the Commission is obligated to consider the
issues and make findings with respect to the public and national
interest." In this regard all parties, including intervenors, may
present evidence relevant to the issues, but the Act is silent as to
which party must bear the burden of convincing the Commission.
Inevitably the question arises whether the applicant must prove
the facility "safe" with respect to each issue or whether the staff
or intervenor must prove the plant "unsafe." The allocation of the
burden of proof is especially sensitive with regard to the intervenor's contentions.
Conceivably the apportionment of this burden could be
made in several ways. The applicant could bear the burden exclusively, or, alternatively, the onus could be imposed solely upon
the intervenor. The burden could be shared between the applicant and the intervenor, each having the responsibility to present
direct evidence on the issues, with the ultimate burden of persuading the licensing board imposed on either the applicant or
"iO C.F.R. § 2.714 (1973).
1242 U.S.C. § 2241 (1973).
"Id. § 2133 (1970).
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the intervenor depending upon the issue. Alternatively, the Commission could adopt a policy of indifference to the burden, deciding that its distribution is immaterial and directing all parties to
present their direct evidence. The board would then balance the
evidence and make its determination in accordance with the public interest.
Further complications arise when the order in which the parties present their case is considered. The applicant, the staff, or
the intervenor could be directed to proceed first, which in itself
would be a de facto determination that that party has some burden. Alternatively, all parties could be ordered to produce their
direct testimony simultaneously by filing it in written form. Such
a procedure likewise would be tantamount to a determination
that all parties have some burden to sustain, as no party is then
able to prevail merely by controverting his opponent's prima facie
case.
This inquiry will proceed with a brief examination of the
allocation of the burdens of proof in the context of civil litigation,
specifically for the purpose of identifying certain underlying concepts. Once identified these concepts will be analyzed in an abstract setting in order to ascertain if some useful generalizations
can be derived. The concepts and generalizations will then be
tested against legislation applicable to atomic energy licensing,
against procedures of other federal agencies, and against the
needs of the Atomic Energy Commission. Ultimately a determination will be made of the optimal apportionment of the burden
of proof for purposes of nuclear power plant licensing.
I.

CONCEPTS DERIVED FROM CIVIL LITIGATION

Before embarking upon a full analysis of the proper allocation of the burden of proof in administrative practice, it is desirable to explore some fundamental concepts developed in the context of civil litigation. In normal two-party civil litigation where
a plaintiff and defendant appear before a judge with or without
a jury, the distribution of the burden of proof is, in most instances, well settled. The plaintiff, as the initiator of the action or the
proponent of an affirmative order, bears the risk of failing to
persuade the jury that his cause is just. This risk is frequently
called the "risk of non-persuasion," for if the plaintiff fails to
present persuasive evidence he loses. 4 Having the risk of nonper"9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW

§ 2485 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as

WIGMORE].

PUBLIC INTERVENTION

suasion, the plaintiff is naturally the one upon whom falls the
initial duty of going forward with evidence. If he fails to do this,
the jury can take no action and the defendant-opponent need not
adduce evidence at all. 5 However, if the proponent produces sufficient evidence to persuade a jury of reasonable men that his
action has merit, the burden of presenting evidence shifts to the
opponent. The plaintiff's burden of going forward is met, and the
defendant, if he wishes
to prevail, must now sway the jury with
6
evidence of his own.
There are several ways by which a plaintiff can successfully
carry his initial burden of "going forward" and pass the burden
to the defendant. He may obtain a specific ruling from the judge
upon the particular evidence, or invoke an appropriate presumption, or ask that a matter be judicially noticed. But because the
plaintiff's evidence is subject to attack by the cross-examining
opponent, the transition point is not automatically surmounted
by perfunctorily presenting evidence. If the defendant can sufficiently weaken the credibility of the proponent's evidence so that
it is unpersuasive to the jurors, then the plaintiff has failed to
sustain his burden.
Moreover, just because the plaintiff succeeds in meeting his
burden of going forward does not guarantee his ultimate success
in the case. The risk of nonpersuasion is always on the proponent,
and if the defendant adduces evidence sufficiently rebutting the
plaintiff's evidence, the jury is to render its decision accordingly.
Specific legal consequences follow from meeting or failing to
meet the evidentiary requirements. If the plaintiff fails to carry
his burden of going forward, either because it was insufficient on
its face or inadequate under the onslaught of cross-examination,
the judge may properly direct a verdict for the defendant. Similarly, if the plaintiff succeeds in going forward and the defendant
responds with no evidence, the judge may properly direct a verdict for the plaintiff. Evidence, which, if unanswered, would justify men of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming the claim
which the plaintiff asserts, establishes what is often referred to
as a prima facie case. If such evidence is not rebutted it may
result in a directed verdict; moreover, even if rebutted, it entitles
the plaintiff to have his case considered by the jury."
15/d. § 2487.
1"d. § 2487(c).
7Id. § 2494.
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II. ALLOCATION OF THE BURDENS OF PROOF IN THE ABSTRACT
Although the foregoing provides a basis for analysis, it is
couched in the context of civil litigation which, though similar in
many respects, is not identical to an administrative licensing
hearing. The typical administrative hearing involves as participants at least an applicant and the regulatory staff, who in the
normal course of regulation will have resolved their disagreements in advance. With intervention, contested issues arise and
the number of parties to the proceeding increases to three or
more, correspondingly increasing the complexity of the adversary
relationships. More fundamentally, in civil litigation the judge
assumes the role of an impartial arbiter, a servant of justice only,
whereas in an administrative hearing a licensing board is charged
with the affirmative duty of pursuing and protecting the public
interest.' This latter distinction is a significant determinant in a
licensing board's perception of evidentiary matters.
Since civil litigation is not exactly analogous, it is perhaps
better to see if evidentiary rules governing the allocation of the
burdens of proof can be developed in the abstract given certain
axioms.
As in civil actions, the proponent of an administrative rule
or order still should bear the risk of nonpersuasion. The question
is how that proponent is identified. One way would be to engage
in a semantic game in which identification of the proponent turns
upon the positive or negative of the question, e.g., the applicant
is a proponent of an order granting a license, or the intervenor is
a proponent of an order denying the granting of a license. Wigmore eschewed this approach and turned instead to the pleadings
or applicable rules to distinguish the ultimate facts-the facta
probanda-in the case. 9 Whoever had to prove these facts bore
the risk of nonpersuasion and was therefore the proponent. In the
final analysis it is the language of the pleadings and the applicable rules which determine the proponent and the imposition of
the risk.
As to the burden of going forward with evidence Wigmore
made the assumption that it naturally fell on the party having
the risk of nonpersuasion since, without evidence, the trier of fact
"Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966).
"'9WIGMORE § 2485.

PUBLIC INTERVENTION

could properly take no favorable action at all and there would be
no need for the opponent to adduce evidence.2 ' While this assumption may be valid in civil litigation, it is not axiomatic in
an abstract sense, nor necessarily applicable to administrative
hearings. The burden of going forward could be imposed upon the
opponent, with his failure to maintain the burden neutralizing his
opposition but not necessarily insuring the victory of the proponent. Placement of this burden is indeterminate in the abstract
and ultimately depends upon not only the pleadings and applicable rules of practice, but also upon broad considerations of
policy.,'
Before turning to statutes and regulations pertinent to atomic energy licensing hearings, one further observation by Wigmore is germane to the abstract model. In special situations "the
burden of proving a fact is

.

.

put on the party who presumably

has peculiar means of knowledge enabling him to prove its falsity
if it is false." 22
III.

ALLOCATION OF THE RISK OF NONPERSUASION AND THE BURDEN
OF GOING FORWARD: AEC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has no provision explicitly
addressing the apportionment of the burden of proof in licensing
hearings. :' It does require an applicant for an operating license to
state in its application technical specifications of the nuclear
material, specific characteristics of the facility, and other inforL
mation which will enable the Commission to find that the utilization of the nuclear material will be in accord with the common
defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the
health and safety of the public.2 Other evidence is implicitly
called for where the statute requires the Commission to make
findings and issue licenses to applicants
(1) whose proposed activities will serve a useful purpose proportionate to the quantities of special nuclear material or source mate-

rial to be utilized;
(2)

who are equipped to observe and who agree to observe such

2"Id. § 2487.
"Cf. id. § 2488(a).
2Id. § 2486 (italics deleted). Wigmore observed that: "This principle had received
frequent application in modern statutes making it an offense to pursue a certain occupation without a State license ....
" Id.
242 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
1
2 1d. § 2232(a); 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.30-38, .55a, .110, Apps. A-F (1974).
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safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or
property as the Commission may by rule establish; and
(3) who agree to make available to the Commission such technical
information and data concerning activities under such licenses as
the Commission may determine necessary to promote the common
defense 51 and security and to protect the health and safety of the
2
public.

Regulations of the Atomic Energy Commission require additional
showings by the applicant which will permit the Commission to
find that:
(1) Construction of the facility has been substantially completed,
in conformity with the construction permit and the application as
amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations
of the Commission; and
(2) The facility will operate in conformity with the application as
amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations
of the Commission; and
(3) There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized
by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the
health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be
conducted in compliance with the regulations in this chapter; and
(4) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage
in the activities authorized by the operating license in accordance
with the regulations in this chapter; and
(5) The applicable provisions of Part 140 of this chapter have been
satisfied; and
(6) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common
26
defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

In essence the foregoing findings of fact to be made by the licensing board are the ultimate facts or facta probandawhich must be
proved at the hearing. Analysis of the language reveals that the
findings are positively stated necessitating proof of compliance
with applicable standards, safety, utility, technical ability, and
financial qualification. Thus the risk of nonpersuasion is on the
person who must satisfy the commission with respect to the requisite findings-namely the applicant.2 7 This conclusion follows irrespective of the origin of the issues so long as they relate to the
ultimate facts to be proved.
2:42 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1970).
2 10

C.F.R. § 50.57 (1973). Similar conditions are imposed for construction permits.

Id. §§ 50.55-.55a.

2The opponent would normally phrase his allegations in terms of unsafeness, noncompliance, technical inability, and financial unqualification. If the ultimate facts were
likewise stated in the negative, i.e., a license will be denied if a facility is found to be
unsafe, etc., then the opponent would bear the risk of nonpersuasion.
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As in the abstract model, imposition of the risk of nonpersuasion is not necessarily dispositive of the assignment of the burden
of going forward on the issues in an administrative hearing. The
intervenor-opponent still may have some burden of going forward
in regard to contentions that he raises even though they relate to
the ultimate facts to be proved in the proceeding.
The Commission complicates the problem with an ambiguous regulation. Section 2.732 provides that: "Unless otherwise
ordered by the presiding officer the applicant or the proponent of
an order has the burden of proof."2" The regulation speaks generally of the burden of proof and arguably could include both the
risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of going forward with evidence. If so, the applicant, as the proponent of an order, would
suffer both burdens. More likely, however, the regulation merely
addresses the ultimate burden in a proceeding-the risk of nonpersuasion-leaving the allocation of the burden of going forward
undecided. In addition, even though analysis of the Act has led
to the conclusion that the applicant should have the risk of nonpersuasion, under the regulation, the presiding officer may decide
otherwise. No standards or criteria are enumerated under which
the decision to shift the burden of proof is to be made.
The clause conferring such discretion upon the presiding officer may have no force and effect whatsoever because it apparently conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
which is incorporated by reference into the Atomic Energy Act."8
Referring to administrative hearings, section 7(c) of the APA
states that "except as otherwise provided by statute the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof."30 Since the regulation is not a "statute" within the meaning of section 7(c), the
Commission's attempt, absent authority under the Atomic Energy Act, to give the presiding officer some discretion in assigning
the risk of nonpersuasion is without effect. But even if the exercise of discretion with regard to the risk of nonpersuasion is prevented by section 7(c) of the APA, that prohibition may not be
dispositive of the ability of a presiding officer to exercise discretion with regard to the burden of going forward.
Section 7(c) uses the familiar language that "the proponent
of a rule or order has the burden of proof," which thus far has
"10 C.F.R. § 2.732 (1973).
-42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1970).
:5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
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failed to yield a hint as to the apportionment of the burden of
going forward. Both the House and Senate reports explained the
provision in the following language:
That the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof means
not only that the party initiating the proceeding has the general
burden of coming forward with a prima facie case but that other
parties, who are proponents of some different result, also for that
purpose have a burden to maintain. Similarly the requirement that
no sanction be imposed or rule or order be issued except upon evidence of the kind specified means that the proponents of a denial
of relief must sustain such denial by that kind of evidence. For
example, credible and credited evidence submitted by the applicant
for a license may not be ignored except upon the requisite kind and
quality of contrary evidence. No agency is authorized to stand mute
and arbitrarily disbelieve credible evidence. Except as applicants
for a license or other privilege may be required to come forward with
a prima facie showing, no agency is entitled to presume that the
conduct of any person or status of any enterprise is unlawful or
improper."

The House Report went on to say:
In other words, this section means that every proponent of a rule or
order or the denial thereof has the burden of coming forward with
sufficient evidence therefor; and in determining applications for licenses or other relief any fact, conduct, or status so shown by credible and credited evidence must be accepted as true except as the
contrary has been shown or such evidence has been rebutted or
impeached by duly credited evidence or by facts officially noticed
and stated.2

Based upon this interpretation the applicant for a nuclear facility
license apparently would have the burden of going forward with
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Sufficient evidence means that there are facts in evidence which if unanswered
would justify the licensing board, as men of ordinary reason and
3
fairness, in granting the license which the applicant seeks. 1
The language of the report would seem to be conclusive with
respect to the applicant's burden of going forward on all issues
whether raised by the Commission or the opponents, if it were not
for the phrase that "proponents of some different result, also...
have a burden to maintain." The phrase is capable of supporting
two inferences. Conceivably it could mean that the intervenor:'H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1946); S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess.
22 (1945).
32
H.R. REP. No. 1980, supra note 31, at 36.
*:9WIGMORE § 2494.
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opponent has a burden of going forward regardless of the issues
being raised; or it could signify that the intervenor has the burden
only with respect to the affirmative issues that he raises, and as
to those issues on which the Act requires the applicant to present
evidence, the intervenor need only rebut the applicant's prima
facie case.
Practice in civil litigation demonstrates the unacceptability
of the first possibility. The civil defendant, if he wishes to prevail
following presentation of a prima facie case by the plaintiff, must
come forward with evidence sufficient to rebut the plaintiffs evidence and sway the jury. 4 Only insofar as the plaintiff is able to
establish credible and credited evidence does the defendant have
a burden to maintain. A similar result in the conduct of administrative proceedings seems to be contemplated by both reports
noted above. While credible and credited evidence put forward by
the applicant cannot be ignored or disbelieved by the agency
unless the opponent of a licensing privilege offers commensurate
evidence in rebuttal, only if the applicant has presented such a
prima facie case do the opponents have a burden to sustain. If,
instead, the applicant's evidence is impeached by crossexamination and a prima facie case is not established, the license
cannot be granted and the opponents have no burden to sustain
at all.
The second inference which may be drawn from the language
of the reports is that the intervenor-opponent may have to maintain a burden of going forward with respect to those issues which
he raises and need only rebut or impeach the evidence which the
Act requires the applicant put forth.
If, on the one hand, the issues relate to the ultimate issues
to be proved prior to granting a license, then the applicant should
initially bear both the risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of
going forward. For example, where the intervenor merely asserts
that the applicant is not financially qualified or that a portion of
the facility is unsafe, it is clear that the applicant, to establish
its prima facie case, must present evidence on such issues irrespective of the intervenor's contention." In essence, when the
"Id. § 2487(c).
' For example, if the ultimate issue is the safety of a nuclear facility, then the applicant, to establish a prima facie case, must come forward with credible evidence as to all
safety considerations and issues including, but not limited to, safety issues raised by
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opponent raises such issues, he is doing nothing more than putting the respective parties on notice that he does not believe that
the applicant can present credible evidence with respect to the
issue and that, if the applicant does, he is prepared to rebut with
evidence of his own. The applicant, once notified of the intervenor's issues, can establish his prima facie case as to aspects
outside the opponent's issues confident that such evidence will go
unchallenged by the opponent.
A different result probably should be reached when the intervenor's issues fall outside the sphere of or do not relate to the
ultimate issues before the board. Hence when the intervenor alleges unlawful or improper conduct on the part of an applicant,
unless the statute requires a prima facie showing to the contrary
by the applicant, the burden of going forward should be on the
intervenor. In fact, both the House and Senate reports contemplated just such a result."
In summary, after having looked at the pleadings and applicable rules of practice, one must reach the conclusion that the
Atomic Energy Act, the APA, and the Commission's regulations
all require that the risk of nonpersuasion be borne by the applicant. Less certain is the allocation of the burden of going forward;
however, the legislative history of the APA strongly suggests that
at least with respect to those issues relating to the facta probanda
the applicant should also bear this responsibility. As to issues not
relating to the ultimate facts, the burden of going forward should
rest with the intervenor.
IV.

ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD
IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

To fully develop and explore considerations of policy in the
atomic energy licensing field, an understanding of the practice
and experience in other federal administrative bodies is essential.
In doing so at least one caveat should be noted. Administrative
procedure is variable and molded to the function of the agency.
Consequently, procedures of dissimilar agencies will differ. The
Atomic Energy Commission in particular seems to be unique
among the federal agencies. The subject matter of its regulatory
opponents. The agency should not depend upon opponents to raise important issues of fact
necessary to support affirmative findings. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
:"See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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responsibilities is complex and technical, with regulation requiring a high degree of scientific sophistication. Most of the information relevant to its regulatory decisions is exclusively in the hands
of the applicant or the Commission. The public in general does
not understand the information and hence does not accumulate
it. Furthermore, nuclear energy is inherently dangerous with awesome consequences if exploitation ignores considerations of
safety. For these reasons the procedure of another agency must
be carefully examined before applying it to the AEC arena.
A cursory analysis of procedures in various federal agencies
leads to the conclusion that there is an unsystematized approach
toward apportionment of the burdens of proof. A more thorough
analysis reveals that while there may be some functional justification for disparate treatment, there remains an inexplicable
degree of difference among the several agencies when making the
allocation.:"
To reiterate there are basically three approaches an agency
can take toward the allocation. First, it may determine that,
although the applicant has the risk of nonpersuasion, the
intervenor-opponent bears at least some burden of going forward
with evidence. Second, the agency may decide that the applicant
has both the risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of going forward on all issues. Finally, the agency may conclude that in administrative hearings it is largely immaterial which party has the
burden of going forward though the applicant bears the risk of
nonpersuasion. Judicial and administrative bodies have failed to
settle upon a uniform approach; therefore, it is necessary to explore fully each alternative.
A.

Burden of Going Forward on Intervenor-Opponent
The leading case imposing a burden of going forward on the
intervenor-opponents is Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC." Familiarity with the decision's long
:"It should be noted that there is a fundamental distinction in administrative law
between proceedings initiated by the agency and proceedings initiated by an applicant.
In the former the agency is usually attempting to enforce a regulation or take some
remedial action against a party and therefore has at least the initial burden of going
forward and, in most instances, the risk of nonpersuasion. It is the latter variety which
concerns this paper although occasional reference will be made to agency initiated actions
for purpose of comparison. The distinction is logical and comports with section 556(d) of
the APA since, in an enforcement proceeding, the agency is the proponent of a rule or
order. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
-425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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and complex history is essential to the understanding of the
court's distribution of the burdens of proof. An earlier opinion of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals dealing with the same
controversy directed that individuals and organizations representing the applicant's listening public be permitted to intervene
and participate :" in the Federal Communication Commission's
license renewal hearing. The prospective intervenors sought a
hearing, contending that the applicant had willfully practiced
racial discrimination and had knowingly violated the fairness
doctrine.
On remand the Commission ruled that the applicant had the
burden of proof on the ultimate issue of whether renewal of its
license would serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity,
but that the Church of Christ and other intervenors had the burden, including the risk of nonpersuasion, of proving violation of
the fairness doctrine and discrimination against significant
groups within the community of the applicant's service area.10
The Commission's allocation being unacceptable, the intervenors
petitioned for reconsideration and sought an order assigning the
ultimate burden of proof upon all the issues to the applicant.'
Intervenors justified their request because the applicant knew the
most about the facts, and because otherwise the burden of proof
on the ultimate issue would be meaningless. 2 It is important to
note that the intervenors desired to impose only the risk of nonpersuasion on the applicants while they were content to carry the
burden of going forward themselves. 3 Even with this concession
the Commission rejected the proposed allocations on the ground
that:
The issues involved in this proceeding are based upon the
charges made by intervenors and relate largely to acts of omission
rather than commission .... Those who allege such discrimination
are in at least as good a position as the applicant to know the facts
relating to it....
... In essence, the hearing order . . .merely requires that those
making specific accusations shall come forward with their evidence
and afford the one accused an opportunity to reply after he is fully
informed of the charges and the evidence."
-1359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'"Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 3 F.C.C.2d 784 (1966).
"Lamar Life Ins. Co., 20 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 92 (F.C.C. 1966).
"Id. at 94.

"Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 431, 433 n.8 (1968).
"Lamar Life Ins. Co., 20 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 92, 95-6 (F.C.C. 1966). The Commission also
stated:
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It is evident that the Commission fell into the semantic trap of
positives and negatives and made an incorrect analogy to cases
involving charges of criminal conduct.4 5
Intervenors, in making their argument, had relied upon two
earlier FCC cases involving serious allegations of misconduct
raised in an opponent's petition to deny a license. In both cases
the Commission ruled that the intervenor was to proceed with the
initial introduction of evidence on the issue even though the applicant had the ultimate burden of proof.4" In its decision concerning the burden to be placed on Church of Christ the Commission
gave little attention to the two earlier cases, stating that in those
cases the rationale for splitting the ultimate burden of proof from
the burden of first proceeding with evidence was that the facts in
issue were peculiarly within the knowledge of the applicant.47 The
Commission then issued an order renewing the broadcaster's license and noting that the intervenors had failed to come forward
and sustain their serious allegations against the applicant."
On appeal the circuit court vacated the order and held that
the Commission had gravely misunderstood the role of the intervenors as well as the allocation of the burden of proof.49 The court
held that the applicant has the ultimate burden of proof on all
the issues and that:
The failure to present particular viewpoints and the failure to provide the
opportunity for expression by significant community groups may be better
known to those claiming to represent the viewpoints of groups denied access
to broadcast facilities than to the broadcaster who keeps records of what he
has presented rather than what he has not presented.
Id. at 95.
'"See 10 C.F.R. § 2.732 (1973) and dissenting statement of Commissioner Cox in
Lamar Life Ins. Co., 20 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 92 (F.C.C. 1966). See also 9 WIGMORE § 2488(a).
The Commission cited as precedent for its allocation of the burden of proof D & E Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 78 (1965), which involved a charge that the applicant had violated
the law by smuggling horses into the United States from Mexico. The Commission ruled
that where an issue involving serious misconduct has been raised, the party making the
charges has not only the burden of going forward with the evidence, but the ultimate
burden of proof as well.
"Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co., 6 R.R.2d 191 (1965); Washington Broadcasting Co.,
3 F.C.C.2d 777 (1966). In the latter opinion the Commission stated that placement of the
burden of going forward upon the intervenor was in accord with concepts of basic fairness.
However, the Commission also explicated that the purpose of so placing the burden was
to delineate the facts in issue and to inform the applicant of precise factual issues to be
resolved.
'17 See Lamar Life Ins. Co., 20 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 92 (F.C.C. 1966).
"Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 495, 549 (1967).
"Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
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We did not intend that intervenors representing a public interest be
treated as interlopers. Rather ... a "Public Intervenor" who is
seeking no license or private right is, in this context, more nearly like
a complaining witness who presents t vidence to police or a prosecutor whose duty it is to conduct an affirmative and objective investigation of all the facts and to pursue his prosecutorial or regulatory
function if there is probable cause to believe a violation has occurred .5

The court's opinion is dispositive of the allocation of the
ultimate burden-the risk of nonpersuasion. But since the intervenors had assumed from the beginning that the burden of going
forward with respect to their contentions was on them, the assignment of the burden of going forward was never decided. In dictum, however, the court concluded that the intervenors did have
to sustain a burden of going forward. Judge, now Chief Justice,
Burger, writing for the majority, analogized to the situation where
a complaining witness must present evidence before a prosecutor
will act. In a footnote to the analogy the court approvingly referred to a memorandum statement prepared by it in denying
intervenors' motion for clarification of the earlier Church of
Christ opinion. 51 In that statement the court impliedly sanctioned
imposition of the burden of going forward on intervenors by making the assumption that the Commission's reference to the burden of proof with respect to issues raised by intervenors was intended to mean "only the burden of going forward with evidence
52
in the first instance."
In short, the Church of Christ court assumed, but did not
decide, that the intervenors had a burden of going forward with
respect to the issues raised by them. The validity of this assumption is questionable. The court regarded the public intervenors as
complaining witnesses. Without a doubt they were; but they were
not complaining of criminal misconduct to a prosecutor as in the
court's analogy; rather they were complaining of a violation of
public trust by the applicant to an agency established to protect
the public interest. In a criminal complaint, where probable
cause is required before action can be taken, a complainant must
certainly come forward with some evidence. Whether a public
interest organization making allegations similar to the ones made
5

ld. at 546.
"Id.at 546 n.6.

121d ,
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by the Church of Christ must initially present evidence should
depend upon the applicable statute, rules of practice, and considerations of policy. ' :'
If the applicant had an affirmative duty under the Communication Act or FCC regulations to demonstrate compliance with
the fairness doctrine and to show nondiscriminatory practices,
then the burden of going forward would properly be upon it irrespective of the intervenors' contentions. On the other hand, in
the absence of an affirmative duty the APA precludes an agency
from presuming that the conduct of any person is unlawful or
improper, and therefore an evidentiary burden of going forward
with some evidence should lie with the intervenors. 4 It is this
rationale which the court misses and which justifies the assumption the court made.
Additional grounds for assigning the burden to the intervenors may have been implicit in the court's assumption. Both the
Commission and the court seem to have been under the impression that the intervenors' knowledge of programming violations
was just as good as the applicant's. In fact, the court noted that
the intervenors had made a monitoring study covering one week's
broadcasts and had several witnesses willing to testify to discriminatory practices. 5 When such evidence is within the grasp of
public intervenors there is little reason why they should not be
expected to sustain an initial burden of going forward.
In addition the allegations of misconduct or other improper
behavior may have evoked a feeling in the court that the intervenor must proceed with evidence so that the applicant can have
reasonable notice as to the charges he is expected to meet. But
the requirement of notice could as easily be met by compelling
the intervenor to make reasonably specific contentions in his
pleadings.
If it is accepted that the court is correct in its judgment that
intervenors bear some burden of going forward there are several
distinctions which may require a different result in the context
of nuclear facility licensing. Contentions raised before Atomic
Safety and Licensing Boards normally relate directly to the ultimate issues before the Board, they are not allegations of miscon'See text accompanying note 21 supra.
"'See text accompanying note 32 supra,
_ 425 F.2d at 547-48.
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duct or unlawful behavior. Atomic Energy Commission regulation requires that contentions be put forward in reasonably specific detail; therefore, there is no notice problem." Finally, in a
field as technical as that of nuclear energy there can be little
question that the applicant is unique in its position of knowledge.
Other administrative cases which have placed a burden upon
opponents or intervenors have done so for a variety of reasons.
In rate proceedings the burden shifts between the regulated
body and the opponent depending on whether the objection is
against a proposed change or against a change that has already
taken place but has yet to receive official sanction. In the proposed rate-change situation there is an applicant who is the proponent of an order and, as such, has the burden of going forward
as well as the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion. Where the change
is in effect and is only questioned if an investigation is conducted
there is theoretically no applicant but only a complainant who,
in the context, is a proponent of an order vacating the change.57
The shift in the burden from the regulated body to the
intervenor-opponent is a result of the presumption of validity
given the increased or changed rate. If it is already in effect and
thus presumed valid, then the regulated body's initial burden is
ipso facto met, and the opponent must then present evidence to
overcome the presumption. Where a rate change is proposed the
regulated body must come forward with evidence in the first instance before the opponent is required to do anything. Aside from
the existence of the presumption, the shift in the burden makes
little sense, since information in the hands of the parties is the
same regardless of the status of the rate. However, from a theoretical standpoint the result is consistent with the APA, which
places the burden upon the proponent of a "rule" or "order.""S
5610 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1972).
"In IML Freight, Inc. v. United States, 30 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 712 (D. Utah 1972) the
motor carrier published rates that greatly exceeded the national classifications. The hearing examiner ruled the intervenor-complainants had the burden of going forward and that
the burden had been met by a presumption of unreasonableness which attached to the
published rates because they so grossly exceeded the recommendations. The court upheld
the procedure as warranted. See also Terminal Charge, at Various Points, on Order Bill
of Lading Shipments, 315 i.C.C. 327 (1962), where the Commission indicated that where
a charge becomes effective prior to the institution of an investigation there is no changed
rate in issue. Accordingly, the proponent of the change does not have the burden of proof
and the complainant does.
75 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
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In two related rate proceedings '" before the Federal Power
Commission, the burden of going forward with evidence as to
excessive contractual rates was placed on the FPC's regulatory
staff. The applicant in both cases, Seaboard Oil Company, had
sought a certificate authorizing it to sell natural gas in interstate
commerce, and the FPC staff had injected the issue of rates into
the proceeding. Although the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion was
on Seaboard, the Commission ruled that imposition of the burden
of going forward to justify the rates would present an impossible
task to any applicant. Since the staff failed to present 'sufficient
evidence to justify a different rate, the applications were
granted."
The rationale underlying the Commission's allocation of the
burden of going forward is far from clear. The Commission believed that the question of reasonable rates was an essential element of the ultimate issue in the application, i.e., whether the
production and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce by
Seaboard would be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.' Since Seaboard had the risk of nonpersuasion with respect to the ultimate issue, logic would suggest that
it should also have had a burden to maintain with respect to the
question of reasonable rates. Undoubtedly rates that are not reasonable cannot be in the public interest.
Conceivably the Commission might have attached a
presumption of reasonableness to the contract rates. If so, any
initial burden of going forward which the applicant had was automatically satisfied and the burden of proof shifted to the staff to
overcome the presumption. Unfortunately, the Commission's
opinion reveals no such presumption. However, an indication
that it might have existed can be inferred from a dissenting opinion which pointed out that there is a distinction between a rate
schedule submitted in evidence to support an application for a
certificate on the one hand, and, on the other, a rate schedule
filed by an already certified natural gas company. 2 A presumption of reasonableness, it would seem, might be appropriate in the
latter case. The dissent further stated that:
'Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416 (1958); Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 20
F.P.C. 264 (1958).
"'Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416, 420 (1958).
"Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, 271 (1958).
"Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416, 435 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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There is no burden of proceeding which shifts to the Commission or
the Staff in a. . . licensing proceeding. Neither the Commission nor
our staff are proponents. Either the standards are met or they are
not."3

An alternative ground for the Commission's assignment of
the burden of going forward may be found in the skepticism of
several Commissioners who questioned the FPC's authority to
alter or set the initial contract rates between producers and purchasers." However, even if the Commission lacked the authority,
such an inadequacy should not be dispositive of the allocation of
the burden of proof. Certainly rates set by contract could be
found unreasonable without the Commission, at the same time,
having to set reasonable rates. A finding by the Commission that
the contract rates were unreasonable would only mean that Seaboard would have to renegotiate the rate and resubmit it to the
Commission with proof of reasonableness. 5 Thus, the question of
the allocation of the burden of going forward as to reasonable
rates is independent of the Commission's authority to fix such
rates. Since the reasonableness of a rate is germane to the inquiry
of public interest, convenience, and necessity the initial burden
of presenting some evidence as to reasonableness should have
been upon the applicant. By assigning the initial burden to the
staff the Commission was in error unless it entertained the pre66
sumption noted above.
There are several instances where a burden of going forward
has been placed upon the intervenor-opponent with apparent jus"Id.

at 429 (dissenting opinion).
"Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, 272 (1958), citing Phillip Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1958) where the court held that under the
Natural Gas Act the rate to be charged for natural gas is initially fixed by contract
between the seller and the purchaser and the Commission had no initial rate making
powers. An initial rate fixed by contract remained in effect unless and until it was changed
in a proceeding under section 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act. But see Atlantic Refinery Co.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), in which the Court decided that the rate
level issue was a factor bearing on the public convenience and necessity. This opinion did
not overrule Seaboardbecause it did not address the respective burdens of proof. However,
it does support the inference that the applicant must come forward with evidence to show
that the contractual rate is in the public interest. Id. at 391-92.
"Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, 290 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
It should not be impossible for the applicant to establish the reasonableness of his contractual rate, and, if found unreasonable, then renegotiate the rate with the producer before
reapplying for certificate.
"Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416, 421-24 (1958). There are also overtones in the
opinion to the effect that consideration of a rate issue, although within the scope of the
ultimate issue, was too burdensome for the agency to undertake.

1974
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tification even though normally the opponent has no such
burden.
In National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB"7 the CAB conducted an
adequacy-of-service investigation and ordered National to institute a Baltimore-Miami flight. As the proponent of a rule or order
the Board theoretically had the ultimate burden of showing that
the additional service was warranted, as well as the burden of
going forward. In spite of this it placed the burden of going forward with evidence as to financial infeasibility upon National
and justified the imposition by saying that the Board was not
asking the airline to come forward with evidence on the entire
subject of economic feasibility, but only with evidence as to facts
particularly within the airline's knowledge.
National objected to the imposition as contrary to the APA
and sought review. The court upheld the agency's assignment of
the burden of going forward because, as the Board had indicated,
the knowledge was peculiar to the airline even though the agency
had access to some of the data. The court considered that
cities petitioning for adequate service and the Board would be unduly hampered by any requirement for overly detailed profit and
loss projections to establish the economic feasibility of adequate
service. This could not only intolerably protract adequacy of service
proceedings, but might create an insuperable barrier to petitioning
civic groups lacking both the relevant operating data and the assistance of experts."

The rationale of the court is equally applicable to the placement of the burden of going forward in a nuclear facility licensing
hearing. Where an applicant utility possesses particular knowledge about the nuclear facility-as it must-imposition of the
burden of going forward upon a public intervenor will certainly
protract the proceedings and create an insuperable barrier to the
citizen organization which lacks the relevant data and the assistance of experts."
In an FPC proceeding,7" the intervenor, American Louisiana
Pipe Line Company, sought to show that the application before
the Commission should be extended to cover Upper Michigan.
-7300 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"Id. at 715.
699WIGMORE § 2486. See also Clarke v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 587, 594 (D.D.C.
1951).
'"American La. Pipe Line Co., 19 F.P.C. 1 (1958).
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The applicant had purposefully excluded the area, intending to
apply for coverage of the area in the future. The intervenor sought
to prove its case solely by cross-examination, but the Commission, in granting the certificate as originally applied for, held that
American Louisiana could not sustain its contention in that manner and should have submitted direct evidence as requested.
The burden of going forward was placed upon American
Louisiana because its contention was outside the scope of whether
the applicant could demonstrate that the public interest, convenience, and necessity required an extension of service into the region it had selected. The intervenor raised an issue which according to the Commission was unrelated to the ultimate issue involved. The peninsula was specifically excluded from the application, and intervenors, by seeking to enlarge the area of service,
.became a proponent of an order with at least a burden of going
forward if not the risk of nonpersuasion. 7 '
In Hall v. FCC72 the applicant for modification of a construction permit relied upon an agency study of reception probabilities
to show that reception would be reduced unless its permit were
modified. The opponent contended that since the study was related to a normal area, and the area in which the applicant operated might be abnormal, the applicant had the burden of proving
the normality of its broadcast area. The court held, however, that
the opponent must prove the area to be abnormal.
Upon first analysis it appears that the burden of going forward with initial evidence in regard to the issue of normality was
placed on the opponent. But this is incorrect. The applicant had
the initial burden of going forward, and the risk of nonpersuasion;
but under the circumstances the court was willing to entertain a
presumption that the region was normal. This presumption was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case and cast the burden of
producing rebuttal evidence on the opponent.7 3
7
See Ashworth Transfer, Inc. v. United States, 27 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 494 (D. Utah 1970),
where the court placed the burden of proof on the intervenors to demonstrate that proposed restrictions on a certificate were in the public interest. The restrictions were outside
the scope of the issues considered in granting certificate of public convenience and
necessity.
126 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
7"9 WIGMORE § 2488(a). This case has implications for issues attacking the interim
criteria for emergency core cooling systems. If a presumption is raised by an applicant's
compliance with the criteria then the burden shifts to the intervenor to come forward with
special circumstances demonstrating why the criteria are inapplicable.
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It is evident, then, that a burden of going forward can be
imposed justifiably upon the intervenor-opponent in some instances, but not without regard to the circumstances and issues involved. When an intervenor becomes a proponent of a rule or
order either by statute or because the issues it raises fall outside
the scope of those which are expected to be or are normally raised
therein, then an initial burden of going forward can be properly
placed upon the intervenor. Likewise when an intervenoropponent has peculiar knowledge, or where the commission or
court is willing to entertain a presumption, the intervenor may
have an initial burden to sustain. The question remains whether
a public interest intervenor raising contentions directly related to
and circumscribed by the ultimate factual issues involved should
have any initial burden except in those instances noted above, or
whether an applicant should have the burden of going forward
with respect to those issues. Judicial and administrative bodies
have seldom, and then only indirectly, placed this burden upon
the applicant.
B.

Burden of Going Forward on Applicant
The issue of whether an intervenor has any burden to sustain
arose obliquely in Deep South Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.74 There
the Commission authorized the applicant to increase its broadcasting power over the objections of the intervenor, Deep South.
The applicant had not been required to show that the increase in
power would have no deleterious impact upon future assignments
to other stations. On appeal the Commission attempted to rationalize the shortcoming by claiming that Deep South could have
done nothing in a hearing, or in meting evidence brought forward by the applicant that would have altered the result reached.
The Commission also claimed that its review board had made an
"independent evaluation" of the impact of the power increase,
and subsequently had indicated its willingness to hear any chatc
lenge to the evaluation's accuracy. Since Deep South had failed
to ask the review board to reopen the hearings at that time, the
Commission argued that the intervenor should not be heard to
complain on appeal.7 5
The court rejected the attempted rationalization stating that
neither the Commission's "independent evaluation" or its will'1347 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
'I1d. at 464.
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ingness to reopen the proceeding had the effect of shifting the
burden of proof on a controlling issue from the applicant to the
intervenor, who theoretically begins with no burden at all.7" The
court explained that the intervenor was not an applicant and
had no burden
or negative. It
could or would
examination or

of proof of any kind on this issue either affirmative
was entitled to see what evidence [the applicant]
bring forward on that issue, and to test it by crossto counter it by evidence of its own."

The court believed that since the question of the impact of
the power increase was directly related to the ultimate issue of
whether the increase would be in the public interest, the applicant should have both the burden of going forward and the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion.
In spite of the unconditional language appearing in the opin-

ion the decision is not dispositive of the allocation of the burden
of going forward with regard to issues raised by an intervenor
because the issue before the court was initially raised by a mem-

ber of the licensing board. Thereafter, the issue was adopted and
pursued by the intervenor, but it is apparent that the court re-

garded the question as one raised by the Commission.7 8
In another rate proceeding,7 " Union Oil Company of Califor7

d. at 464 n.3. The court stated that:
It is said that Deep South should not now be heard to complain because it
did not ask the Board to reopen the hearings at that time. But Deep South
was not an applicant for a licensing privilege, nor was there any burden of
proof on it to establish that WKTG's application should be denied. It was
entitled to lay before the Commission, as it did, alternative contentions that
WKTG had not sustained its burden of proof as to the merits of its application, and that the application should be denied; or that the procedure followed in assembling the quantum of proof on behalf of the application had
been so irregular that, if the Commission was not disposed to deny the
application without more, it should remand the application to a hearing
examiner so that WKTG could seek to sustain its burden of proof on the
record.
Id. at 464.
7
1d. at 465.
7
1The court relied upon section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 which
provided that:
The burden of proceeding with the introduction of evidence and the burden
of proof shall be upon the applicant, except that with respect to any issue
presented in a petition to deny or a petition to enlarge the issues, such
burdens shall be as determined by the Commission.
47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (Supp. 1974). If the court had viewed the issue as raised by the
intervenor then it would have referred to the discretionary authority vested in the Commission by statute to assign the burdens of proof. Instead the court found that the statute
required both burdens be placed upon the applicant.
7In
re Union Oil Co.. 16 F.P.C. 100 (1956).
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nia applied for a rate increase on the sale of natural gas. 0 Following the applicant's presentation intervenors waived crossexamination and moved to dismiss the application because Union
Oil had failed to produce evidence that the increased rates were
no higher than necessary to encourage exploration for and production of known and future gas reserves. The Commission gave
Union Oil further time to adduce evidence and, upon its failure
to do so, held that the applicants had failed to submit evidence
on which it could be determined as a matter of law that the rates
were just and reasonable.8"
The Commission stated that the applicant had the burden
of proving that the proposed rate increase was just and reasonable, and the discharge of that burden must be affirmative, concrete, and persuasive. s2 Further,
[n]o burden of proof rests with intervenors or the staff to present
negative evidence that the increased rate is unreasonable, for until
the applicant has presented a prima facie case opposing parties have
no burden of going forward. 3
In Railway Express Agency, Inc., 4 the Civil Aeronautics

Board instituted an investigation of the tariff schedule by which
REA proposed to increase its charges. The burden of going forward was placed upon REA to show that the proposed rate was
just and reasonable because the proponent had within its possession the major portion of the evidence supporting the charge,
"'The distinction between seeking a rate increase and attacking an existing rate
should be remembered. See text accompanying note 57 supra. In this case Union Oil is
the proponent of an order permitting it to raise its rates on the sale of natural gas.
"16 F.P.C. at 113.
"Id. at 111, citing In re Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 2 F.P.C. 170, aff'd 121 F.2d 159
(8th Cir. 1941).
'1d. See also Colorado-Arizona-California Express, Inc. v. United States, 224 F.
Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1963), where the Interstate Commerce Commission denied a carrier's
application for a certificate because the applicant had failed to establish that present and
future public convenience and necessity required the grant of the application, and had
failed to establish its fitness, willingness, and ability to properly conduct the proposed
operation. In affirming the Commission's action the court held that the applicant had a
burden of proof to show inadequate service, and that burden cannot be met by inferences
drawn from failures of protesting carriers to prosecute their cause. See also Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 8 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 235 (I.C.C. 1958) where the Commission, denying
the merger application because applicant had failed to sustain its burden of proof, stated:
Nor are we relieved of this application by the fact that many of the competing carriers refrained from intervening and introducing evidence . . . . The
burden is upon applicants to submit the necessary evidence . ...
Id. at 237.
118 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 543 (C.A.B. 1958).
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evidence which was not readily available to other parties."5 The
Board concluded that to place such an onus upon an opponent
would create a heavy obstacle in its path by requiring it to make
an initial presentation on the basis of evidence readily available
only to the proponent. Moreover, substantial delay to the administrative process would ensue if the opponent were forced to
gather evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case."8
The ICC easily disposed of intervenors' numerous contentions in Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight Co. v. United
States. 7 There M.R. & R. Trucking Company made application
to extend its motor common carrier service by annexing approximately 150 shipping points, all to be serviced from Atlanta. At
the hearing 10 protesting intervenors contended that the applicant could not and did not show need for improved service with
respect to each and every one of the points involved. The applicant did offer direct testimony relating to 22 of the points, and
this showing convinced the Commission that the proposed service
was required by the present and future public convenience and
necessity.
On judicial review intervenors alleged that the certificate
was granted without being supported by substantial evidence.
The court, however, refused to impose the burden of presenting
direct evidence with respect to all of the points upon the applicant. Instead the evidence which was introduced was sufficient
to support a presumption of need at other points within the area
as to which no specific testimony was offered.8" The inference
shifted the burden to the intervenors who, in order to rebut it,
were required to demonstrate by direct evidence that the public
convenience and necessity did not require the proposed operations of the applicant.
The applicant had the initial burden of going forward in the
face of intervenors' contentions, but because of an interest in
Id. at 545. The attitude of the CAB toward a rate increase is somewhat different than
that of the FPC. In an FPC investigation the increased rate has a presumption of validity
with the consequence that the opponent has the burden of proof. The CAB views its
investigation as an application for a rate increase with no presumption attached.
"The dissenting Board members argued that the CAB, as a proponent of an order
rescinding the charges, should have the burden of establishing a prima facie case before
shifting the burden to REA.
"7197 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
"Id. at 369.

PUBLIC INTER VENTION

administrative efficiency, its burden was deemed satisfied by a
rebuttable presumption.":
None of the foregoing decisions placing a burden of going
forward upon an applicant squarely faced the question of the
apportionment of this burden in instances where an intervenor
raised contentions. In Deep South the language strongly suggests
that there would be no burden whatsoever upon the intervenor,
but the court's decision related solely to an issue raised initially
by the licensing board and considered important by it. In the
remainder of the cases in which the applicant was found to have
a burden of initially presenting evidence, the court or administrative body, in effect, merely held that the applicant had the burden of going forward on issues normally involved in a licensing
hearing even without the presence of intervenors."' Logically the
language and rationale of these cases would support the conclusion that if an intervenor raises a contention, which contention
is or would be considered by the board to be part of the applicant's case even without intervention, then the applicant should
have the initial burden of going forward with evidence. But this
conclusion is not the one best suited to the efficient conduct of
administrative proceedings, nor is it generally applicable to all
contentions raised by an intervenor or all circumstances in which
administrative agencies function.
Certain rate cases illustrate the third approach which administrative agencies have adopted toward the apportionment of the
burden of going forward.
C.

Burden of Going Forward Immaterial
Terminal Charge, at Various Points, on OrderBills of Lading
Shipments"' involved an investigation of existing motor carrier
"Id. A petition for leave to intervene in proceedings before the Interstate Commerce
Commission must set forth "the grounds of the proposed intervention, the position and
interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and whether petitioner's position is in support
of or in opposition to the relief sought." 49 C.F.R. § 1100.72 (1974). Under the regulation,
although the opinion of the court does not mention it, intervenors must have raised
contentions with regard to each one of the points in question.
"'"In In re Union Oil Co., 16 F.P.C. 100 (1956) the applicant had the burden of going
forward on the issue of just and reasonable rates irrespective of the intervenor's presence.
Similarly, Colorado-Arizona-California Express, Inc. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 894
(D. Colo. 1963), Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 8 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 235 (I.C.C. 1958),
and Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight, 197 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1961), were all cases
involving issues normal to the administrative inquiry and not regarded as contentions
placed in issue by intervenors.
"315 I.C.C. 327 (1962).
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charges by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Because there
was no changed rate in issue, the proponents of the existing rate
did not have the burden of proof; instead the protesting intervenors as proponents of an order changing the rate had the burden.
The Commission, considering the case important because of
the burden of proof issue, cautioned that the allocation of the
burden of proof was primarily a rule of evidence designed to insure orderly procedure; but if viewed solely in quantitative terms,
it soon would become master of the administrative process rather
than the servant.
The Commission found that the intervenors had failed to
establish that the charges were unlawful even though they had
submitted as much evidence as could reasonably be expected in
light of information available to them. Nevertheless, the Commission held that the existing charge was unreasonable because
the carriers had failed to produce evidence justifying the charges
on the basis of facts peculiarly within their knowledge. This seemingly injudicious regard for the consequences of bearing the burden of proof was brought about because the Commission was
confronted with a situation where identical rates in other proceedings had been found unreasonable. If the rates in Terminal
Charge had been permitted to stand simply because the intervenor had failed to meet its burden of proof there would be an
irrational and unacceptable inconsistency. Thus the Commission
explained that even if the intervenor had offered no evidence at
all, the Commission as protector of the public interest would have
been obliged to supplement the record to determine if the rates
were reasonable.
Although the ICC in Terminal Charge did not explicitly so
indicate, it seemed to regard the administrative hearing as fundamentally different from the ordinary civil litigation between two
private parties. According to the Commission the agency's determination could not be based upon who proved what by a preponderance of the evidence, or by which party came forward with
evidence to establish a prima facie case. Rather, as the protector
of the public interest, it had the affirmative duty to search out
all the evidence as well as draw upon its own technical expertise
before rendering a decision. In essence, if the Commission's judgment is correct, the question of who has the burden of going
forward may be irrelevant in the administrative process except in
terms of orderly procedure and the public interest. If an agency
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believes that imposition of the burden upon an intervenor would
best assist the Commission in protecting the public interest, then
according to the reasoning in Terminal Charge it may do so. 2
The FPC adopted a similar approach towards the burden of
going forward in Area Rate Proceeding" when it ordered simultaneous written presentation of direct cases by all parties including
intervenors, followed by simultaneous presentation of rebuttal
evidence. After considering intervenors' motion to revise the
schedule to permit them to present their direct cases after the
staff and respondent had presented theirs, the Commission
remarked that
[it] unquestionably [had] the authority in discharging its duties
to establish an appropriate hearing procedure. It has done so in this
proceeding. Whether or not the staff or any of the parties has the
burden of proof or the burden of going forward in no wise calls for
any change in the requirement that simultaneous direct presentations be made."

The intervenors contended that fair procedure dictated that they
be allowed to see the respondent's direct case before presenting
their own because they needed more time. They also argued that
simultaneous submission of direct evidence would be inefficient
as there was bound to be much duplication by staff and intervenors or staff and applicant. Rejecting these contentions, the Commission found the approach to be the fairest and most expeditious
5
means of conducting the proceeding.
11Id. See also Great Northern Ry. Discontinuance of Service, 307 I.C.C. 59 (1y59),
where the hearing examiner, after considering carrier's request that the burden of proof
should be upon the parties complaining that public convenience and necessity required
continuation of service, ruled that the carrier seeking to abandon passenger s~vice must
proceed with the presentation of evidence. Noting that the carrier had not been prejudiced
by the procedure, the Commission declined to decide who had the burden of proof in
investigation proceedings and stated:
In any event, the question is of more theoretical than practical importance
...
. Regardless of where the burden of proof lies, a carrier subject to our
regulation is expected to aid in the disposition of proceedings to which it is
a party by making available all pertinent facts within its knowledge.
Id. at 61.
930 F.P.C. 512 (1963).
"Id. at 512.
"'See also Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 29 F.P.C. 723 (1963), where the intervenor in a rate proceeding requested that the presiding examiner follow a procedure
whereby the cases in chief of the proponents would be served upon all parties prior to the
cases in chief of any intervenors. The presiding officer declined, adopting a plan requiring
intervenors to proceed first. On review the Commission upheld the examiner's procedure
stating that
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Thus far the decisions analyzed have disclosed three alternative approaches toward the apportionment of the burden of proof.
In general there seems to be no consistent formula applied by
either administrative or judicial bodies. As an outsider to the
numerous varieties of agency adjudicatory hearings, one should
hesitate to conclude that the agencies and courts approach the
apportionment of the burden on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps no
comprehensive scheme can or should be developed. Arguably the
kinds of privileges applied for, whether they be a motor carrier's
certificate, a rate increase, renewal of a broadcast license, or construction permit, are dissimilar enough to justify a different approach by each agency.
If the analysis of the three alternatives has not provided a
consistent approach, it has at least imparted a sense that administrative hearings are not procedurally similar to two-party civil
litigation. The ultimate issue before a licensing board is not who
wins or loses, but, more importantly, whether grant of the privilege will best serve the public interest. And thus the agency's
apportionment of the burdens of proof becomes less a substantive
rule with legal significance in terms of dismissal or directing a
verdict and more a procedural rule serving the interests of the
administrative body and the public.
In the abstract the question of who has the burden of going
forward, or even the risk of nonpersuasion with regard to issues
raised by an intervenor, might and probably should be immaterial, as suggested by the third alternative. And if the allocation is
in the first instance a neutral proposition, then perhaps the
agency should have the discretion to assign the burdens in such
a way as to facilitate its statutory duty. In fact, there is one
federal agency with statutory authority to adopt a discretionary
approach. Section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 provides:
Any hearing subsequently held upon such application shall be a full
hearing in which the applicant and all other parties in interest shall
be permitted to participate. The burden of proceeding with the introduction of evidence and the burden of proof shall be upon the
considerations of who may ultimately bear the burden of proof in these
proceedings have little bearing on the real problem confronting the Examiner, i.e., establishing a schedule which most nearly balances the needs and
conveniences of the parties against the interests of expedition.
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applicant, except that with respect to any issue presented by a petition to deny or a petition to enlarge the issues, such burdens shall
be as determined by the Commission."

The legislative decision to give the Federal Communications
Commission this discretion was not without reference to practical
experience. Predecessor sections of section 309(e) had categorically stated that with respect to issues set forth in protest and not
adopted or specified by the Commission, both the burden of going
forward and the ultimate burden of proof would be on the protestant. 7 Although the legislative history is unclear, the categorical
approach seems to have been abandoned because of a legislative
feeling that it was sometimes difficult for a legitimate opponent
to sustain the burdens and that the Commission required the
flexibility to effectively ascertain the public interest."
Now that courts have begun to recognize that administrative
agencies can no longer rely solely upon the evidence presented by
the parties, but instead must affirmatively search out all aspects
relevant to the public interest," the flexibility authorized by section 309(e) and assumed by other agencies is essential. It is also
essential, when the public interest is at stake, to impose upon all
parties participating in the administrative proceeding a duty to
make available all pertinent facts within their knowledge irrespective of any burden of proof.""
Determination of the order in which disclosure of the pertinent facts is made should rest with the agency, but its discretion
should not be exercised arbitrarily, frivolously, or with malice
toward any party. Since by statute all parties participate with
equal right, the allocation should be made, as Wigmore sug"47
U.S.C. § 309(e) (Supp. 1974).
7

1 Id. § 309(c) (1956).
See Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir.
1958), where a competitor of an applicant for a broadcasting license alleged that the grant
of a license would be adverse to the public interest because it would impair his (the
competitor's) economic position. Although the burden of proof issue was not squarely
presented, the court found that the intervenor had the burden of showing potential economic injury and that it was "certainly a heavy burden." Id. at 444. At the time section
309(d) of the Communications Act placed both burdens of proof upon the protestant.
However, the result is also justified because the facts relevant to a competitor's economic
vulnerability are peculiarly within the control of the competitor.
'S. REP. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (1959). Ironically Clay T. Whitehead,
director of the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, recently proposed legislation which seeks to reinstate the burden of proof upon the challenger in a license renewal
hearing, as reported in the Chicago Tribune, March 14, 1972.
"See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965).
'See cases cited note 92 supra.
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gested, on the basis of broad considerations of policy.'"'
An agency should consider numerous facts when making its
determination, not the least important of which is that the applicant is asking the public to grant it a privilege. Important also is
the nature of the party and of the regulated subject matter. Additional consideration should focus upon the particular party's access to relevant information, and his ability to process facts and
hire competent expert witnesses. Administrative efficiency, while
not paramount, should also receive attention.
Thus in proceedings before the Atomic Energy Commission,
the hearing examiner should be vested with the discretion to
assign the burdens of proof as considerations of policy dictate.
V.

AEC PROCEEDINGS
Before analyzing the considerations relevant to the question
of whether a public interest intervenor should have a burden of
going forward or even the ultimate burden of persuasion, it is best
to understand the procedure that the Commission has provided
for intervention. Under the applicable rules of practice intervention is only permitted when the prospective intervenor is able to
set forth with particularity both the facts pertaining to his interest and the basis for his contentions with regard to each aspect
on which he desires to intervene.'"2
Once intervention is permitted, an intervenor is entitled to
utilize the discovery devices available to gather facts relevant to
the contentions raised. 03 Upon the discovery of new information
which was not previously available to the intervenor, it has been
the Commission's policy to permit amendments to the
contentions.
Historically, public interest intervenors in each AEC licensing proceeding have presented to the licensing board an average
of 150 contentions. In the course of discovery a substantial number of these are normally explained to the intervenor's satisfacALLOCATION OF THE BURDENS OF PROOF IN

'9
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.1210C.F.R.

§ 2488(a).

§ 2.714 (1973). The new regulations require that the petition to intervene
shall set forth the interests of the petitioner in the proceeding, how that interest may be
affected by Commission's action, and other contentions including the facts and reasons
why he should be permitted to intervene. The petition must be accompanied by supporting affidavits setting forth with particularity both the facts pertaining to his interest and
the basis for his contentions with regard to each aspect on which he desires to intervene.
""The anomaly has been pointed out previously that the contentions have to be
supported initially, otherwise intervention is denied. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1973).
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tion. The remaining contentions are again given to the licensing
board for a determination of relevancy and merit. After hearing
argument from each of the parties, the board decides whether the
contentions will become issues in the licensing hearing. The number of contentions surviving this prehearing process is usually no
more than 20.
Almost invariably the issues raised by the intervenor relate
directly to the ultimate findings of fact that the board must make
before granting or denying a license. For example, an intervenor's
contention might postulate a steam line rupture leading eventually to a serious accident. There can be no question that the
steam line is adequately constructed and is within the sphere of
the required finding of safety. In most instances intervenors simply deny that the applicant has complied with an explicit AEC
standard which must be met before a license can be issued. This,
then, is the context in which the various policy considerations
must be analyzed and balanced.
Applicants eager to begin constructing or operating a nuclear
facility vigorously argue that fairness and administrative efficiency require that some burden of going forward be placed upon
intervenors. They contend that without imposing some evidentiary burden there is no way to protect the administrative process
or the applicant from frivolous contentions contrived to delay the
licensing of a multimillion dollar facility. The floodgate argument, used to bar public intervenors so many times in the past,
is here resurrected once again.104
Viscerally, one might be inclined to sympathize with the
applicant. Perhaps a modest burden should be imposed upon a
public intervenor to show that his claims have merit. Otherwise,
if they are frivolous, the applicant and the agency will suffer
needless delay and expense.""5 There are, however, countervailing
considerations.
In order to obtain permission to utilize special nuclear material, with all of its inherent hazards, an applicant must demon'"'In Church of Christ, Judge Burger gave short shrift to the floodgate argument raised
against allowing intervention. He noted that the prohibitive cost of participating in litigation would serve to discourage the bringing of frivolous claims.
'"Giving the intervenor the benefit of the doubt for the moment, its original petition
to intervene is prepared without the benefit of discovery. Consequently some of the contentions will be well founded while others may be based upon a misunderstanding. However, once intervention is granted and discovery proceeds, the responsible intervenor will
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strate to the satisfaction of the Commission that the proposed
facility meets all of the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act
as well as the Commission's regulations. These requirements include the ultimate findings that must be made, as well as detailed
design and operational criteria.106 The applicant, as the proponent of an order granting the license, must bear the risk of nonpersuasion on these issues and the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case. Presumably, absent intervention or a contested proceeding, the applicant could sustain
this burden solely with the introduction of documentary evidence
addressing the applicable standards and criteria.""
After viewing the applicant's evidence, the board then makes
findings on the ultimate issues, e.g., the plant has been designed
and constructed in accordance with the Commission's rules and
regulations; the applicant is technically and financially qualified;
and there is reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.
As noted earlier, an intervenor's contentions will frequently
deny an applicant's compliance with certain specific criteria, criteria on which the applicant must make a prima facie showing
irrespective of the intervenor's presence. In such a case the intervenor has done nothing more than place the parties and the board
on notice that it intends to challenge the applicant's evidence and
rebut it if his fears are not assuaged or if he considers it necessary.
To impose any initial burden upon an intervenor when the Commission's own criteria are in question makes little sense and can
result only in delay and inefficiency.
Those contentions which do not call into question the applinarrow its contentions, making them more accurate and more specific. If discovery works
properly, i.e., if there is a free interchange of information between all parties, then those
contentions based upon a misunderstanding will be satisfied and laid aside. A serious
intervenor should not wish to jeopardize his valid claims by alienating the board with
frivolous ones.
:"610 C.F.R. §§ 50.55-.55(a), .57 (1973).
"' 7Commission regulation requires an applicant to prepare a multivolume Final Safety
Analysis Report (F.S.A.R., Preliminary Safety Report for a construction license) and draft
a Detailed Environmental Statement covering all aspects of the facility's compliance with
design and construction standards and all deleterious effects upon the environment. These
documents form the basis of the applicant's evidence and if unchallenged might be sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.743(g), 60.34(a), (b) (1973). Section
2239 seems to contemplate just such a result where the Commission can make the requisite
findings upon an operational license application without a hearing absent a protest by any
person whose interest may be affected. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970).
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cant's compliance with existing specific criteria but are nevertheless directly related to an ultimate finding do nothing more than
focus upon deficiencies in the applicant's case. If, for example,
the applicant must prove that his plant is safe, then he must
convince the board by direct evidence, by inference, or whatever,
that every aspect of the facility is safe. It is of course beyond the
mortal competence of the applicant to show that his plant is
universally safe; however, when licensing the use of such inherently hazardous material, the board should not compromise the
goal or the public interest. It should not permit the applicant to
escape his duty when deficiencies in his case are revealed."" If the
intervenor's issue relates to safety, or any other required finding,
then as part of the whole it is legitimately a component of the
applicant's case. As such, the applicant must meet the specific
issue in order to establish its prima facie case or suffer an unfavorable finding on the ultimate or general issue. Administrative
economy would dictate that the issue should be met by the applicant at the same time it comes forward with evidence with respect
to other specific issues in the proceeding.
Ideally, the question of who should come forward with evidence in an administrative hearing should have no quantitative
legal significance for any of the parties. Once all the evidence is
before the board it is sufficient that a determination whether the
grant of a license would be in the public interest can be made. If
an intervenor is to have any initial burden with regard to issues
related to the ultimate findings, neither the applicant nor the
Commission should be free to ignore such issues simply because
the intervenor fails to establish a prima facie case.'10 Nuclear
energy is so hazardous that no question about safety ought to
remain unresolved. The applicant and the Commission have a
duty to the public to explore every conceivable hazard, every
perceived problem, without imposing legal standards that operate to foreclose inquiry.
The risk of litigating frivolous issues is considerably lessened
by the Commission's prehearing procedure. It is arguable that,
because the board makes a judgment as to the merit of an issue
before permitting it to be litigated, it has, in effect, adopted the
issue, and the intervenor need not establish a prima facie case at
all.
"See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
'See text accompanying note 92 supra.
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The danger posed by procedural traps inherent in requiring
an intervenor to come forward and establish a prima facie case is
greatly enhanced in a field as technical as nuclear engineering. A
facility is designed and built by an applicant with all of its multifarious experts. The Commission with its expert regulatory staff
reviews the design and monitors the construction. But a public
intervenor with limited resources and limited expertise is severely
handicapped in the gathering and processing of information.
The information relevant to the intervenor's contentions is
peculiarly in the hands of an applicant. With its vast resources
and abundance of experts, the imposition of the burden of going
forward upon an electrical utility will create slight inconvenience.
Any hardship would be miniscule when compared with the risk
which would be created by placing an evidentiary burden upon
an intervenor.
Availability of information has frequently been used to determine the placement of the burden of going forward. When a party
is specially or peculiarly in possession of information relevant to
the proceeding, then it has, and rightfully should bear, the burden of initially coming forward with evidence on the issue."
When it is recognized that a party lacks the expertise and the
resources to effectively establish a prima facie case, then no initial burden should be placed upon it."'
Congress provided for public participation in nuclear facility
licensing proceedings primarily because it wanted local citizens
to be informed about the awesome and hazardous force placed in
the midst of their community. Secondly, legislators wished to
insure that the agency would be accountable to the public for its
actions. Both of these reasons argue in favor of full discussion of
all the issues raised irrespective of any burden of going forward.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the placement of the burden of going forward
in administrative proceedings is initially a neutral factor whose
eventual assignment depends ultimately upon considerations of
policy. A public interest intervenor participating in atomic energy litigation is under a duty to present all of the information
within its possession to the licensing board. But because of its role
§ 2486.
'"National Airlines, Inc. v.CAB, 300 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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in the proceedings and because of its relative lack of information
and expertise, the attention given the intervenor's issues should
not depend upon whether he is able to establish a prima facie
case. All of the issues raised should be fully explored and resolved
to the satisfaction of all the parties. On balance, it would seem
that the most efficient approach would be to have the applicant
proceed first with regard to all the issues raised in the proceeding,
with the intervenor following.

EMPLOYMENT OF NONTENURED FACULTY: SOME
IMPLICATIONS OF
By

Roth

AND

Sindermann

CAROL HERRNSTADT SHULMAN*
INTRODUCTION

In concurrent 1972 decisions authored by Justice Potter
Stewart, the Supreme Court examined the right of nontenured
teachers' in public institutions to a statement of reasons and
collegiate due process hearings prior to nonrenewal of their contracts. These cases, Board of Regents v. Roth2 and Perry v.
Sindermann,:' came before the Court at a time when there was

considerable conflict among the various circuits concerning the
rights to be accorded to such teachers.4 They raised two major
issues: whether the fourteenth amendment entitled teachers to
institutional due process hearings prior to contract nonrenewal,
and whether nonrenewal might be an infringement of free speech
interests protected by the first amendment.
The Court held in Roth and Sindermann that nontenured
teachers are entitled to due process protection5 only under limited
conditions: (1) when a teacher has been deprived of proven interests in "property" or "liberty" as these concepts have been interpreted under the fourteenth amendment; or (2) when an institu*Research Associate, ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education; B.A., 1966, City
College of New York; M.A., 1967, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
'A tenure system provides that:
After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers, or investigators
should have permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be
terminated only for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age,
or under extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies.
AMERICAN

ASS'N OF

UNIV.

PROFESSORS, Academic Freedom and Tenure, 1940 Statement of

Principles and 1970 Interpretive Comments, in A.A.U.P. Poiicy DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS
2 (197:3).
'2408 U.S. 564 (1972).
:1408 U.S. 593 (1972).
'See, e.g., Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970); Jones v.
Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); Freeman v.
Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
"'Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those
personal immunities which . . . are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952),
citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). The central meaning of procedural due process is that "parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order that they enjoy that right they must first be notified." Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972), citing Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1864).
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tion has directly violated a teacher's first amendment free speech
interests.
This article will analyze the decisions in Roth and
Sindermann, consider their impact on first and fourteenth
amendment rights of nontenured teachers, and explore some of
the policy implications raised by the decisions.
I.

ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS IN

Roth

AND

Sindermann

A.

Board of Regents v. Roth
David Roth was employed under a 1-year contract for the
1968-69 academic year as an assistant professor at Wisconsin
State University-Oshkosh. He did not have tenure, which is
granted under Wisconsin statutes only after 4 years of continuous
service.' Without a statement of reasons, Roth was notified in
January 1969, that his contract would not be renewed for the next
academic year. This notification followed a period of conflict on
campus during which Roth had openly criticized the university
administration. His suit in federal district court 7 claimed that his
free speech and due process rights under the fourteenth amendment had been violated because his publicly expressed views were
the reasons his contract was not renewed, and, in any case, he was
entitled to an institutional hearing before a final decision on his
contract could be made.' The district court agreed with the latter
contention' and granted summary judgment ordering the university to provide Roth with a statement of reasons and to set a
mutually agreeable date for a hearing.' The court of appeals
affirmed." In its review of Roth, the Supreme Court addressed
itself only to Roth's due process rights under the fourteenth
amendment and did not consider the free speech aspects of the
case, which had caused the district court to deem summary judgment 2 inappropriate, since the facts surrounding the alleged interference with Roth's freedom of speech would have to be developed at trial.
The Supreme Court approached the case differently than did
§ 37.31 (1966).
7Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D.Wis. 1970).
lid. at 974.
9
1d. at 983.
"'Id.at 984.
"Roth v.Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1970).
'2Summary judgment is granted where there are no material facts in the controversy
that need to be litigated and where the party asking for summary judgment is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
'WIs.STAT.

1974
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the district court and the court of appeals. The lower courts had
been concerned with weighing the plaintiffs interest in securing
his job against the institution's need for unfettered discretion in
its employment practices. The Court asserted that this weighing
process must come only after a determination that there is either
a "liberty" or "property" interest under the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, the Court examined the circumstances surrounding Roth's initial employment and his contract nonrenewal
for the existence of such interests.
On the question of liberty, the Court recognized that term as
meaning "generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized...
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."' 3
The Court held that if a teacher's liberty under this interpretation were impaired, he would be entitled to a due process hearing.
Examples given by the Supreme Court of circumstances that
would impair a teacher's liberty when his contract is not renewed
are an accusation that "might seriously damage his standing and
associations in his community,"'" or a nonrenewal that
"impose[s] on [the teacher] a stigma or other disability that
foreclose[s] his freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities.' 5 The Court noted that while the district court
and the court of appeals deemed nonretention itself to have a
"substantial adverse effect" on a teacher, it found nothing in the
record to support this belief. Therefore, the Court held that there
was nothing in Roth's case to show that his liberty had been
impaired."
After reviewing decisions on property interests, the Court
announced a standard to be used in determining the existence of
such an interest:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.'1

The Court found that such a claim emerges from the "rules
or understandings" issued by an independent source, such as a
state government."' In Roth's case, a property interest would have
'408 U.S. at 572, quoting from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
"408 U.S. at 573.
'Id.
'Id. at 574 & n.13.
'1d. at 577.
lid.
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to have been shown from the terms of his employment or the state
statutes relating to granting tenure at public institutions. Roth's
appointment, however, did not provide for employment beyond
June 30, 1969, nor was there any renewal provision in his teaching
contract. Despite Roth's observation that Wisconsin State
University-Oshkosh generally rehires teachers who have 1-year
contracts, the Court noted that the district court had found no
"common law" of reemployment."' Therefore, the University's
practices did not create the sort of expectation of renewal that
would require a statement of reasons and a hearing on nonrenewal. State statutes also did not establish any right to reemployment for Roth. Given these considerations, the Court found that
Roth did not have a "sufficient" property interest to entitle him
to a statement of reasons and a hearing.2" Accordingly, the Court
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision.
In its conclusion, the Court made clear that its
analysis of the respondent's constitutional rights in this case in no
way indicates a view that an opportunity for a hearing or a statement of reasons for nonretention would, or would not, be appropriate
or wise in public colleges and universities.2'

Perry v. Sindermann
Sindermann presented the Court with a claim of free speech
violations under the first and fourteenth amendments, as well as
a charge that he was entitled to fourteenth amendment procedural due process. Because it dealt with different issues and with
a substantially different set of circumstances in Sindermann, the
Court's judgment was more favorable to the teacher than in Roth.
Robert Sindermann had been employed at Odessa Junior
College in Odessa, Texas from 1965 through 1969 under a series
of 1-year contracts. Odessa had no tenure system at that time."
He had previously worked for 6 years in the Texas state college
system. During the 1968-69 academic year Sindermann testified
before committees of the Texas legislature in his capacity as president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association. He favored changing Odessa to a 1-year institution, a position opposed
by the college's Board of Regents. In May 1969, Sindermann was
B.

"Id. at 578 n.16.
1"Id. at 578.
"Id. at 578-79.
"'This situation has been changed. See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
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notified that his contract would not be renewed, and the Board
of Regents issued a press release setting forth allegations of insubordination by Sindermann. Despite its public stance, the board
refused to provide Sindermann with an official statement of the
reasons for nonrenewal of his contract or with an opportunity for
a hearing.
In federal district court, Sindermann claimed that his nonrenewal was based on his public criticism of the Board of Regents
and it therefore infringed upon his right of free speech. He also
asserted that his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due
process was violated by the college administration's refusal to
provide a hearing. The district court's summary judgment for the
college 2:' was reversed because the court of appeals felt that a full
hearing on the contested facts was necessary.2 4 It further held that
despite Sindermann's nontenured status, his contract nonrenewal would be impermissible if it violated his constitutionally protected free speech rights.
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the
district court had to investigate the facts of Sindermann's claim
that his free speech rights had been violated. The Court declared
it to be a well-established principle of constitutional law that a
government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his
'11
interest in freedom of speech. 2
On the issue of Sindermann's right to a due process hearing,
the Court held that he should have been given the opportunity
to demonstrate that he had a property interest in continued employment, despite the absence of a formal tenure policy at
Odessa. The Court defined such a property interest as follows:
A person's interest in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that
2
he may invoke at a hearing. 1

It found that Sindermann's allegations based on factors such as
his years of service in the Texas state college system and the
policies and practices of Odessa Junior College might be suffi1:Sindermann v. Perry, Civil No. MO-69-CA34 (W.D. Tex., Aug. 4, 1969).
"Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970).
"Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).

2Id. at 601.
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cient for him to prove a property interest.2 7 In this regard, Sindermann had claimed that he had a form of job tenure because the
guidelines of the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and
University System provided for tenure after 7 years of service in
institutions of higher education. (Sindermann had 10 years of
service.) Odessa's faculty handbook declared:
Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the
College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent
tenure . . . as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his
co-workers and his supervisors, and as long as he is happy in his
work."
The Court therefore found that Sindermann had raised tenable
claims to a property interest in continued employment.
The Court concluded that "[Sindermann] must be given an
opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his claim of [property]
entitlement in light of 'the policies and practices of the institution.' "2 Such proof would require the college to grant him a
hearing at which he would be given the reasons for his nonretention and would be able to "challenge their sufficiency. ' ""

II.
A.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS OF LIBERTY
AND PROPERTY

Liberty

As noted earlier, Roth held that for the nonrenewal of a
teacher's contract to violate his liberty as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, it must cause serious damage to his reputation in the community or so stigmatize him as to impair his
ability to obtain other employment.' Precisely what constitutes
a stigma severe enough to be considered deprivation of liberty is
not yet clear.
Both the district court32 and the court of appeals 3 in Roth
viewed nonretention as a serious impediment to a college
teacher's career, but the Supreme Court stated:
[O]n the record before us, all that clearly appears is that the respondent was not rehired for one year at one university. It stretches
"Id. at 599-601.
"Id. at 600.
"Id. at 603.
:"Id.
"'See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
:1"310 F. Supp. at 970.
:1:446 F.2d at 809.
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the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of "liberty"
when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before
to seek another.:"

Disagreeing with the majority opinion, Justice Douglas
argued in his Roth dissent:
Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is tantamount in effect to a
dismissal and the consequences may be enormous. Nonrenewal can
be a blemish that turns into a permanent scar and effectively limits
any chance the teacher has of being rehired as a teacher, at least in
his State.'

Others have also recognized the obstacles to future employment which may result from nonrenewal of a teacher's contract?"
For example, Professor William Van Alstyne of Duke University
Law School, :7 a distinguished commentator on matters relating to
higher education, observed that the majority opinion in Roth fails
to recognize the stigma of nonrenewal by treating Roth as if he
had only a special, 1-year, limited appointment:
By placing Professor Roth in this different frame, as though he were
not a regular appointee and as though there were no significant
distinction between his situation and that of a special one-year terminal appointment, the majority of the Supreme Court reduced his
constitutionally cognizable substantive interests in reappointment
to zero. :"

Laurence H. Kallen notes the Court's statement:
Mere proof, for example, that his [Roth's] record of nonretention
in one job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive
to some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of liberty. 9

and asks: "[Wihat does this say about the teacher who is given
notice of nonrenewal in January and by May has one hundred
rejections to applications for employment?" 4 "
"408 U.S. at 575.
I'Id.
at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
:"See. e.g.,
Kallen, The Roth Decision: Does the Non1 nured Teacher Have a Constitutional Right to a Hearing Before Nonrenewal?, 61 ILL. B.J. 464 (1973); Levinson, The
Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Fairness, the Probationary Instructor, and the
University of California - An Incompatible Foursome?, 5 DAvis L. REv. 608 (1972); Van
Alstyne, The Supreme Court Speaks to the Untenured: A Comment on Board of Regents
v. Roth and Perr' v. Sindermann, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 268 (1972); Comment, Constitutional
Law - The Rights of the Untenured Teacher to ProceduralDue Process Priorto Dismissal
- Roth v. Board of Regents, 7 RICHMOND L. REV. 357 (1972).
:"Professor Van Alstyne was formerly Chairman of the American Association of University Professor's Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure.
:'Van Alstyne, supra note 36, at 268.
"Kallen, supra note 36, at 467.
11d.
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That the stigma caused by nonrenewal of a teacher's contract
can indeed create difficulties in securing other employment is
illustrated by the two case histories which follow.
In Orr v. Trinter" a Columbus, Ohio high school teacher
whose contract was not renewed and who was not given a statement of reasons was unable to find a teaching position for the
following year. He claimed that he
will continue throughout the remainder of his professional career to
suffer the [stigma] of having his professional qualifications
limpugnedl by the present action of the [school board] in refusing
to renew his contract for unknown reasons, and will have his prospects of acquiring future teaching positions at other schools substantially impaired by the aforementioned actions .... 11

The district court agreed and held that Orr was entitled to a
statement of reasons and to a hearing,' but the court of appeals
reversed," holding that the school board's interest in freedom to
hire was not outweighed by the teacher's interest in learning the
reasons for nonrenewal.45
Mrs. Susan Russo, a high school art teacher in Henrietta,
New York, also found that she was not able to find employment
in her profession after her contract was not renewed. The reason
given for nonrenewal was "insubordination." However, the court
of appeals found that this reason was invalid because "Mrs.
Russo's dismissal resulted directly from her refusal to engage in
the school's daily flag ceremonies." 4 The court of appeals therefore reversed the lower court and remanded the case for proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.17 Despite this judicial finding, a highly satisfactory teacher observation report during her
probationary year, and further scholastic achievement, Mrs.
'318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970), rev'd, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 943, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).

Two petitions for certiorari were filed. The first petition, submitted before the Roth
and Sindermann decisions were handed down, raised the issue of whether Orr was entitled
to a statement of reasons and procedural due process before nonrenewal. The second
petition, submitted after the Court's decisions in Roth and Sindermann and after Orr's
first petition was denied, raised the issue of first amendment violations, which was present
in the original complaints but not examined by the district court.
"Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Orr v. Trinter, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
"318 F. Supp. at 1046-47.
"444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971).

'Id. at 135.
'"Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 630 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S.
932 (1973).
7
' Id. at 634.
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Russo has been unable to find work as an art teacher in and
around Henrietta. She believes that work is available, but she has
found that the controversy surrounding her nonrenewal has
proved an insurmountable obstacle to employment as an art
teacher. She has been told as much in job interviews."
Although it is clear that nonrenewal can be a professional
detriment, cases decided since Roth have not clearly settled the
extent to which difficulty in reemployment-and, hence, how
great the stigma of nonrenewal-constitutes deprivation of
liberty."'
For example, in Lipp v. Board of Education" the Seventh
Circuit held that an elementary school substitute teacher was not
deprived of liberty when he was characterized as "antiestablishment" in a generally satisfactory efficiency rating, since
the court did not consider the comment sufficient to damage his
reputation so as to constitute a deprivation of liberty. Further,
the court of appeals found that the comment did not prevent him
from obtaining other employment in the school system.' Moreover, the court of appeals noted, "not every negative effect upon
one's attractiveness to future employers violates due process if it
results without a hearing." ' '
But in another 1972 decision, Wilderman v. Nelson, 5': the
Eighth Circuit reviewed a case in which it found evidence "tending to show state action imposing a stigma upon Wilderman
which may affect his future employment opportunities." 5' Wilderman, a welfare worker, was discharged, and his letter of dismissal, which cited his unfavorable attitude, was filed in several
state offices. Also, a reference letter to a prospective employer
"commented adversely upon [his] ability willingly to carry out
his employer's policies. 5' The court held that the district court
'THE NEW YORKER, July 30, 1973, at 35.

",See. e.g.. Lipp v. Board of Educ.. 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Fraley,
470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972); Wilderman v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1972);
McDowell v. Texas, 465 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1971); Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior

College Bd., No. 4-71 Civil 555 (D. Minn., Dec. 18, 1972); Franz v. Board of Educ., No.
772 Civil 151 (N.D. Ill.,
Aug. 10, 1972); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist., 337 F.
Supp. 977 (N.D. III. 1972).
'1470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
'Id. at 805.
-'!Id.
-"467 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1972).
"id.at 1176.
'Id.
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"was not justified in summarily dismissing Wilderman's complaint insofar as it alleged a right to a pretermination hearing."'"6
An examination of Roth, Sindermann, and the other cases
discussed in this section suggests that college administrations
and school boards can minimize legal entanglements if they avoid
impairing a teacher's reputation in his community or attaching
such discredit to his nonrenewal that other job opportunities are
foreclosed. Thus, college administrators and school boards may
find that the best course legally is to say or publish nothing about
7
a teacher whose appointment is not being renewed.1
B.

Property
The Supreme Court's treatment of the deprivation of property question in Roth and Sindermann suggests that it is in the
best interest of a school board or college administration to be very
explicit in its employment policy concerning yearly contracts and
probationary teachers. This conclusion is suggested by the different results reached in Roth, where clearly the teacher had not
been granted tenure, and Sindermann, where the teacher was
able to allege that he had tenure based on a de facto tenure
system.
Although in Roth there had been an explicit tenure system,
neither state statutes nor university regulations gave rise to a
legitimate expectation by Roth of continued employment as a
probationary teacher. Professor Van Alstyne notes, however, that
the Court made this finding in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary in the record. He suggests that there may be situations
in which,
on a better record, under more compelling circumstances, where the
"Id. The district court had granted summary judgment for the defendants. Wilderman v. Nelson, 335 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
7
5 James F. Clark, of Ela, Christianson, Esch, Hart & Clark, counsel for the Wisconsin
Association of School Boards, noted that the Supreme Court decisions "appear to have
resulted in some reluctance on the part of school officials to give reasons for nonrenewal."
Letter from James F. Clark to Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, July 10, 1973. His view is
corroborated by Bruce F. Ehlke of Lawton & Cates, counsel for the Wisconsin Education
Association. Letter from Bruce F. Ehlke to Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, Aug. 8, 1973. See
also Shannon, Due Process for Nontenured Teachers from the Board's Viewpoint, in
FRONTIERS OF SCHOOL LAW 15 (1973). However, Mr. Clark has also informed the author
that reasons for nonrenewal were given to some plaintiffs following the court of appeals'
decision in Roth and, in turn, these plaintiffs have amended their complaints following
Roth and Sindermann to charge a deprivation of an interest in liberty without due process,
because the reasons given for their nonrenewal damage their professional reputations.
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faculty member is well along the tenure track under policies explicitly encouraging reliance, peremptory notice of nonreappointment
may not be enough to quench the constitutional claim to more specific consideration than none at all.8

In order for schools with an explicit tenure system to avoid
creating expectations of continued employment for probationary
teachers, another writer has suggested following Harvard's example.r'i It hires more probationary teachers than can be used to fill
the available and expected tenured positions, and stresses to
them that tenure is only a "faint possibility." Since administrators at other institutions and teachers are aware of this competitive situation, Mr. Levinson believes that little stigma is attached
to nonrenewal of these teachers' contracts, and that the same
would be true for other institutions that adopt similar hiring policies."'
Institutions without explicit tenure systems may discover
that they have created an expectancy of reemployment in some
circumstances. A series of 1-year contracts may indicate a property interest in continued employment.' In Johnson v. Fraley2
the court appeared to recognize what one authority has called the
"quasi tenure" situation which had been acknowledged in the
Supreme Court,"' i.e., official actions by the institution that lead
a teacher to expect continued employment despite the legal barrier of mere periodic contracts."4
On the other hand, one court has found that a long period of
employment under a series of 1-year contracts did not constitute
de facto tenure."5 In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that the
complaint of a public school teacher who had been employed 22
years under 1-year contracts, but whose contract was not renewed
for the 23d year, failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. The court further found that the teacher did not
allege "the existence of rules or understandings promulgated or
fostered by state officials which would justify any legitimate
claim of entitlement of continued employment.""
'Van Alstyne, supra note 36, at 270.
'evinson,
L'
supra note 36, at 619.
:"Id.
'See, e.g.. Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972); Scheelhaase v. Woodbury
Cent. Community School Dist. 349 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
12470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
"Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972).
"Letter from William Van Alstyne to Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, July 12, 1973.
"Skidmore v. Shamrock Independent School Dist., 464 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1972). See
also Lukac v. Acocks, 466 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1972).
"464 F.2d at 606.
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These unpredictable results in contract nonrenewal cases
may lead institutions without an explicit tenure system either to
develop such a system or to adopt form contracts and an institutional policy that are very clear on the terms and conditions of
employment. Such institutions may profit from Odessa College's
unhappy example. Following the Supreme Court's decision in
Sindermann, Odessa settled with Sindermann for $48,000 in back
pay and court fees. 7 It has also, however, replaced its old statement of policy and contract system 6 with a formal tenure policy. "'
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S TREATMENT
OF THE FREE SPEECH QUESTION

In Sindermann, the Court did not rule on the allegation that
nonrenewal was in reprisal for the exercise of free speech rights,
since the district court had granted summary judgment for
Odessa College. Thus, Sindermann does not directly speak to the
question of pretermination proceedings on charges of free speech
violations. But when Sindermann is read with Roth, it is evident
that direct violations of free speech rights would require such
pretermination hearings. In Sindermann, the Court noted:
The Court of Appeals suggested that the respondent might have a
due process right to some kind of hearing simply if he asserts to
college officials that their decision was based on his constitutionally
protected conduct ....
We have rejected this approach in Board of
70
Regents v. Roth, ante ....

This reference is to an extensive footnote in Roth, which states
in part: "Whatever may be a teacher's right of free speech, the
interest in holding a teaching job at a state university,
simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest." ' 7' In Sindermann,
however, the Court found that the "allegations represent a bona
fide constitutional claim. . . For this reason we hold that the
grant of summary judgment against the respondent, without full
72
exploration of this issue, was improper.
Summary judgment was also held to be improper in a later
case in which it was claimed that first amendment rights were
7
1 Telephone conversation with Richard J. Clarkson (attorney for Robert Sindermann)
in Odessa, Texas, Aug. 22, 1973.
"See text accompanying note 28 supra.
"Policy Statement on Academic Freedom, Tenure, and Responsibility of Odessa College, adopted by Board of Regents of Odessa College, March 27, 1972.
7408 U.S. at 599 n.5 (citation omitted).
71408 U.S. at 575 n.14.
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violated. In Chitwood v. Feaster" nontenured teachers at a state
college claimed that their contracts were not renewed because of
their free speech activities and that they were entitled to a statement of reasons for nonrenewal. The court of appeals reversed the
lower court decision that granted summary judgment for the college, holding that while the teachers were not entitled to a statement of reasons under Roth, their free speech claims, "although
unsupported by hard evidence," must be heard.74 The court of
appeals noted:
The concurrence of protected speech, which may be unpopular with
college officials, and the termination of the employment contract
seem to be enough, in the view of the Supreme Court, to occasion
inquiry to determine whether or not the failure to renew was in fact
caused by the protected speech.7"

Not all speech by teachers is protected, however. For example,
in Duke v. North Texas State University" a teaching assistant
was not rehired because she had used profane language when
criticizing the university and its administration. The university
claimed that such language impaired her effectiveness as a
teacher. The court of appeals held that:
As a past and prospective instructor, Mrs. Duke owed the University
a minimal duty of loyalty and civility to refrain from extremely...

offensive remarks aimed at the administrators of the University. By
her breach of this duty, 7the
interests of the University outweighed
7
her claim for protection.

A similar decision was reached in another case involving similar issues, although the employee was not a teacher. In Tygrett
v. Washington7 the court also found for the employer, here the
District of Columbia police force. Tygrett, a probationary officer,
was dismissed after he announced that he would falsely call in
sick, organize, and lead a "sick-out" unless certain personnel
benefits were implemented. In finding for the employer, the district court noted: "[Tlhe First Amendment Right of Free
Speech, whether in the context of employment or any other legitimate activity, is not absolute. Frequently the right to speak freely
7408 U.S. at 598.
7:468 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1972).
"Id. at :361.
7 'Id.
1469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
;71d. at 840.
7'346 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1972).
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must be balanced against legitimate conflicting interests."7
These cases demonstrate that teachers cannot be assured of
success in court when seeking relief on the ground that their first
amendment rights have been violated.
One significant effect of Roth and Sindermann may be to
inhibit the bringing of such first amendment cases to court when
contracts are not renewed. Roth's attorneys argued that if institutional proceedings were foreclosed to probationary teachers,
few professors, faced with non-retention decisions, will seek judicial
relief. Litigation and the attendant public exposure may be costly
both in terms of money and personal embarrassment. Moreover,
without a statement of reasons, the professor has only two alternatives: quietly acquiesce in the non-retention or begin a major law
suit based on his suspicion that the reasons behind the nonretention were constitutionally impermissible."

The National Education Association and Robert P. Sindermann,
in their amici curiae brief in Roth, presented a similar argument
about the "chilling effect" which results when litigation is the
only available alternative in a nonretention dispute.9 Their comments are directed to an opposing amicus argument of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that a teacher has an adequate remedy in nonrenewal cases under section 1983.12 Massachusetts appears to advocate this position in the belief that institutional
proceedings in every nonrenewal case would be more burdensome
7

1'd. at 1250, citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, a
teacher was dismissed by his school board because of his criticism of the board's activities.
The Court, while finding for the teacher, also noted that
it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the citizenry in general. The problem
in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
Id. at 568.
"'Brief for Respondents at 8, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
"Brief for National Education Association and Robert P. Sindermann as Amici Curiae at 3, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action by law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
12
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than occasional court proceedings." :
IV.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF

Roth AND Sindermann

The Supreme Court decisions in Roth and Sindermann establish the "constitutional boundary lines around the territory
covered by procedural due process." 4 If institutions work within
these "boundary lines," they will find that they have wide discretion in renewing the contracts of probationary teachers. On the
other hand, probationary teachers confronted with the limits
imposed by the Court's decisions will find that seeking relief
through the courts is costly and yields unpredictable results.
Because there is a surplus of qualified college teachers,"5 Roth
and Sindermann come at a time when institutions desire great
flexibility in hiring, retaining, and dismissing faculty members.
New concepts and needs in higher education in areas such as
curricula, organization, and time spent in obtaining a degree also
require colleges and universities to maintain flexibility in their
programs. Under these circumstances, colleges and universities
want to maintain a balance between tenured and nontenured
faculty which will provide flexibility as well as stability." If the
Court had held that the mere fact of contract nonrenewal required a statement of reasons and an institutional hearing, institutions might have been overburdened with the work required for
processing a substantial number of nonrenewal cases. They might
then have been tempted to retain teachers simply to avoid the
nonrenewal procedures, and as a consequence would have heavily
tenured faculties with little flexibility. Such a situation might
easily have arisen in an institution with a standard tenure policy
of a 7-year probationary period after which the teacher must be
granted tenure or not rehired, since the institution might have
found it difficult to offer satisfactory reasons for nonrenewal after
7 years of continuous employment. In light of Roth and
Sindermann, however, colleges and universities are legally free to
develop employment policies that will provide the faculty mix
most favorable to their own institutional goals.
Brief for Massachusetts as Amicus Curiae at 7, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
"Rosenblum, Legal Dimensions of Tenure, in COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN
HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
IT.

160 (1973).

FURNISS, STEADY-STATE STAFFING IN TENURE-GRANTING INSTITUTIONS AND RELATED

PAPERS 2 (1973).
"Id.
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As an alternative to tenure policies, colleges might consider
the pure contract system of employment. This system was recently implemented by the Virginia community colleges which
simultaneously abolished tenure for all faculty members who had
not yet attained it. 7 The system's multiple contract plan does not
contain any stated or implied promise of continuous employment
beyond the term of a particular contract. The plan does, however,
detail a procedure for appeal of a decision not to renew a contract.
In view of Sindermann, institutions adopting this plan should not
be found to have created an implied tenure-by-contract system.
In either a formal tenure or a contract system, the refusal of
administrators to give reasons for nonrenewal,m coupled with the
surplus of qualified college teachers, places probationary teachers
at an obvious disadvanatage. However, in practice such teachers
may not be at as great a disadvantage as these considerations
suggest. There are pressures on universities not to adhere rigidly
to the legal rights they have under the Court's decisions. First,
the Court itself in Roth noted that its decision does not set university policy as to the "appropriate" action for a public institution
to take in its treatment of employees." It merely made clear that
a hearing or statement of reasons would not inevitably be required when a nontenured teacher's contract was not renewed.
Second, it is important to note in this connection that many
universities already provide a statement of reasons in nonrenewal
cases. A survey conducted in April of 1972 by the American Council on Education's Higher Education Panel found that tenure
systems are "nearly universal" in public and private universities
and 4-year colleges, and that almost half of these institutions give
written reasons for nonrenewal9 0 The survey also found that
about 90 percent of these institutions had procedures for appeal
following denial of tenure or contract nonrenewal, but that in only
about 14 percent of these institutions had more than three appeals been taken during the preceding 30 months."
Third, it is likely that teachers-and perhaps their un7

1 Memorandum

from Chancellor Dana B. Hamel to the presidents of the Virginia
community college system, Sept. 20, 1972.
"See, e.g., authorities cited note 57 supra.
"408 U.S. at 578. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
T. FURNISS, supra note 85, at 21. See also C. SHULMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
CAMPUS (ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education No. 2, 1973).
'IT. FURNISS, supra note 90.
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ions-will exert pressure to continue and extend the probationary
teacher's opportunities for redress. In this regard, William Van
Alstyne has commented:
The experience of the AAUP [American Association of University
Professors] vividly demonstrates that . . . the lack of any intramural opportunity for hearing at all must ultimately undermine the
untenured faculty member's constitutional freedom of speech and
his academic freedom. Thus, we [AAUP] shall doubtless continue
to stand by our own policy statement on this matter, whatever the
prevailing fashion on the Court. 2

The AAUP's position on this issue is, in fact, in opposition to the
Court's rulings. But its position is apparently not out of favor
with the Court, since the Court referred to the AAUP in its comment that institutional policy need not be limited by the Roth
decision.'
Current AAUP policy classifies the question of nonrenewal
under two separate headings: (1) cases in which the probationary
teacher claims that his nonrenewal is based upon inadequate
consideration of his qualifications; and (2) cases in which the
probationary teacher charges that his nonrenewal resulted from
considerations in violation of academic freedom or "governing
policies on making appointments without prejudice with respect
to race, sex, religion, or national origin."" In the first situation,
the AAUP advises that the teacher be allowed to present his
claim charging inadequate consideration of his qualifications to
a designated faculty committee that will determine whether the
original decision is in accordance with institutional standards.
The faculty body may recommend a reconsideration of the decision, but will not "substitute its judgment on the merits for that
of the [responsible] faculty body." 5 In the second situation,
informal settlement of the teacher's charge should be attempted.
If this is unsuccessful, a hearing may be held at which the faculty
member has the burden of proof. If he makes a prima facie case,
his supervisors must demonstrate the validity of their decision."
In either situation, the AAUP urges that a teacher, upon request,
should receive a written statement of reasons for nonrenewal.
A more ambitious plan for the protection of nontenured fac"2Letter from William Van Alstyne, supra note 64.
1:1408 US. at 579 n.15.
9
A.A.U.P. POLICY DOcUMENTS AND
11Id. at 16.

111d. at 19.

REPORTS,

supra note 1, at 19.
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ulty members is found in a draft statement by the National Education Association (NEA).17 This statement differs from the
AAUP position in three ways: it places the burden of proof for
justifying nonrenewal on the institution rather than the teacher;
it gives the teacher the right to appeal the institution's decision
to a neutral third party, e.g., the American Arbitration Association; and, most significantly, it maintains that "the conferring of
the initial annual contract upon a probationary employee does
.

. carry with it an expectation of renewal so long as his work

meets the predetermined standards of scholarship and teaching."'s Both the NEA and the AAUP serve as collective bargaining agents for colleges and universities. It is predictable that in
their contract negotiations they will press for guarantees to carry
out their respective policies.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decisions in Roth and Sindermann
place conservative interpretations on the fourteenth amendment
concepts of liberty and property that limit probationary teachers'
opportunities to obtain a statement of reasons and institutional
due process hearings when their contracts are not renewed. Such
teachers can, of course, resort to the courts, but success in court
is unlikely if their institutions have acted knowledgeably in light
of the Court's discussion of what will or will not constitute a
violation of liberty or property interests.
In addition, when nontenured teachers allege that their nonretention was in retaliation for their exercise of first amendment
rights, institutions are not, in general, legally required to offer
due process hearings under the Roth and Sindermann decisions.
Sindermann does provide, however, that allegations of contract
nonrenewal for exercise of free speech rights must be heard in
court without summary judgment against the teacher. 9 On the
question of a property interest in continued employment,
Sindermann holds that proof of an objective expectancy of de
facto tenure entitles the teacher to an intramural hearing and a
statement of reasons for contract nonrenewal. 1 'I
1 National Education Association, Due Process and Tenure in Institutions of Higher
Education, Today's Education, Feb. 1973, at 60.
Id. at 61.
1'408 U.S. at 598.
"'!d.at 603.

NONTENURED FACULTY

The courts, therefore, are a nontenured teacher's first and
last source of redress in most cases of violations of liberty and
property interests and violations of first amendment rights.
However, commentators have questioned whether it is desirable
for higher education to rely so heavily on the courts for adjudication of its disputes. The Commission on Academic Tenure in
Higher Education (the "Keast Commission") criticizes such dependence on the courts, because it demonstrates that an institution has not implemented satisfactory standards and procedures. I"" In addition, it claims that "frequent resort to court determination of personnel questions will surely erode institutional
and faculty autonomy, thus jeopardizing the ability of faculties
and institutions to govern themselves in the interest of their students and society generally.""'" Therefore, the commission recommends that colleges and universities develop policies and procedures for handling faculty personnel problems which will "minimize reliance on the courts."""

Much of the adverse effect of Roth and Sindermann on nontenured teachers may disappear as faculty collective bargaining
units clarify in their contracts the rights of represented nontenured teachers to institutional hearings and statements of reasons
in the event of contract nonrenewal. It remains to be seen, however, how the national pressures of the faculty labor market and
the several professional faculty organizations will in fact affect
institutional policies and practices in the nonrenewal of faculty
contracts.
"'The "Keast Commission" was established in 1971 under the sponsorship of the
Association of American Colleges and the American Association of University Professors
with a grant from the Ford Foundation. The commission examined the full range of issues
concerning tenure: current status, criticisms, alternatives, and improvements. William R.
Keast. chairman of the commission, is professor of English and Director of the Center for
Higher Education of the University of Texas at Austin. The commission's report is
COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE. FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1973).
" 1d. at 33.
1 11d.

NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW-THE

PRINCIPLE OF HARM AND ITS APPLICATION
TO LAWS CRIMINALIZING PROSTITUTION
INTRODUCTION

The past decade has witnessed a renascence of interest in
criminal justice. As the rights of an accused have received more
intense judicial scrutiny, multitudinous protections have been
prescribed and delineated' with the concomitant establishment of
unprecedented protections against abuse of procedure. Nor has
the expansion of rights stopped at the prison gates. More and
more constitutional claims of prisoners are being recognized,' and
the case law in the field of corrections is expanding at a prolific
rate. From arrest through incarceration, the criminal process is
now closely monitored by the courts.'
The failure of the courts is that their monitoring of the criminal process begins so late-that it remains dormant until a
confrontation has arisen between the state and a citizen. The
requisite attention is not given to the substantive criminal law
which determines, by delineating what conduct is and is not
criminal, what confrontations can legitimately be created by the
system and its agents. Thus what should be the most basic and
'E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 334 U.S. 436
(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'The following areas are representative of those in which post-convicton claims are
being sustained by the courts.
Limitations upon censorship of mail: Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir.
1972); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono,
317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
Access to the press: Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Burnham v.
Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
Right to congregational worship: Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971);
Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
Conditions of confinement: Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
Due process protections in disciplinary hearings: Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.
Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969).
Rights upon revocaton of parole or probation: Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S. Ct. 1756
(1973).
'For a discussion of the effectiveness of judicial control over prearrest confrontations
which occur within the context of police field interrogation see Tiffany, The Fourth
Amendment and Police-Citizen Confrontations,60 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 442 (1969).
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preeminent constitutional question-"When is governmental intrusion into the private lives of citizens warranted?"-is being
judicially ignored. The courts should be under a continuing duty
to ask and to attempt to answer this fundamental question and,
in so doing, to impose limits on the use of the criminal sanction.
But with few exceptions4 the United States Supreme Court has
been unwilling to rule on the constitutionality of the substance,
and not merely the procedure, of the criminal law.
The thesis of this note is that the fourteenth amendment,
through its prohibition against arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, and property, imposes not only procedural but also substantive limitations on the criminal justice system; that there are
basic criteria to which the courts should look in evaluating the
constitutionality of the substance of the criminal law; and that
these criteria must be satisfied before conduct can be declared
criminal and the machinery of the criminal process thereby set
in motion. Specifically, conduct which does not meet the criterion
of legal harm should not be declared criminal. The principle of
legal harm will be developed, its elements set forth, and the
validity of criminalization of prostitution evaluated in light of
this principle.
The crime of prostitution is an appropriate subject for a
harm analysis for several reasons. Not only has "[t]he debate
over criminal laws forbidding certain varieties of sexual conduct
. . . become the locus classicus of modern interest in the limits
of criminal law," 5 but also the opponents of prostitution assert
with great vigor that prostitution causes several harms. But what
makes prostitution particularly apropos is that although recently
challenges to the constitutionality of prostitution laws have been
brought' and sustained in several jurisdictions,' the constitu'In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision which made it a crime "to be addicted to the use of narcotics." Id. at
660. However, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court refused to extend the
Robinson rationale and upheld a provision which made it a crime to "get drunk or be
found in a state of intoxication in any public place .... " Id. at 517. The Court clarified
its holding in Robinson by stating that the crucial issue is whether or not "the accused
has committed some act .... " Id. at 533.
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 301 (1968).
'Unsuccessful challenges have been brought in Maryland and Indiana. In Cherry v.
State, 18 Md. App. 252, 306 A.2d 634 (1973), where the male defendant had advertised in
the Washington Post for prostitutes to entertain his clients under the guise of advertising
a receptionist position, the court rejected overbreadth, vagueness, and freedom of speech
arguments and sustained the constitutionality of MD.ANN. CODE art. 27 § 15(e) (1957)
which prohibited solicitation for the purposes of prositution. In Wilson v. State, 278
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tional issues thus far raised-equal protection, 8 right to privacy, 9
and freedom of speech' 0-fail to go to the heart of the constitutional infirmities which beset laws criminalizing prostitution.
These arguments should be reserved for attacking regulationof,
and not criminal prohibition of, prostitution."
After a brief survey of the scope, function, and inadequacies
of each theory which has been utilized in framing constitutional
challenges to prostitution laws, the principle of harm, which will
be shown to address the critical constitutional defect of laws
criminalizing prostitution, will be applied to the harms most frequently alleged to be caused by prostitution. This analysis will
show that criminalization of prostitution should not constitutionally be allowed to stand.
I. PRESENT CHALLENGES
A. Equal Protection
By far the most successful argument asserted in attempts to
N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972), the court rejected an equal
protection challenge to its facially discriminatory law. In Sumpter v. State, 14 CRiM. L.
REP. 2373 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1974), the court upheld a statute making it a crime for women
but not men to frequent or live in a house of ill fame. The court rejected arguments that
the statute violated the equal protection clause and the prohibitions against establishment of religion, suffered from unconstitutional vagueness, and imposed punishment for
a "status" rather than for criminal conduct.
7
Successful challenges have been brought in three jurisdictions. In State v. Fields, No.
72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973), the court held ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.40.210 (1970), criminalizing prostitution, invalid on its face under the equal protection clause and ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.230 (1970), criminalizing solicitation for prostitution,
discriminately enforced against females in contravention of the equal protection clause.
In United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),
appeal docketed, No. 7042, D.C. Cir., Nov. 10, 1972 (abbreviated opinion reported in 41
U.S.L.W. 2298), the court held D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1967), criminalizing solicitation for prositution, invalid as an unconstitutional invasion of the defendants' rights of
privacy and freedom of speech. It furthermore found discriminatory enforcement of the
provision against female offenders constituted a denial of equal protection. In State v.
Woods, No. 443012 (Minneapolis Mun. Ct., Dec. 21, 1971), the court held MINNEAPOLIS
ORD. 870.10 invalid on its face under the equal protection clause and void for vagueness.
'Equal protection issues were raised in State v. Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist.
Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973), United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super.
Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), Wilson v. State, 278 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 1972), and State v. Woods, No.
443012 (Minneapolis Mun. Ct., Dec. 21, 1971).
'Right of privacy issues were raised in State v. Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist.
Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973); and United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972).
"Freedom of speech issues were raised in Cherry v. State, 18 Md. App. 252, 306 A.2d
634 (1973); United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3,
1973).
"Regulation of prostitution consists of legalization by the state accompanied by reten-
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invalidate prostitution laws has been that the challenged law in
some manner contravenes the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Three courts have found that a challenged prostitution law treated those similarly situated differently and thus worked a denial of equal protection. Such disparate treatment generally results in one of two ways: (1) a statute
may be discriminatory on its face by defining prostitution as an
offense by a female, thereby precluding prosecution of male prostitutes; 3 or (2) a statute neutral on its face may be discriminately
enforced against female prostitutes. 4
While all the courts which have struck down contested prostitution laws have done so either totally or partially on equal
protection grounds, the limitation of equal protection challenges
should be recognized. The equal protection clause provides no
basis for a prohibition of all laws which criminalize prostitution,
but only a basis for ensuring that laws criminalizing prostitution
are drafted and enforced without discrimination.
B. Right of Privacy
Prostitution laws are also being challenged as representing
an infringement of the right of privacy, although to date only one
court has recognized the applicability of this argument to prostition of authority to license, tax, require periodic health inspections, and, in the case of
houses of prostitution, to regulate the hours of operaton. NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.345(8)
(1971) legalizes prostitution in counties with populations under 200,000 and confers upon
those counties authority to issue licenses for houses of prostitution. Regulation and criminalization of prostitution raise different constitutional questions. Because the concern and
scope of this note is exclusively the criminal law, laws which regulate but do not proscribe
prostitution will not be considered.
"2State v. Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist. Alas., June 27, 1973); United States
v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972); and State v. Woods,
No. 433012 (Minneapolis Mun. Ct., Dec. 21, 1971). For a thorough discussion of equal
protection arguments as a basis for the invalidation of prostitution laws, see Rosenbleet
& Pariente, The Prostitution of the Criminal Law, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 373 (1973).
'"Examples of such facially discriminatory laws are those held invalid in State v.
Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973) and in State v. Woods,
No. 433012 (Minneapolis Mun. Ct., Dec. 21, 1971). ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.210 (1970) provided, "Prostitution includes the giving or receiving of the body by a female for sexual
intercourse for hire." MINNEAPOLIS ORD. 870.10 provided, "No female shall offer or submit
her body indiscriminately for sexual intercourse whether or not for a consideration."
"D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1967), which provided, "It shall not be lawful for any
person to invite, entice, persuade, or to address for the purpose of inviting, enticing or
persuading any person or persons sixteen years of age or over . . . for the purpose of
prostitution, or any other immoral or lewd purpose . . ."was found in United States v.
Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), to be neutral on its face
but discriminatorily enforced against the female offender.
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tution laws. 1 5 While commercialized sex between unmarried
adults may eventually be included within the scope of the right
of privacy,"' it is doubtful that many courts will be willing to rest
the invalidation of laws criminalizing prostitution on this ground
in the near future. This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court's recent obscenity decisions holding that an activity
which would be protected if indulged in within the privacy of
one's home will be accorded less protection in a commercial situation. 17
Right of privacy challenges, unlike equal protection challenges, would, if successful, result in total prohibition of laws
criminalizing prostitution. However, the usefulness of right of
privacy arguments for present challenges to prostitution laws is
limited by the as yet fairly narrow and undeveloped scope of the
right.'
C. Freedom of Speech
Statutes which proscribe solicitation for the purpose of prostitution have been attacked on the ground that they abridge the
"United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972)
slip op. at 31. The argument was raised in State v. Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist.
Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973), but the equal protection issue was held to be dispositive of the
case and the right of privacy issue was not considered.
"Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) is a step in this direction. In upholding the
right of unmarried individuals to receive contraceptives, the Court stressed that the right
of privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) is not limited to the
marital relationship. 405 U.S. at 453.
"United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351,
354-55 (1971).
"The Supreme Court has recognized the right of privacy in matters relating to abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); contraception (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)); marriage (Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)); family relationships (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)); and childrearing and education (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). For a discussion of post-Griswold federal
court decisions which address the ninth amendment, see Rhoades & Patula, The Ninth
Amendment: A Survey of Theory and Practicein the Federal Courts Since Griswold v.
Connecticut, 50 DENVER L.J. 153 (1973).
The now famous case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), has raised the question
whether invalidation of laws which contravene the right of privacy will be based on the
doctrine of substantive due process. Significant in this respect are the Court's words,
"This right of privacy, may it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people ....
" Id. at 153. One effect of a shift
to due process might well be abandonment of the need for showing a "compelling state
interest" and a lack of a "less restrictive alternative"; both must be shown under the ninth
amendment approach before the state can override the fundamental right involved. Under
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first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.' 9 This claim
has much merit and chance of success in the three jurisdictions
which prohibit solicitation for prostitution but not prostitution
itself; 0 however, in those jurisdictions which define the act itself
as a crime and make solicitation to commit a crime a punishable
offense, the doctrine will be of little use.
None of the arguments currently utilized in framing challenges to the constitutionality of prostitution laws" address the
crucial issue in criminalization of prostitution. For whenever
state intrusion into the private lives of its citizens is accompanied
by potential imposition of the criminal sanction, questions of a
very peculiar nature must be asked.
II.
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Jerome Hall, one of the foremost scholars of criminal law,
divided propositions about criminal law into three categories:
principles, doctrines, and rules;2 2 those which are of the widest
generalization and universally applicable to all crimes are de23
nominated principles.
[Tihe principles of criminal law consist of seven ultimate notions
expressing: (1) mens rea, (2) act (effort), (3) the "concurrence" (fusion) of mens rea and act, (4) harm, (5) causation, (6) punishment,
a due process approach, a less stringent "balancing test" would likely
be substituted.
right is not
"The right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that ...
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation." Id.
at 154.
"The claim was rejected in Cherry v. State, 18 Md. App. 252, 306 A.2d 634 (1973),
but was sustained in United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 3, 1972).
1"The District of Columbia, Michigan, and Nevada are the only jurisdictions which
prohibit solicitation for prostitution but not prostitution itself. Th relevant statutory
provisions are D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1967), held invalid in United States v. Moses,
Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 750.448 (1968), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.448 (1969); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 207.030(b) (1971).
"The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment was asserted in
United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), as a
basis for invalidating D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1967), which prohibits solicitation for
the purposes of prostitution. The court did not address the issue but rested its decision
on other grounds. In Ex parte Carey, 57 Cal. App. 297, 207 P. 271 (1922), the defendant
unsuccessfully raised the plea of cruel and unusual punishment in response to the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following her conviction for solicitation for prostitution.
For a discussion of the utility of the cruel and unusual punishment clause in framing
challenges to prostitution laws, see Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 12, at 379-80.
11J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 17 (2d ed. 1960).
"1Id. at 17, 22.
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1974

and (7) legality .... [Tlhe principles of criminal law, excepting
. . . "punishment" and "legality" refer to essential elements of
"crime" ....

Unlike most of the above principles, which have been well
developed and well integrated into criminal theory, the principle
of harm has been largely ignored. The briefest examination of
American criminal law theory confirms the contention of the wellknown legal theorist G. 0. W. Mueller that "[t]he principle of
harm is the most underdeveloped concept in our criminal law.",,
In failing to take account of the principle of harm, American
jurisprudence has failed to recognize what should be one of the
primary limitations on the power of government to make conduct
criminal.
Perhaps the genesis of the problem can be traced to the extent to which framers of both state and federal constitutions concentrated on procedural safeguards, foregoing, for the most part,
specific substantive limitations on the kinds of conduct which
could be declared criminal." H. L. A. Hart points out that the
framers, in lieu of supplying substantive limitations, relied primarily on the legislature's sense of justice and, secondarily, on the
courts' use of due process to prevent an arbitrary application of
the criminal sanction when the legislature's sense of justice somehow went awry." It is debatable whether the reliance on the legislature or on the courts in this instance was more misplaced. Both
appear to have almost totally abrogated responsibility in first,
developing, and secondly, abiding by principles of criminal liability consonant with constitutional mandates. Hart summarizes
the problem:
Closely and vitally related to the failure of American courts to develop adequate principles of criminal liability . . .has been their
failure to come to grips with the underlying constitutional issues
involved. This failure is the more surprising because of the obvious
concern of the Constitution to safeguard the use of the method of
the criminal law-especially, but not exclusively, on the procedural
'Id. at 18.

' Mueller, Criminal Theory: An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's Studies in Jurisprudence
and Criminal Tneay, 34 IND. L.J. 206, 220 (1959).
2"Of ex post facto laws, an obvious exception, H.L.A. Hart says, "the principles of just
punishment implicit in such clauses have relevance in other situations than that only of
condemnation under an after-the-fact enactment-a wider relevance than courts have yet
recognized." Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 411 n.27
(1958).
"Id. at 411.
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side ....
What sense does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made
a crime in the first place?"

That one may not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property
without due process of law" has traditionally meant that one may
not be deprived arbitrarily of the same. Concern over arbitrariness explains the reverence with which the principle of legality is
viewed and the enshrined positions of the guarantees of notice
and trial by jury. But if no set principles are used in defining
criminal conduct, if criminality is determined solely by
undefinable, constantly changing public notions of morality, is
this not an arbitrary imposition of punishment and deprivation
of liberty without due process of law? As Justice Harlan wrote in
his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution ....
It
is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints .... 25

If due process is to have any meaning at all as a check on the
police power, its protection must extend to the very heart of the
criminal system and first and foremost provide constitutional
limits on what conduct may be declared criminal. If it is to be
no more than protection against arbitrary procedure in a system
whose prime characteristic is arbitrariness, it is a hollow guarantee indeed.
A. Morality: A Legitimate State Interest
Discussions of "victimless crimes" have traditionally been
carried on within the context of the age-old debate over the legitimacy and propriety of governmental regulation of morality. This
approach is both misleading and ineffective. It is misleading because it obscures the fact that the real issue is not regulation of
morality but criminalization of nonharmful conduct.3 0 It is inef"Id. at 430-31. Hart's thesis is that a sanction which imports blame is misused when
it is applied to conduct which is not blameworthy. Although he concerns himself with
conduct which is not blameworthy because the actor lacks a criminal state of mind, many
of his criticisms of the failure of American courts to develop adequate principles of criminal liability and to recognize and attempt to resolve the underlying constitutional issues
are directly applicable to the courts' treatment of conduct which is not blameworthy
because of the lack of any resultant objective harm.
"Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'""What truly distinguishes the offenses commonly thought of as 'against morals' is
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fective because, while the propriety of governmental regulation of
morality is a question which has been discussed, debated, and
disposed of by many legal philosophers, 3 the regulation of
morality as a component of the police power has been long accepted by American courts. 2 In the words of Eugene Rostow,
"Men often say that one cannot legislate morality. I should say
that we legislate hardly anything else." 33
The argument should not be that government should not
regulate morality, but rather that applications of the criminal law
should be restricted to that aspect of morality which concerns a
harm committed." This argument addresses the real issue: When
can the government's general authority to regulate morality be
exercised without transgressing constitutional norms? The answer should be that morals may be regulated by means of the
criminal sanction when, and only when, a breach of the moral
code would imminently cause a cognizable harm to a legally protected interest of another.
B. The Elements of Legal Harm
1. Invasion of a Legally Protected Interest
Upon first glance harm appears to be a normative concept,
neither lending itself to legal analysis nor to a systematized application within a legal context. Indeed, few legal theorists have
ventured to define the term.
Hall and Mueller have defined harm as implying "interests
or values which have been destroyed, wholly or in part,"" and as
"the violation of [an] intangible, legally protected interest
. The latter definition is preferable because of the impornot their relation to morality but the absence of ordinary justification for punishment by
a nontheocratic state." Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 669 (1963).
:"See P. DEAIIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); L. FULLER. THE MORALITY OF
LAW (1969); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958); Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1967).
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97
U.S. 25, 33 (1877). But see United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
535 n.7 (1973).

:'Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 18 CAMB. L.J. 174, 197 (1960).
"Comment, Private ConsensualAdult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others
in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581, 582 (1967). See J. HAILL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL. LAW 158 (1947 ed.).
"J. HAI.L & G. MUELLER. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 90 (2d ed. 1965).
:16Id.
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tance of limiting definitions of harm to the destruction in whole
or in part of legally protected37 interests. By so limiting its meaning, harm becomes a workable, legally significant concept, removed from the normative, subjective sphere. It makes clear that
in analyzing the external effect of a legally prohibited act, the
harm requirement will not be fulfilled merely by asserting that
the effect is in some way undesirable to some individual or individuals. The harm requirement is only satisfied when legally protected interests have been infringed. The determination of which
interests are to be given legal protection is one made continuously
both by the courts, and the legislatures.
2. Harm to Others
John Stuart Mill once wrote:
[Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant.u

His words have sparked much heated debate; the sides have been
chosen and the battlelines formed." The issue, however, should
not be decided in the abstract according to one's philosophical
disposition, but rather by rigorous adherence to legal analysis.
Within the framework of the principle of harm there are two
separate issues: (1) Can the harm requirement be satisfied if the
only injury resulting from a given act is to the individual
performing the act? and (2) Is all harm to others punishable?
The answer to the former question turns upon whether one
has any interests which are legally protected against infringement
by oneself. Laws making it a crime to commit suicide are the most
obvious example of laws which implicitly assert that one's interests (i.e., in life) are protected from such infringement.
If one accepts the basic premise that the sole purpose of
according legal protection to various interests is to provide sanctions for unwanted interference with those interests, the faulty
logic of maintaining that one has interests which are legally protected against infringement by oneself is easily highlighted. By
: See generally Eser, The Principleof "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 345 (196566).
:,J. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANIsM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
95-96 (1951).
'See note 31 supra.
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definition whenever the interference with one's interests stems
from an act which one performs oneself, the interference is not
unwanted. Since there can be no harm without interference with
legally protected interests, the harm requirement can never be
fulfilled outside of the context of harm to others.
Generally courts avoid having to rule on the constitutionality
of legislation which has as its only purpose the protection of the
individual from himself by holding that the statute challenged on
this ground does in fact cause harm to others.4 0 However, as H.
L. Packer has pointed out, "The question is one of the remoteness
and probability of the harm."'" Therefore, the second issue, what
harm to others is punishable, must be resolved by considering the
requirement of imminence set forth below.42
3. Factually Demonstrable Harm
One of the most important criteria which must be met before
harm can appropriately be subjected to the criminal sanction is
that harm must be harm in fact. Given the courts' failure to
recognize and require harm as an element of every crime, it is not
surprising the extent to which they have been willing, when they
have considered harm at all, to satisfy themselves with mere
3
4
presumptions of harm .

"'People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (Erie County Ct. 1967);
People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799-800 (City Ct. Buffalo 1967);
State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 31, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (1968).
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968) is
one of the few cases which held that a criminal statute whose only purpose is to protect
the individual from himself is unconstitutional. The court struck down a statute requiring
motorcyclists to wear crash helmets on the grounds that it violated the due process, equal
protection, and right of privacy protections of the ninth and fourteenth amendments. The
court's response to the attorney general's contention that the state has an interest in the
viability of its citizens and can legislate to keep them healthy and self-supporting was that
"this logic could lead to unlimited paternalism." Id. at 75.
"H. PACKER, supra note 5, at 266.
2
See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
"In Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956), where the defendant was
prosecuted for assault after he touched a policeman's genitals, the victim denied any
emotional injury. However, the court said that no specific proof of emotional injury was
required. " llt would seem that a sexual touching is a sufficiently offensive act to constitute an assault. Nor should the fact that an experienced policeman denies emotional
injury alter the situation." Id. at 580. But see Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243
N.E.2d 898 (1969), where the defendants challenged their convictions for unlawful possession of marijuana on due process grounds, asserting that the law was irrational and
unreasonable because there was no evidence that marijuana endangered the health,
safety, welfare, or morals of the community. In reaching its conclusion that the statute
was reasonable the court found "harm" by examining the results of several scientific
studies. Id. at 194 nn.1I & 12, 243 N.E.2d at 903 nn. 11 & 12. It is important to note that
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Of those jurists who have concerned themselves with the
principle of harm, Orville Snyder has been the most adamant
about the need for factual harm:
The principle, "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," that only
conduct causing or threatening public harm can be made a crime
and that public harm is a matter of fact, which must be susceptible
of factual demonstration, is the fundamental limitation on legislative power and of the essence of law as a means of protecting freedom. While it is not the function of the courts to second-guess legislatures on the wisdom of making or not making conduct in fact
harmful a crime, the question of whether conduct is or is not harmful
in fact . . . is open . . . . The answer is not to be extracted from
the exegesis of an abstract morality, from social-welfare generalities
• . . nor is the touchstone . . . what public opinion demands. The
answer is to be found in a public evidential inquiry into such matters
as, What and who are affected? How are they affected? To what
extent are they affected? In what is this harmful? How is this a
public harm?"

Snyder's admonititions aside, factual establishment of the
presence or absence of harm is admittedly difficult because of the
very definition of harm, the impairment of legally protected interests or values. Interests and values are, by their nature, often
intangible, and the measurement of their infringement or destruction not susceptible to quantification. However, to accept
Hall's premise that harm in those crimes where there is no
physical injury (e.g., libel, kidnapping, perjury) may be stated in
terms of intangibles such as harm to reputation, public safety, or
institutions' 5 is not to say that there is no necessity for factual
proof in such situations.
Who has the burden of proving the existence or nonexistence
of factual harm? Given the lattitude accorded the legislature in
its exercises of the police power, the answer is fairly clear. The
judgments of the legislature enjoy a presumption of constitutionality even though unsupported by evidence, and the burden of
proof generally falls on the challenger. 6 Evidence on the record
supporting a particular provision is not a condition precedent to
the courts' upholding it upon challenge. However, while the burthe court chose to focus on those studies which did support the allegation of harm to the

public health, rather than simply to hold that a showing of harm was not necessary to
support the provision.
SNYDER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 764 (1953).
"J. HALL, supra note 22, at 217.
"United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
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den of proof would remain on the challenger, a showing of a lack
of factual harm should result in mandatory invalidation of the
provision.
4. Imminent Harm
It must be emphasized that it will often be possible to find
some harm, some infringement of a legally protected interest,
which if traced back far enough can be found to originate with a
given act. Thus discussions of harm should not be carried on in
terms of a sharp dichotomy-harm or no harm.47 The issue is
whether the harm in question is a proper subject of the criminal
law. The resolution of this issue involves a great interplay between Hall's principles of harm and causation."
Harm to others may be one of two kinds-direct or indirect.
The former is always punishable; the latter may or may not be.
What is needed is a principle to separate punishable from nonpunishable indirect harm-a principle which could provide a
consistent, nonarbitrarytest, whose operation would meet the
due process requirements of rationality and regularity in the application of the laws. That the proximity of an act to its resultant
harm is the crucial criterion in separating punishable from nonpunishable harm is shown by an examination of attempt law.
a. Attempt Law
The problems and issues of attempt law are a microcosm of
the problems and issues involved in the principle of harm. According to Hall, the doctrine of criminal attempt represents "a
major explication of the fundamental principle stipulating the
commission of external harm."4 9
The presence and the nature of the harm in inchoate offenses
such as attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, and possession of burglar's tools, has been a matter of much debate.w If it is said that
such offenses contain no harm, the basis for infliction of punishment must be the moral culpability of the actor. But if moral
culpability of the actor as evidenced in crime-directed behavior
suffices, why the emphasis in attempt law to distinguish between
states of preparation, which are held to be nonpunishable, and
attempts, which are held to be punishable? In both instances
equivalent moral culpability and antisocial behavior can be
found.
"7 Hall, Perennial Problems of the CriminalLaw, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 15, 23 (1973).
"See note 24 supra.
"J. HALL, supra note 34, at 95-96.
"'J.HALL, supra note 22, at 217-18 & n.18.
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If all conduct "in the direction" of certain harms were penalized, the
. . . problem would disappear. But only the criminal attempt, not
the preparation, is punishable. The plain implication of that must
be explored.5 '

The remoteness or proximity of the harm from the actor's
conduct is the distinguishing element between preparation and
attempt in both case law52 and statutory codifications." For the
defendant to be liable for attempt there "must be a dangerous
proximity to success" 54 or "an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culmimate in [the
actor's] commission of the crime."5 5 Attempt law, then, separates those harms which are punishable from those which are not
by examining the attenuation of the relationship between the act
and its resulting harm, by asking the question, "How far removed
from the act or tangentially connected to the act is the harm in
question?"
b. The Test of Imminence
A criterion similar to that applied in attempt law to distinguish culpable from nonculpable conduct should be applied to
other determinations of criminal liability. A principle
conveniently termed "imminence" would (1) accurately represent criteria considered in imposition of liability for attempt, a
major area of the law where the harm is intangible, and (2) serve
a function in determinations of criminal liability analogous to
that of proximate cause in determinations of civil liability.
The imminence principle would focus attention on the question, "Is the harm imminently forthcoming from the act?" Application of the principle would answer the crucial question, "Is the
harm involved of a nature which should be subject to criminal
sanctions or is it too removed in time and space from the act
engendering it?"
The answer to the latter question is, of course, ultimately a
policy determination, as are proximate cause determinations in
"J. HALL, supra note 34, at 101.
-21n Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1897), Justice Holmes
said for the court, "As the aim of the law is not to punish sins, but is to prevent certain
external results, the act done must come pretty near to accomplishing that result before
the law will notice it." Id. at 20, 48 N.E. at 770.
"'"A person commits criminal attempt if ...
he intentionally engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense." COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2-101 (Supp. 1971), amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-25-1 (1963).
"'Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"'MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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civil liability. Of importance here, however, is that proximate
cause determinations have been the task of the courts; the imminence principle also envisions active participation of the courts
in deciding what conduct should be made criminal-an all too
new role.
What should the test of imminence be? It is not necessary nor
even desirable that the test be narrowly drawn; it must be flexible
and capable of application in a wide variety of circumstances. It
is significant that the guidelines for proximate cause determinations of civil liability have been drawn in such a way as to give
5
the courts wide latitude.
A test which is reflective of the above considerations and
which would at once provide the courts with the necessary guidelines, yet leave them free to make independent determinations
based on the merits of the individual case, is, "Is there a direct
and causal sequence between the act and the resulting harm,
such that the chain of causation can be perceived and evaluated,
and the harm determined thereby not to be too remote nor the
relationship between the act and the harm too attenuated?" The
crucial part of the test is that there be a perceivable chain of
causation. If the chain must be assumed, liability cannot attach.
Having posited the imminence principle as a workable criterion for distinguishing punishable from nonpunishable harm, a
test of its general applicability is in order. For purposes of analysis crimes can be separated into two broad categories: (1) resultoriented crimes, where the act prohibited is itself the harm to be
prevented, and (2) simple conduct crimes. With crimes of the first
category application of the principle is easy. By definition, once
the elements of the crime are satisfied, the harm has occurred.
For example, "[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he...
causes the death of another human being."57 The act (causing
death) is contemporaneous with the specific harm (interference
with the interest in life). Thus result-oriented crimes contain a
built-in satisfaction of the imminence requirement.
In the second category of cases, where the conduct prohibited
is not itself the harm to be prevented, each crime must be individually examined to ascertain whether or not harm is imminently
forthcoming from the prohibited act. A simple chart demonstrates that even where the harm sought to be prevented is intan'See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
"'MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962").
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gible, penal codes by and large restrict liability to instances where
the harm is imminent:
Crime
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Imminent Harm

perjury
libel
treason
assault
bribery

obstruction of justice
harm to reputation
overthrow of state 5
psychic harm, apprehension
corruption of public officers

A glaring exception to this general rule is crimes commonly
termed "crimes against morals." Such crimes represent a sphere
where none of the usual principles of criminal liability are applied
and where none of the usual considerations which result in making conduct criminal are present.

III.

THE HARM IN PROSTITUTION

Having established the fundamental nature of the principle
of harm and that harm should be an essential element of every
crime, the question, "What is the harm in prostitution?" will now
be explored. The asserted harms in prostitution will be examined
in light of the principle that for conduct to be punishable, it must
satisfy the four elements of legal harm: (1) a factually demonstrable (2) invasion of a legally protected interest (3) of another (4)
imminently caused by the conduct.
The harms which are alleged to be caused by prostitution
and thereby justify its prohibition are: (1) prostitution provides
an opportunity for the commission of crimes which may be ancillary to prostitution; (2) prostitution provides a breeding ground
for the activities of organized crime; (3) prostitution is a significant factor in the spread of venereal disease; (4) prostitution
results in the subjection of citizens to offensive public
solicitation; and (5) prostitution contributes to the destruction of
public morals.
A. Opportunitiesfor Commission of Ancillary Crimes
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by providing an increased opportunity for the
commission of other crimes? It is often argued that prostitution
should be suppressed because its commission is inevitably connected with the commission of other crimes such as beatings and
"Note the imminence requirement built into the crime of treason by the requirement
of an overt act. U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 3.
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theft. The first step in the analysis is the determination of the
presence or absence of a legally protected interest to serve as the
basis of harm. Arguably, a legally protected interest is present in
the form of the general security of the community; no doubt
concern for the general security underlies every criminal prohibition, each of which protects the general security from destruction
in a specific way.
Although a legally protected interest is perhaps present, the
cause in fact requirement is unsatisfied. There is nothing about
an act of intercourse for hire which in itself makes the commission
of other crimes likely. The harm embodied in the ancillary crimes
is a byproduct of the environment to which society consigns
prostitution, not a harm caused by that conduct itself. The irrationality of criminalizing prostitution to decrease theft or assault
is obvious if one realizes that it is precisely because prostitution
is criminalized that such crimes are not reported when committed
within the context of prostitution.59 If anything, then, criminalization of prostitution serves as an incentive and shield for the
would-be thief or assailant. Armed with the knowledge that his
or her victim will be reluctant to report the illegal incident, the
actor, whether the patron or the prostitute, is encouraged rather
than deterred.
More basically, there may be a limit on the extent to which
a state may proscribe one kind of conduct with the purpose of
eradicating a different kind of conduct. In Stanley v. Georgia"'the
Supreme Court found an overstepping of that limit by the state
legislature and held:
[The legislature] may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene
matter on the ground that it may lead to anti-social conduct than
it may prohibit the possession of chemistry books on the ground that
they may lead to the manufacture of home-made spirits."

In holding invalid their respective prostitution laws, both the
Washington, D.C., Superior Court in United States v. Moses"2
3 examined the
and an Alaska district court in State v. Fields"
ancillary crimes argument. Both courts, in finding the harm not
"James & Burnstin, Prostitutionin Seattle, 6 WASH. STATE BAR
1971).
"394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"Id. at 567.
2
Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972).
3
" No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973).
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only unsubstantiated but also unsound constitutionally as a basis
for criminalization, cited Stanley. The court in Fields said:
[Pirosecution of future criminality presumed to be associated with
certain types of offenses or offenders may not only have little empirical support, but is incompatible with our constitutional system of
due process and equal protection of the laws. 4

And in Moses the court said:
If indeed there is evidence that prostitution is sometimes coincident
with certain crimes, there is also ample indication that the extension
of the criminal law to soliciting significantly hinders application of
legal sanctions to those very crimes. By the most fundamental precepts of our law, it is to those violent acts that such sanctions must
directly be addressed. Endorsement of an alleged state interest
which precisely inverts this proscriptive emphasis would be a
perversion of justice . . ..

B.

The Encouragement of Organized Crime
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by providing a breeding ground for the activities of
organized crime? The drafters of the Model Penal Code seriously
considered following Britain's example of decriminalizing prostitution and retaining only public solicitation as a crime; one of the
determinative factors in their decision not to do so was the belief
that "call-houses" were an important part of the financial machine of the underworld and closely linked to "rackets" such as
narcotics."
This contention has much in common with the previously
discussed assertion that prostitution causes an increased opportunity for the commission of other crimes. The allegation that
prostitution provides a breeding ground for the activities of organized crime may, like the allegation that prostitution results in
an increase in other crimes, confuse the effects of prostitution
with those of illegalized prostitution. The San Francisco Committee on Crime has stated that "[i]t is

.

.

.probable that if prosti-

tution were not a crime, it would not be organized." 67
Even assuming that the presence of organized crime in a
given activity is not a function of the illegality of the activity, the
"Id., slip op. at 9.
"United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),
slip op. at 22.
"Schwartz, supra note 30, at 682.
"THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON NoN-VICTIM CRIME IN SAN
FRANCISCO 32 (1971).
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harm requirement is still not met because invasion of the interest
in the general security through encouragement of organized crime
can be factually rebutted. The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice reported in 1967 that
the role of organized crime in prostitution is both small and declining" and its findings have been corroborated by two other
,recent studies. 9 Significantly, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code formulated their position without the benefit of the above
information-all three studies were published after the completion of the Proposed Official Draft in 1962.0
In conclusion, the assertion that prostitution causes harm by
providing a breeding ground for organized crime fails to satisfy
that element of legal harm of a factually demonstrable invasion
of a legally protected interest. Not only can it not be factually
established that prostitution itself and not illegalized prostitution
is tied to organized crime, but the presence of organized crime
cannot be factually established at all. On the contrary, a substantial body of evidence tends to disprove its presence.
C. Transmission of Venereal Disease
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by the transmission of venereal disease? Such a
contention has been a continuously proffered justification for
criminalization of prostitution." The community no doubt has
"PRESIDENr'S

COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE

CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189 (1967).

"Sherwin & Winick, Debate: Should Prostitution Be Legalized?, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR,
Jan. 71972, at 72; Esselstyn, Prostitutionin the United States, 376 ANNALS 123, 127 (1968).
"The court in Moses took judicial notice of the reports cited in notes 67-69 supra in
holding the possible connection of organized crime with prostitution insufficient to justify
an invasion of the defendants' rights of privacy and freedom of speech through prohibition
of solicitation for prostitution. After citing yet another study which heralded the decline
of prostitution as an underworld activity and also highlighted underworld involvement in
more profitable activities such as labor control (DAvIS, Prostitution, in CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 262 (1961)), the court said:
While this Court naturally expresses no view on the relationship of organized
crime with organized labor, it is a conceivable affiliation no less logically
plausible than that of organized crime and prostitution. However, one would
expect to find few serious proponents of the abolition of labor unions in order
to prevent their potential domination by criminal syndicates. Courts have,
in fact, long held that society should regulate illegal conduct directly, rather
than prohibit other activities on the ground that those activities are somehow, in some cases, connected with illegality.
United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), slip
op. at 19.
7
'J. WARREN, THIRTY YEARS' BATTLE WITH CRIME 141-42 (1875); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.12, Comment at 171-75 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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a legally protected interest in the state of its health; protection
of "the general health, safety, and welfare" has long been recognized as a component of the police power.7" Analysis can proceed
to whether or not such interest is in fact invaded by prostitution.
In reaching its decision to retain prostitution as a crime in
the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute put considerable weight on the alleged impairment of community health
caused by prostitution.73 However, in arriving at their conclusions
that "[p]rostitution is an important source of venereal disease"7 4
and that "non-commercial 'promiscuity' appears to be less dangerous [in this respect] than commercial prostitution" the Institute relied upon data gathered from studies conducted three
decades ago on the causes of venereal disease in army populations.7"
Fortunately more recent and representative data are available. An extensive 3-year study in Seattle, Washington, based in
part upon a medical examination of every prostitute arrested,
found syphilis to be almost nonexistent among prostitutes and
the rate of gonorrhea to be between 5 and 6 percent.7 7 The Public
Health Service of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare found that of over 13,600 females diagnosed with infectious
syphilis, less than 3 percent were prostitutes."
Two other sources suggest a relatively constant rate of venereal disease among prostitutes of less than 5 percent.7" Furthermore, as the court in Moses noted, the conclusions of experts that
there is no significant link between prostitution and the spread
of venereal disease may easily be corroborated inferentially: while
the 15 to 30-year-old age group accounts for 84 percent of all
reported cases of venereal disease, the 30 to 60-year-old age group
accounts for 70 percent of all visits to prostitutes. 0
71"'According to settled principles the police power of a State must be held to embrace,
at least, such reasonable regulations . . . as will protect the public health and the public
safety." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1904).
7:MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12, Comment at 171-75 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
7
'Id. at 171.
"I!d. at 175.
71ld.
at 171 n.10, 173 n.20, 174 n.21.
77James & Burstin, supra note 59, at 9.
7
'United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),

slip op. at 15, citing DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,

per J. Millar, M.D., Chief, Veneral Disease Branch, Center for Disease Control, Atlanta,
Ga. (June 1,1972).
7"Sherwin & Winick, supra note 69; Honolulu Star Bulletin, Mar. 23, 1972, at B-8.
"James & Burstin, supra note 59, at 8.
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What conclusions can be drawn from the above data? First,
because the incidence of venereal disease among prostitutes is
approximately 5 percent, it can be assumed that approximately
5 percent of all persons who patronize prostitutes will thereby
acquire venereal disease. But is a legally protected interest of a
patron invaded by the acquisition of venereal disease from a consensual act of intercourse? This question must be answered in the
negative because, as previously established, the harm requirement cannot be satisfied if the only injury resulting from a given
act is to the individual performing that act.
However, the possibility exists that the patron who acquires
venereal disease from a prostitute will transmit that disease to
another, who may in turn transmit it to another, and so on. While
at no point will there be legally cognizable harm to any individuals who acquire venereal disease from a consensual act of intercourse, at some point the contagion may reach a dimension where
it can be said to invade the broad interest in community health.
Does the prostitute who infects a patron who in turn infects
other members of the community cause harm to the interest in
community health? The existence of venereal disease can be factually demonstrated and its widespread existence invades a legally protected interest. Therefore only one element of legal harm
still remains to be fulfilled: Is the invasion of the interest imminently forthcoming from the act?
There is a perceivable chain of causation, composed of a
series of acts of intercourse, between the act by which the patron
was first infected and the ensuing infection of numerous members
of the community-which widespread infection constitutes the
harm. Thus it could be maintained that the prostitute who infected the patron, who in turn transmitted the disease to other
members of the community, caused harm to the interest in community health. But it could just as logically be maintained that
the patron who first transmitted venereal disease to the prostitute, who transmitted it to a patron, who in turn transmitted it
to other members of the community, caused the harm to the
interest in community health. With whom should the chain of
causation be said to originate?
Is there validity to the argument that the harm should be
attributed to prostitutes as a matter of policy-on the grounds
that they account for a great volume of indiscriminate sexual
activity? The problem with this argument is that it fails to focus
accurately on the harm involved. The harm is widespread vener-
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eal disease and it is caused by indiscriminate sexual activity by
one who has venereal disease. Even if it is conceded that prostitutes may contribute more than their proportional share to the
spread of venereal disease, the fact remains that they only cause
a very small fraction-approximately 5 percent-of all venereal
disease.
Therefore,a criminal provision which prohibits all prostitution in order to prevent the harm of venereal disease bears no
reasonable relation to the end it is designed to serve, and consequently is an invalid exercise of the police power. The Supreme
Court stated long ago:
The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled
by mere pretenses. They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn
duty-to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon
the inquiry whether the Legislature has transcended the limits of its
authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted
to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety,
has no real or substantial relation to those objects . . . it is the duty
of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.",

Most importantly for purposes of a harm analysis, the finding that provisions criminalizing prostitution bear no substantial
relationship to the object they are designed to protect-community health-means that although there may be a
perceivable chain of causation between the prohibited conduct
and some resulting harm, the relationship between the act and
the resulting harm is too attenuated to fulfill the imminence requirement.
The harm alleged to be caused by prostitution to community
health fails to satisfy the criteria of legal harm and thus fails to
provide the necessary justification for criminalization.
D. Subjection of Citizens to Offensive Solicitation
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by the subjection of citizens to offensive public solicitation? The determination of harm in this instance is a matter
of some difficulty since it is unclear whether or not a legally
protected interest is involved. The issue is twofold: first, whether
the public's sensibilities are ever a legally protected interest; and
secondly, even if they are sometimes legally protected, whether
I'Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
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or not they are protected when the only interference stems not
from acts, but speech.
That the public's sensibilities receive some protection may
be shown by an examination of the internal division of penal
codes. Such crimes as prostitution, open lewdness, and
disseminating obscene materials are often subsumed under the
appellation "Public Indecency." 2 The crime of open lewdness is
based squarely on protection of the sensibilities of others; statutes
prohibiting open lewdness make it a crime to do "any lewd act
which [the actor] knows is likely to be observed by others who
would be affronted or alarmed." 83
Despite consensus on the permissibility of protecting public
sensibilities from offensive acts, first amendment issues arise
when protection is attempted to be invoked against offensive
speech. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the right of
an individual to be shielded from speech which he may deem
offensive is severely limited by the right of others to enjoy the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment."4
But even assuming that public sensibilities are a legally protected interest and that offensive public solicitation for the purposes of prostitution causes an invasion of that interest, the issue
remains whether the practice of prostitution is the cause in fact
of the harm which results from such solicitation. The answer is
that it is not the cause in fact. Publicly soliciting customers for
one's business is by no means an intrinsic part of doing business;
were prostitution not illegal, the multifarious mechanisms for
procuring business available to the average commercial enterprise would likewise be available to prostitutes. Great Britain has
recognized the separability of prostitution and solicitation for
prostitution and deals with whatever problems are caused by the
latter directly. It continues to apply criminal sanctions to offensive public solicitation while preserving the noncriminal status of
prostitution itselr 5 in keeping with the recommendations of the
8 that private sexual
Wolfenden Report"
behavior between consenting adults should not be criminalized.
art. 251 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
93!d. § 251.1.
"'Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'"Street Offenses Act, 7 & 8 ELIZ. 2, c. 57 (1959).
"MODEL PENAL CODE,

"COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT,

25 (1957).

CMND No. 247 at
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Because prostitution and public solicitation for prostitution
are separate and severable, the harms occasioned by the latter
should not be attributed to the former. No invasion of the interest
denominated the public's sensibilities is caused by prostitution
itself; therefore, this asserted harm cannot serve as a basis for
criminalization of prostitution, but only for criminalization of
offensive public solicitation.
A statute which prohibited all public solicitation, whether or
not offensive, would not only encounter serious first amendment
problems,8 7 but would suffer from the defect of not satisfying the
requirements of legal harm. Statutory prohibitions of solicitation
should be drafted to incorporate the requirement that to be punishable, solicitation must in fact invade the public sensibilities.
Furthermore, "[i]n order to curb effectively the use of undesirable police techniques, it might also be desirable to provide that a
conviction for public solicitation should require evidence that the
person solicited was offended thereby .... "88
Under such a statute, 89 present enforcement practices for
prostitution could not continue. Unlike the majority of offenses
which involve a complaint by a harmed citizen, "morals offenses"
are enforced by the costly practice 0 of police posing as potential
customers; "[i]n these cases, the policemen holding themselves
out as potential customers seeking solicitation can scarcely claim
to have been offended or harrassed [sic] by any conversation
their subterfuge elicited."'"
An alternative method of dealing with harm caused by offensive public solicitation is through presently existing breach of the
peace or disorderly conduct statutes. The court in Moses suggests
this approach.9" Statutes or ordinances which
1 United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 3, 1972),
slip op. at 24-26.
"RH. PACKER, supra note 5, at 331.

"Such a statute could be worded:
A person commits an offense if he addresses another in a manner designed
to, or likely to, and which does offend that other, for the purpose of engaging
that other in a sexual act for hire.
"'A publication prepared by the Alliance for a Safer New York suggests that present
enforcement practices of prostitution laws result in a yearly loss to the nation of $10
million. "On a per case basis it is one of the most expensive non-victim crimes to 'control.'
San Francisco estimates run to about $270,000 a year, or $175 per arrest." ALLIANCE FOR A
SAFER NEW YORK, CRIMES WITH No VICTIMS 35 (1972).
"United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),
slip op.
at 23.
2
1 1d. at 25.
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make it unlawful to provoke a breach of the peace by acting in a
manner as to annoy, disturb, obstruct or be offensive to others,
[focus] narrowly on the problem of the individual grievously offended by certain language. . . . [An] advantage of this or some
alternative "disorderly conduct" statute is that ... the individual
citizen as complainant ascertains the offense, rather than . . . a
police officer . . . whose quality of performance is measured by the
number of successful prosecutions flowing from his efforts."3

In summary, the allegation that the practice of prostitution
causes harm by subjecting citizens to offensive public solicitation
is unfounded in that prostitution is distinct from solicitation and
is not the cause in fact of whatever impairment of legally
protected interests is caused by the latter. While some solicitation for prostitution may be criminally prohibited, the principle
of harm requires that the criminal prohibition include only that
solicitation which causes an invasion of the legally protected interest of the public's sensibilities.
E. Destruction of Morals
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by contributing to the destruction of morals? Of all
the harms alleged to be caused by prostitution, this requires the
most careful scrutiny. Not only is it probable that this alleged
harm is foremost in the minds of those who advocate criminalization of prostitution,94 but it is a "harm" which is inevitably approached and analyzed incorrectly. The court's treatment of this
alleged harm in Moses is illustrative of the problem; although it
recognized the primacy of the alleged harm in the mind of the
legislature, it phrased the issue in misleading and ultimately ineffectual terms:
The inordinate overextension of this statute, so disproportional with
any of the potential evils occasioned by solicitation for prostitution,
contributes to the inevitable deduction that the government's primary concern here is to suppress prostitution because it is "immoral." Having reached what this Court believes to be the central, if
tacit, state interest in these cases, it must now consider the broad
question of the right of government to regulate morality."

As emphasized above,9" the real issue is not whether, but
9:11d.

§ 207.12, Comment at 171 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
"United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),
slip op. at 28.
"See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra,
"MODEL PENAL CODE
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when, government may regulate morality. Because of the many
instances in which morals receive, if not direct protection, at least
indirect protection through the overlap of moral and legal
prohibitions (e.g., prohibitions against taking the life of another),
this analysis will presume morality to be a legally protected interest. Attention will be focused on the issue of whether or not prostitution imminently causes a factually demonstrable invasion of
that interest.
The first obstacle to resolution of this issue is the difficulty
of determining exactly what constitutes the interest. It begs the
question merely to assert that "morals" means the public morals 7-whose morals are to be the standard? In In re Davis98 a
California court struggled with a similar issue in reviewing a conviction under a statute which made it a crime "wilfully and
wrongfully" to commit any act "which openly outrages public
decency." 9 9 In attempting to decide what constitutes a violation
of "public decency" the court asked:
"[Wiho is the public?" . . . That answer is a great deal easier to
give in a homogeneous society, in times of well established precepts
of morality and manners, such as Victorian England, than today
....
When the statute speaks of "public decency" does it presuppose some kind of consensus among the majority of the public as to
what is and what is not "decent" and, if that assumption is wrong,
to which segment of the public is the trier to look?' ®

In a complex and pluralistic urban society a term as amorphous
as morals cannot easily be ascribed meaning.
Even if one uses as the standard whatever the majority,
through the medium of the penal code, says the public morals are,
the problem remains to determine when those morals have been
destroyed, wholly or in part, by a given act. To maintain that
harm may be presumed from the simple act of disobedience of the
mandate would be to ignore an essential element of legal
harm-that it be factually demonstrable.
Does prostitution, as is frequently maintained, in some manner cause a public harm? The danger of an allegation of "public
harm" is that it often serves as "an intellectual smokescreen hiding a lack of analysis."'"' "Society has no interests over and above
"7Comment, supra note 34, at 582 n.4.
"242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. App. 1966), vacated, 245 Cal. App. 2d
376, 53 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1966).
"CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 6501/2 (West 1970).

'"242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 652, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702, 706-07 (Cal. App. 1966).
'"'Comment, supra note 34, at 592.
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the interests of its constituent members. To say that society is
harmed can only mean that some number of individuals are
harmed."""2 Therefore, in every allegation of a public harm there
must be some ascertainable member or members of the public
who are harmed. Asserting the existence of a public harm thus
does not destroy the need to demonstate factually who is harmed
and in what manner.
In this case it is impossible to identify an effect on anyone's
morals except possibly those of the participants. But can the
morals of the participants be legally harmed? The requirement
of harm to others necessitates answering this question in the negative. The morals of the participants are not interests which are
legally protected against actions taken by themselves.
It can be seen that attempts to establish harm by destruction
or impairment of the interest denominated "general morals" are
deficient by virtue of an inability to establish a factually demonstrable invasion of a legally protected interest. However, this
is not the only weakness in the argument that deviation from
community notions of morality results in destruction of public
morals. The question which highlights the most fallible point in
such an argument is, assuming that there is harm, "Is harm imminently forthcoming from the act?"
Applying the test, "Is there a direct and causal sequence
between the act and the resulting harm, such that the chain of
causation can be perceived and evaluated, and the harm thereby
determined not to be too remote nor the relationship between the
act and the harm too attenuated?" to the alleged harm, no chain
of causation between the act of intercourse and the destruction
of general morals can be perceived. And, as established above, if
the chain of causation is so attenuated that it must be assumed,
liability cannot attach.
The harm to morals alleged to be caused by the practice of
prostitution fails to meet the requirements of legal harm in two
major respects: (1) there is no factually demonstrable invasion of
a legally protected interest; and (2) even if the assumption is
made that the practice of prostitution affects the community's
interest in general morals, the alleged harm is not imminently
forthcoming from the act, but rather is remote and only tangentially connected thereto. Therefore, the harm to morals alleged to
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result from the practice of prostitution fails and criminal liability
cannot be imposed.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps in a country as prone to examine its criminal doctrine as its constitutional doctrine-and to examine the former
within the context of the latter-the crime of prostitution would
long ago have been eliminated. Application of the principle of
harm to the criminalization of prostitution demonstrates that
none of the harms alleged to be caused by prostitution meet the
criteria of legal harm. A rigorous adherence to the principle of
harm would achieve both a reconciliation of prostitution with
fundamental principles of criminal liability and a greater harmony of constitutional and criminal doctrines.
It is entirely too easy to forget that American pride in having
a government of laws and not of men is a sham if those laws are
not founded on reason, sound principles of liability, and, ultimately, the Constitution itself. Recognition and application of
the principle of harm would bring the body of criminal law back
into concord with the most fundamental of constitutional
mandates-that one may not arbitrarilybe deprived of life, liberty, or property. A criminal code which ignores this fundamental
precept, which makes nonharmful conduct criminal, should not
be allowed to stand. It is the duty and responsibility of the courts
to ensure that such codes do not stand and their acceptance of
this responsibility has been too long delayed.
The historic concern of American courts to provide procedural safeguards for those threatened with loss of their liberty is
laudable. It is not enough. If the full scope of liberty guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment is to be realized, the courts must
recognize that due process of law is properly a safeguard of not
only the procedure, but also the substance of the criminal law.
Madeline S. Caughey

NOTE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND EQUITABLE DISCRETION

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)
INTRODUCTION

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)l provides for judicial review of an agency's refusal to produce information. Section
552(a)(3) 2 of that Act grants federal district courts jurisdiction to
order agencies to disclose improperly withheld records. The FOIA
was intended by Congress to give any person access to governmental records, unless the material sought falls within one of nine
expressly enumerated exemptions.' In general, the Act places the
burden on the agency to justify nondisclosure. 4
This Act replaced section 3 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), ' which had granted administrative agencies discretion in determining whether to release information, with little or
no opportunity for judicial review of the agency's action. Under
'5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
"The pertinent text of the statute is set forth in section I, infra.
:'Exempted are:
(b) IMlatters that are ....
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to
the extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). See also Annot., 7 A.L.R. FED. 870 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
'Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237.
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the prior provisions, if agency officials determined that the information sought could be withheld for any of a number of reasons,'
the party seeking the information had no remedy available unless
an action was pending before a court so that pretrial discovery
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be available.'
Both the House and Senate condemned the results under the
prior Act, which through its broad language generally allowed the
withholding of information." The changes made by the FOIA were
fundamental, creating a true disclosure act and eliminating the
vague standards embodied in the APA.
The emphasis in the FOIA on required disclosure, however,
has led to the further question of whether courts should exercise
equitable discretion in applying the Act, beyond determining if
any of the nine specified exemptions apply. An increasing divergence of viewpoint within and between jurisdictions that have
considered this issue has become apparent since the exercise of
such discretion was first upheld in Consumers Union, Inc. v. Veterans Administration.' One view is that the Act allows courts to
exercise equitable discretion; the opposite is that in applying the
Act, courts should limit themselves to ascertaining whether any
specific exemption applies, and, if not, disclosure should be ordered. The recent case of Hawkes v. IRS'" typifies the ongoing
debate regarding equitable discretion under the Act. Hawkes also
provides a vantage point for possible reconciliation of the conflict
that has emerged from this debate.
To understand these recent developments and their implications, this note will analyze the Act's language and its legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended that Act to abro'The prior Act allowed agencies to withhold records for such reasons as secrecy required "in the public interest;" the agency officials determined that the records sought
related to the internal management of the agency; or there was "good cause found" to
withhold
the records. Id.; Annot., supra note 3, at 884.
7
Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237; Annot., supra note 3, at 884-85.
'H.R.REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1965); see Annot., supra note 3, at 879; Note, JudicialDiscretionand the Freedom
of Information Act: DisclosureDenied: Consumers Union v. Veterans Administration, 45
IND. L.J. 421 (1970); Note, Administrative Law-The Freedom of Information Act-The
Use of Equitable Discretion to Modify the Act, 44 TUL. L. REV. 800 (1970).
'301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
For discussions of this issue in light of Consumers Union, see Note, Judicial Discretion
and the Freedom of Information Act: Disclosure Denied: Consumers Union v. Veterans
Administration, supra note 8, at 424; Note, Administrative Law-The Freedom of Information Act-The Use of Equitable Discretion to Modify the Act, supra note 8, at 805.
"467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
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gate courts' equitable remedies, discuss the Consumers Union
and Hawkes cases concerning the use of traditional equitable
principles to withhold disclosure which would otherwise be available under the Act, and propose reconciliation through coexistence of the two seemingly conflicting viewpoints enumerated
above.
I. FOIA: ITS LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The language of the FOIA appears to convey a clear Congressional intent to make the Act the exclusive authority for withholding information. The pertinent sections of the Act provide:
(3) [Elach agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published rules . . . shall make the records promptly

available to any person. On complaint, the district court of the
United States in the district in which the complainant resides, ...
has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain
its action. In the event of noncompliance with the order of the court,
the district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee

(c) This section does not authorize withholding of information
or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section. This section is not authority to withhold
information from Congress."

In spite of this strong language, it is not clear from the legislative history of the Act that Congress intended to exclude judicial use of equitable discretion in the application of the FOIA.
The intention of the Senate in enacting the FOIA was to close the
loopholes of section 3 of the APA, which it superseded, thereby
creating a disclosure act to replace what had become a withholding act. 2 The FOIA was to make available "to any person" all
information disclosable under its terms, and to allow exemptions
based only on the nature of the material sought, not on the identity or status of the seeker." However, the authority of the Senate's interpretation of the Act, approved by the House and Senate
when the Act was passed, is weakened through contradiction by
the interpretation given the Act by the House Committee on
"5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (c) (1970) (emphasis added).
'2S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
'3ld.
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Government Operations, which reported favorably without
amendment on the Senate bill to amend section 3 of the APA.
The House interpretation of the language in subsection 552(a)(3)
was that the proceedings were to be de novo "so that the court
can consider the propriety of the withholding instead of being
restricted to judicial sanctioning of agency discretion."'" The
grant of authority to the district courts was, in the view of the
House, to enjoin an agency from withholding information "whenever [the court] considers such action equitable and appropriate."' Thus, either viewpoint of the Act-that it does or does not
allow equitable discretion in its application by the courts-gives
effect to what was arguably the legislative intent, based on both
the language and the legislative history of the Act.
It has been suggested that an amendment is necessary to
clarify Congressional intent with respect to equitable discretion.
During the 1972 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, one witness stated:
Those of us who participated, in the 1960's, in the drafting and
passage of the act never dreamed that our glaring imperfections
would be reviewed and, hopefully, corrected at such an early stage.
We knew that we had achieved only a small beginning, and that we
had compromised away much for the sake of passage of the act.
The major deficiencies in the act as codified, in my view, are
contained in section 552(a)(3) and (4).
. . . [T]he
to any person"
into a person's
of the Freedom
any particular
cords, nor that

phrase "shall make the records promptly available
is still causing troubles. Judges continue to inquire
"need to know." It was not the intent of the drafters
of Information Act that a person should have to have
or stated reason for wishing to see Government remotivation should be a matter for the courts.
. . . [Jludges have decided for themselves that it is discretion-

"1H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th CONG., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
'l1d.
'"The witness was Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., an attorney, described as one of the
"experienced frontline soldiers in the fight for the public's 'right to know' [who has]
brought and is presently engaged in litigation which has substantially opened the doors
on our Government's activities," by Representative William S. Moorhead, Chairman of
the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations. Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act Before a Sub-

comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at
1375-76 (1972).
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ary with them whether they order the production of nonexempt
material. In effect, they are applying theories of equity. This, again,
was not the intention of the drafters. Hence the phrase "has jurisdiction to enjoin" should be changed to read "shall enjoin."' 7

This proposed change, however, would be unlikely to effectuate clearly the intent of Congress to remove equitable discretion
from courts, as there is precedent that even the words "shall
enjoin" are not necessarily sufficient to preclude courts from exercising their inherent equity powers." In commenting on the Supreme Court's position in Hecht Co. v. Bowles," Professor Davis
stated:
Even though the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 provided
that an injunction "shall be granted" against a violation, the Supreme Court held "we do not think that under all circumstances the
court must issue the injunction or other order which the Administrator seeks." The Court emphasized the fundamental character of
equity jurisdiction: "The qualities of mercy and practicality have
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between
competing private claims." The Court accordingly upheld a refusal
to enjoin violations resting on "mistakes . . . made in good faith
When the Supreme Court so holds even under a statutory provision that an injunction "shall be granted," surely equitable traditions apply under the Information Act's provision that the court
"shall have jurisdiction ....
"'"

The Supreme Court recognizes its jurisdiction to exercise
equitable discretion in appropriate cases, and by analogy to the
Hecht case, the Supreme Court would not restrict courts to application of the Act's exemptions where the equities involved called
for additional considerations. If Congress is to limit the equity
powers of a court, then, it must do so expressly, and the words
"shall enjoin" are probably not sufficient to convey decisively
that under all circumstances Congress intends that courts apply
only statutory rules, and not equitable principles.'
7Id. at 1377-78.
"Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944).
"Id.

"'Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminarv Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 767
(1967). But see United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959), wherein the
Supreme Court held that the court must issue an injunction when the statutory requirements of the Labor-Management Relations Act were met.
"'It should be noted, however, that the fact that Congress would change the FOIA to
say "shall enjoin," after extensive hearings showing that this would deprive courts of
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II. FOIA CASES AND THE USE OF EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
A. Consumers Union, Inc. v. Veterans Administration
If words as strong as "shall enjoin" are insufficient under
present rules of statutory construction to remove equitable discretion from the courts, it is hardly surprising that, under the current wording of the Act, numerous cases exist upholding equitable discretion to refuse enforcement in FOIA cases even when the
material sought does not come within a specific exemption.22 In
the first case upholding such discretion, Consumers Union, Inc.
2 " Consumers
v. Veterans Administration,
Union sought release of
Veterans Administration (VA) test results and evaluations that
had served as the basis of a qualified products list from which VA
doctors prescribed hearing aids. The court concluded that although none of the exemptions from disclosure in subsection
552(b) applied, it was not automatically bound under the Act to
order disclosure. The Consumers Union court held that, if records
are not exempted from disclosure under that Act, the court must
order disclosure unless the agency proves that greater harm than
good would result; moreover, the court emphasized that it is the
effect on the public rather than on the person seeking information
2
that must be weighed. 1
equity jurisdiction, might in itself make a stronger case for courts to abstain from exercising their discretion. Generally, however, where principles and rules of equity are extended
or abridged by statute, the statute is given a strict construction, i.e., courts will normally
construe the statute so as to preserve their equitable powers. Dennis v. Prather, 212 Ala.
449, 103 So. 59 (1925); Ethridge v. Pitts, 152 Ga. 1, 108 S.E. 543 (1921); Jay-Bee Realty
Corp. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 330 I1. App. 310, 50 N.E.2d 973 (1943); Brown v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 82 N.W. 1003 (Iowa 1900). It has also been said that a court of equity may
not be divested of its jurisdiction by implication. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry,
Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960). When Congress extends to an equity court power to
enforce statutory enactments, "it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic
power of equity to provide complete relief in the light of statutory purposes." Id. at 292.
"Cases holding or implying that courts do have equitable discretion to decide whether
to order disclosure of documents not exempt from the Act include Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972); General Servs. Admin. v. Benson,
415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Consumers
Union v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot,
436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). Cases with implications that such discretion does not exist
include Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62
(6th Cir. 1972); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448
F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dictum); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir.
1971); Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1972).
1:1301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
"Id. See Annot., supra note 3, at 891; Wiel, Administrative Finality, 38 HARV. L. REV.
447, 462 (1925) (discussion of effects of administrative action on the public); Davis, supra
note 20.
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The Consumers Union court expressly adopted the general
rule that statutes are not to be construed so as to divest by implication a court of equity of its jurisdiction.", The court looked to
the language of subsection 552(a)(3) granting district courts "jurisdiction to enjoin,"" which sounds in equity, as a basis for its
reasoning that courts can and should apply their full equity powers in FOIA cases.
The mandate in subsection 552(a)(3) that "the court shall
determine the matter de novo"27 has also been used as a basis for
arguing that the general scope of judicial review in considering an
order to disclose particular records should not be limited merely
to determining the technical applicability of the nine exemptions.
The injunction is an equitable remedy. In a trial de novo under
subsection (c) the district court is free to exercise the traditional
discretion of a court of equity in determining whether or not the
relief sought by the plaintiff should be granted."

Under this argument, subsection 552(a)(3) is interpreted as implicitly providing for the use of equitable discretion, and therefore
the restriction of subsection 552(c) does not prevent courts from
exercising such discretion.
B. Hawkes v. IRS
Equally forceful arguments have been made by courts refusing to apply equitable discretion when none of the FOIA exemptions authorize withholding information. The majority opinion in
Hawkes v. IRS2"' typifies the latter approach. In Hawkes, the
plaintiff had been indicted for tax fraud, and to prepare his defense sought information and documents held by the IRS, some
through regular discovery proceedings and some extrajudicially.
The IRS declined to release some of the requested information,
including portions of an IRS manual which had not been requested through the discovery proceedings. Hawkes then sought
in a separate action under the FOIA an order requiring disclosure
of all requested materials. The IRS successfully moved for dis".See the discussion of general principles concerning statutory enactments and equity
discretion, supra note 21.
2'5
U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
2

Id.

GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE APA
27. 29 (1967). Subsection (c) provides that the Act does not authorize withholding inforination except as specifically provided. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970); see text accompanying
note 11 supra.
2'467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
2'ATToRNEY
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missal, arguing that disclosure under the FOIA was an equitable
remedy which should not be granted when there was an adequate
remedy at law available, here discovery proceedings. The IRS
also argued that the material sought was specifically exempted
from the FOIA under subsection 552(b)(2).10 The district court
ruled in favor of the IRS, and, while his civil appeal was pending,
Hawkes entered a plea of nolo contendere to the fraud case and
was sentenced to prison.'
Although the Sixth Circuit was able to dispose of Hawkes'
civil appeal on an unrelated issue,32 the court felt the matter of
equitable discretion was of sufficient importance to merit comment, even though the court specifically declined to set a binding
precedent pending a "live controversy." 33
The majority in Hawkes looked to the intent of the legislature as their basis for rejecting the IRS' argument that a district
court, in applying the FOIA, is bound by rules traditionally governing equity courts, and in particular the principle that equitable relief is not to be granted where an adequate remedy at law
exists. The Hawkes majority reasoned that not only may Congress cut back on both discretionary power and on restrictions of
equity jurisdiction when it grants courts injunctive power to enforce federal policy, but that Congress actually intended to do so
under the Act. Therefore, they reasoned, Congress did not intend
to require exhaustion of the criminal discovery process as a prerequisite to disclosure under the FOIA. The court held that in accordance with Congressional intent the FOIA denies the court
power to refuse disclosure of materials covered by the Act for any
34
reason other than those exceptions listed in subsection 552(b).
The majority pointed out that protection for documents to be
disclosed only through the discovery process is afforded ly
subsections 552(b)(7) and (b)(3) of the Act, and that whatever
conflicts might arise between criminal discovery procedure and
civil disclosure suit under the Act would be minimal in nature
and could be handled by the judicial process.35
U5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970).
:'467 F.2d at 790 n.3.
3
The lower court had failed to consider the propriety of withholding all the requested
information. Its ruling, and the IRS' arguments for dismissal, focused solely upon the IRS
manual. Id. at 790-91.
:Id.at 792-93 n.6.
3
This is also the position of the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits. Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1972, 1973 DUKE L.J. 178 n.9.
: 467 F.2d at 792-93 n.6.
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The court viewed the legislative history of section 3 of the
APA and of the Information Act as expressing an intent to allow
exemptions based "on the nature of the material sought-not the
identity or status of the seeker. '" ' Therefore application of the
principle that equitable relief would not be granted where an
adequate remedy at law exists would thwart the Act's purpose
since it would require a court to look at the seeker's situation and
reasons for requesting the information in order to determine if he
might obtain the requested information through any other legal
means prior to allowing him to invoke the injunctive remedy
provided by the Act. In sum, the majority in Hawkes found that
in giving effect to Congressional intent the court, under the Act,
does not possess its full equitable powers.
C.

Judge Miller's Separate Opinion in Hawkes
Judge Miller in his separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, did not agree that the power of a court sitting
in equity is necessarily restricted by the FOIA, and especially
objected to the majority's discussion of the equitable discretion
question prior to its presentation in a live controversy. 3 He stated
that "a strong argument can be made that courts do possess
equitable powers under the Act." ' It was his opinion that it was
unnecessary to decide whether a court may apply equitable principles under the Act, but since the majority saw fit to speak out
on the issue he resisted their contention that the FOIA generally
restricts discretionary jurisdiction and the powers of a court sitting in equity.
The majority and Judge Miller start from contrary premises:
The majority, that application of the FOIA is governed by the
legislative intent which precludes a court from exercising its traditional equitable jurisdiction; Judge Miller, that the court retains equity powers when applying the Act, since neither its language nor its history expressly provides otherwise.
II.

RESOLUTION

By juxtaposing and analyzing the seemingly conflicting viewpoints of the Consumers Union court and the Hawkes court, a
basis for resolution can be found. An analysis of Judge Miller's
"'Id.See also id. at 790 n.3.
'1d. at 797.
:'Id. Judge Miller was quoting his concurring opinion in Tennessean Newspapers, Inc.
v. FHA. 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972).
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separate opinion in the Hawhes case is a helpful catalyst to this
process.
Judge Miller's remarks, while stating the general rule that
the court cannot be deprived of its equitable powers by mere
statutory enactment, appear to recognize some limitation on
these powers. Judge Miller qualifies his objections by saying that
it is "unnecessary to decide whether a court may not in some
situations under the Freedom of Information Act apply general
equitable principles.' ' His is not a categorical rejection of any
encroachment whatsoever on the court's equity powers, but a
rejection of general abdication of such powers. Even though
Judge Miller does not accept the majority's view that the Act's
legislative history controls its application such that the court
becomes bound to implement the Act in place of exercising its
own equitable powers, he appears to concur in all other aspects
of the majority opinion. And in so doing Judge Miller impliedly
accepts the Act as preempting the court's discretion at least to
the extent that equitable principles do not become applicable
unless the court first determines that none of the nine exemptions
apply. This reasoning necessarily implies that the Act requires
court review of an agency's action in withholding information,
and possible application of any of the Act's statutory exemptions,
prior to applying general equitable principles and imposing a
nonstatutory remedy. Such a modified approach would not preclude the trying of a suit altogether, as would, for example, the
principle that where an adequate remedy at law exists equitable
relief is not available.' The necessity of following this sequence
creates a condition precedent to the exercise of a court's traditional equitable discretion, thereby placing some limit on its
equity jurisdiction.
:11467 F.2d at 797 (emphasis added).
"Concerning available remedies for withholding disclosable information, it is interesting to note the contradiction between the Department of Justice's endorsement of a court's
inherent equitable powers in administering the Act and the statement of Mr. Robert
Ackerly, another attorney engaged in litigation under the FOIA, who was called to testify
before the 1972 House Subcommittee on Government Operations. Discussing the possibility of speeding up agency action by asking the court to enjoin renegotiation proceedings
until the agency complies with the Act, he stated: "The Department of Justice denies that
the court has any jurisdiction whatsoever to enter an injunction outside the injunction
mentioned in the Act." Hearings, supra note 16, at 1401. Accepting Mr. Ackerly's statement as accurate, the position of the Justice Department, that a court has inherent power
to exercise equitable discretion, but that this does not extend to shaping equitable remedies, is untenable.
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On the other hand, the view of the majority in Hawkes, and
of the other circuits holding the same way, appears to leave itself
open for the exercise of equitable discretion if the need should
arise. It is significant that the Hawkes majority declined to hold
as a rule of law that in general the Act precludes exercise of a
court's equity powers. Similarly, Soucie v. David,4 often cited for
holding that the Act precludes a court's equity powers, also leaves
itself leeway for applying equity rules in extreme circumstances.4 2
These cases which uphold the Act's displacement of the court's
equity jurisdiction, seem to imply that in extreme circumstances,
if none of the Act's exemptions apply so as to withhold disclosure,
the court retains such equitable powers as are necessary to do
justice outside the Act's language.
A basis for resolution of these seemingly antagonistic points
of departure exists in the recognition that, although certain of a
court's traditional powers have been limited and that certain
equitable principles have been made inapplicable under the
Act,4 situations may arise which could lead the court to apply
equitable principles." The resolution of the equitable discretion
question, then, would not necessarily involve a substantial shift
from present policy and practice, but would lie in the courts'
incorporation of both of the positions that have been developing.
This compromise, if adopted by the courts, would make for an
adaptable, flexible, and realistic application of the FOIA.
'448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'-The Soucie court stated:
Since judicial use of traditional equitable principles to prevent disclosure would upset this legislative resolution of conflicting interests, we are
persuaded that Congress did not intend to confer on district courts a general
power to deny relief on equitable grounds apart from the exemptions in the
Act itself. There may be exceptional circumstances in which a court could
fairly conclude that Congress intended to leave room for the operation of
limited judicial discretion, but no such circumstance appears in the present
record of this case.
Id. at 1077 (footnote omitted).
"E.g., the principle that equity is not available where an adequate remedy at law
exists should not be applied under the Information Act since this would focus on the seeker
rather than the material sought. It is true that this principle was also rejected in Hawkes
because of the change of circumstance such that substantial justice would have been
denied had the court applied it. But the majority intimated that the district court was
not justified in apparently accepting the IRS' argument that this principle applied.
Also, certain equitable principles which would bar an action altogether are made
inapplicable because the court must first apply the Act to find if any exemptions apply
before considering any equitable principles.
"See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
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Incorporation of both views, however, would necessarily impose equity jurisdiction (at least in extreme circumstances, with
the definition and application of what is "extreme" left up to the
courts) on courts such as the Hawkes majority which do not want
equity jurisdiction under the Act. Moreover, such a two-step resolution, in which the Act is first construed to find out if any exemption applies, and then if none applies the courts are allowed
to invoke equity jurisdiction, could result in a one-sided construction in favor of nondisclosure, in effect giving the government two
chances in which to defy what appears on the Act's face to be a
clear mandate to disclose. Such a result flies in the face of the
Act's purpose, and yet appears justified somewhat by the ambivalence inherent in its language and history.
CONCLUSION

Realistically, however, the circuit courts appear unlikely to
resolve the equitable discretion question on their own, since five
circuits have already reached conflicting positions on the issue.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have upheld courts' equitable discretion in applying the FOIA, and the Fourth, Sixth, and District
of Columbia Circuits have decided that courts do not have such
discretion under the Act.", Although the Supreme Court could
decide this issue, it has not yet done so. Therefore, the solution
to the equitable discretion question will more likely be forthcoming, if at all, from Congress.
Phyllis L Crist
"Note, supra note 34.

COMMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THE

COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-

§ 3-16-6: Application-A
Matter of Construction

CEDURE AcT-COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

INTRODUCTION

The coexistence of procedural requirements in the State
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)' and in the organic statutes
of many state agencies frequently presents a dilemma for the
Colorado attorney representing a client in an administrative matter. He must choose the applicable procedures from overlapping
and sometimes inconsistent statutory authority. To guide him in
this choice the final section of the APA provides that "where
there is conflict between the APA and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision
shall control as to such agency."' Prior to 1969 this provision had
simply stated that specific statutory provisions pertaining to a
specific agency "shall control as to such agency." ' Implicit in the
addition of the conflict language to section 3-16-6 is the legislature's intent to make procedures in an organic statute and the
APA jointly apply where they parallel each other. The 1969
amendment's expanded definition of the APA's jurisdiction,
which makes it apply "to every agency of the state having statewide territorial jurisdiction" and also "to every other agency to
which it is made to apply by specific statutory reference"' further
evidences the intended overlap. Taken together, these changes
suggest a legislative attempt to delineate the APA's scope and to
clarify its proper application.
Two recent Colorado Supreme Court cases have interpreted
section 3-16-6 as amended: North Kiowa-Bijou Management District v. Ground Water Commission5 and PUC v. District Court.'
'CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-16-1 to -7(Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV, STAT. ANN.
§§ 3-16-1 to -7 (1963). Section 3-16-7 provides that the entire article shall be known and
cited as the "State Administrative Procedure Act."
'CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (Supp. 1969).
'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (1963).
'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added). Prior to 1969 the
APA's jurisdiction had to be inferred from the definition of "agency" in section 3-16-1.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-1 (1963). The addition of the language quoted in text to
section 3-16-6 obviates the necessity for such an inference by providing a clearly dispositive definition of the APA's jurisdiction.
5505 P.2d 377 (Colo. 1973).
'505 P.2d 1300 (Colo. 1973).
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Although they arose under different statutes, both cases involved
judicial review of administrative action. Unfortunately, neither
opinion adequately examined the possible application of the APA
to the procedural problems involved.
In PUC the court concluded, after quoting the conflict language in section 3-16-6, that the APA should not apply because
"the statutory authority governing the judicial review of PUC
orders and decision is specifically detailed in 1969 Perm. Supp.,
C.R.S. 1963, 115-6-14, 15 and 16."1 In a similar perfunctory manner the court in North Kiowa concluded:
As a threshold matter. . . the Code has no applicability where
a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency provides
a scheme for the administrative control of that agency. Such is the
situation with the Ground Water Management Act. . ., which contains a comprehensive scheme for administering the provisions of
that article!

While PUC does at least acknowledge the existence of the
new APA language, neither opinion addresses itself to an interpretation of the conflict requirement. Specifically, neither opinion lays out any conflict it has found between provisions in the
organic statutes and the APA. The court thus fails to require,
much less define, the statutorily mandated conflict. As a result
the attorney, when forced to choose between the parallel procedures, is left with broad, imprecise standards-whether or not the
organic procedures are "specifically detailed" or constitute a
"comprehensive scheme"-which may sanction arbitrary exclusion of the APA in many situations where it should now apply.
A particularized construction of the conflict language should
have been an important issue in both cases. The problem is the
extent to which a conflict precludes use of the APA. Does any
conflict eliminate the entire APA provision or section in question,
or should the organic statute control only insofar as there is actual, specific conflict, thus leaving the APA's procedures operational on all other points? The question becomes one of legislative
intent and the extent to which the APA's standardized
procedural scheme should supplement organic statutes where
they are silent. This comment will pursue the legislative history
of the 1969 amendment in order to clearly establish an intent to
at 1301 (emphasis added).
1505 P.2d at 379 (emphasis added). The Ground Water Management Act may be
found at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1965).
7Id.
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expand the APA's use and will then suggest a construction of the
amended language which will correctly direct the application of
the coexisting procedures where they conflict.'
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT

A.

Administrative Codes: The Basic Concept
The basic idea underlying the promulgation of an administrative code is the standardization of administrative procedures
in one enactment and the application of those procedures to all
agencies within a jurisdiction. While the concept has won wide
acceptance, in practice many situations exist in which the particular needs of individual agencies require specialized procedures.
Moreover, even in some instances where the merits of such specialized needs are debatable, the special procedures remain
because local concerns-the vested interest of an entrenched bureaucracy or specialized bar-so dictate."'
Where such compromise obtains, as it often does in
Colorado," there are two possible solutions to the inherent problem of conflict between provisions of the organic statutes and the
uniform procedures of an administrative code. First, where specific statutory procedures exist, they could be deemed controlling
and exclusive. PUC and North Kiowa incorrectly suggest this
possibility, although without clearly articulating such a rule. Second, the separate provisions can coexist and jointly apply. Although this solution lacks the definiteness of the first solution, it
allows potentially broader employment of the APA, a preferable
result since the specialized organic procedures, even if they serve
a legitimate, particular need, are often skeletal. 2 Colorado's statutory scheme, the PUC and North Kiowa opinions notwithstanding, should be interpreted so as to follow this second possibility.
B. The Conflict Requirement: Its Origin and Intent
In support of the proposition that the amended language of
section 3-16-6 should be read to increase the APA's use is the
specific origin of the language and the expressed intention of its
'Obviously, in a situation where the organic and code procedures parallel each other
exactly there is no problem of choosing between them.
''More often than not, this situation arises when the organic statute of an agency
predates the adoption of the State APA. See note 11 infra.
"See Henry, The Colorado Administrative Procedure Act: Exclusions Demanding
Reform, 44 DENVER L.J. 42 (1967).
2
See text accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
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author. The origin of the conflict language, and, in fact, the
meaning of the entire provision, has a history unique to Colorado.
The drafters of the Colorado APA worked from both the revised
Model State APA and the final draft of a revised federal code
which was never enacted. 3 Hubert Henry, a longtime Chairman
of the Administrative Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Association and the drafter of much of the language in the Model
State APA, including the 1969 amendment to section 3-16-6,
points out, however, that many changes and additions were made
to conform to Colorado's specific needs. 4 The language in section
3-16-6 is one of these changes, and it represents Colorado's novel
"solution" to the problem of inconsistencies between the APA
and organic statutes. The absence of similar language in other
states negates the possibility of using constructions from other
jurisdictions as a guide. This circumstance places primary importance on the amendment's legislative history. Fortunately,
such legislative history is available and it offers not only insight
into the origin of the amended language, but also directions as to
its proper construction.
The conflict language was first proposed by Henry in a 1967
Denver Law Journal article as the desired judicial construction
of the pre-1969 language of section 3-16-6.1 Arguing for a judicial
interpretation that would increase the APA's use, he contended:
The number of conflicts can and should be held to a minimum by
strictly and narrowly construing the crucial provision that "where a
specific statutory provision applies to a specific agency, 6such specific statutory provision shall control as to such agency.'

The author then proceeded to articulate the interpretation he
would give the provision in words later to be codified in the 1969
amendment:
Only if there is an actual conflict between the APA and the statute
applying to any specific agency, does the latter control, and then
only to the extent of the specific conflict.'"

To whatever degree the language of the statute fails to convey an
exact, statutory command as to the application of the article, the
words and intent of its author should supply the proper direction.
:Henry, supra note 11, at 43.

111d.
"Id.
at 50.
16Id.
'"Id. (emphasis added).
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II. A MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION
The language of the 1969 amendment deserves detailed attention from the court, for it provides a workable, even if not
precise, guide to the legislature's intention. The conflict requirement has suffered, though, from an unfortunate judicial tendency
to apply the APA not according to its own instructions, but in
accordance with traditional rules of common law construction.
In 1968 the Colorado Supreme Court construed the preamendment language of section 3-16-6 in Shoenberg Farms, Inc.
5 The defendants wanted the adequacy of notice issue
v. People."
to be resolved by reference to section 3-16-6 of the APA, but,
according to the court in this case, the state APA is a general law
and "[iut is a general rule of statutory construction that a specific statute prevails over a general one."' 9 There was no need,
however, to resort to this general rule of statutory construction in
order to preclude the application of the APA to this case. A separate provision of the organic statute in question provided that the
organic procedures should control to the exclusion of any general
law. 9 The resulting, unnecessarily broad preemption of the APA
foreshadows the treatment section 3-16-6 received in North
Kiowa and PUC. 1
In Colorado, it is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that in construing amendments a change in meaning must
be attributed to a change in language.2" Furthermore, "[ijn arriving at legislative intent, the language of an amendment must
be construed in light of previous decisions by courts of last resort
"23 Therefore, it must be preconstruing the original act . .
sumed that the legislature had in mind the judicial construction
in the Shoenberg Farms opinion when the 1969 amendment was
passed. Construed in light of the Shoenberg Farms opinion, the
'1166 Colo. 199, 444 P.2d 277 (1968).
"Id. at 215, 444 P.2d at 285.
"CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-23 (1963).
"Colorado is not the only state where the judiciary has limited the applicability of
an administrative code by resorting to the rule that the specific controls the general. Three
Michigan cases dealing with the availability of APA procedures for judicial review where
such procedures were also provided in the organic statutes in question were decided on
the same basis. Superex Drug Corp. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 375 Mich. 314, 134 N.W.2d
678 (1965); Dossin's Food Prods. v. Michigan State Tax Comm'n, 360 Mich. 312, 103
N.W.2d 474 (1960); Imlay T. Primary School Dist. No. 5 v. State Bd. of Educ., 359 Mich.
478, 102 N.W.2d 720 (1960).
"General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 393 (D. Colo. 1956).
"Industrial Comm'n v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 120, 410 P.2d 181, 184 (1966).
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clause- "[B]ut, where there is a conflict between this article
and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency,
such specific statutory provision shall control as to such
agency" 2 -should have persuaded the court to abandon its reliance upon a blanket application of the specific-over-general rule
in favor of the more restrictive guidelines set forth by the legislature.
The supreme court should have devoted special attention to
the words "conflict" and "specific." Applying the accepted rule
of statutory construction that "[i]n interpreting words of a legislative enactment . . . the intention of the legislature is to be
found in the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute
when considered in the light of the object to be accomplished or
remedied," 2" "conflict" implies terms directly in opposition, an
inconsistency rather than the mere existence of separate statutory provisions which pertain to the same procedures. Moreover,
the adjective "specific" modifies the phrase "statutory provision," and thus narrows the focus to the exact procedural requirements within a provision rather than to the provision as a whole.
The amended language of section 3-16-6 anticipates, then, the
situation where a particular requirement in an organic statute
would actually vary the application of the uniform procedures of
the APA.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in both the North Kiowa and
PUC opinions, failed to give the words such a detailed analysis
and instead relied on more general impressions to reach its conclusions, saying the APA is not to apply where the organic statute
is "specifically detailed" or constitutes a "comprehensive
scheme." The net result of the court's imprecision is the creation
of a doctrine of preemption that, potentially, could be used to
exclude the APA whenever an organic statute provides any procedures for its administration-a result in direct derogation of the
legislative intent embodied in the amended version of section 316-6.
III. APPLICATION
The foregoing analysis of the legislative intent and statutory
language shows that there are problematic deficiencies in the
supreme court's handling of the applicability questicn in PUC
4
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
"Blevins v. Truitt, 134 Colo. 88, 90, 299 P.2d 1100, 1101 (1956).

2
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and North Kiowa. Fortuitously, the procedural questions were
not determinative of the outcome in either case. Indeed, if the
issue were restricted solely to the substantive merit of the decisions, the overbroad language would pose no problem.26 The question is rather the value of these two opinions as precedent on the
more general issue of the APA's application where its procedures
are to some degree paralleled in an organic statute.
A. PUC v. District Court
The organic statute involved in PUC specifically incorporates the APA by reference; however, it also states that "where
there is a specific statutory provision in this chapter applying to
the commission such specific statutory provision shall control as
to the commission. '28 Furthermore, section 115-6-15(4) provides
that "[n]o court of this state, except the district court to the
extent specified, shall have jurisdiction to review . . . or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the performance of its official duties ....
,,2" A closer examination shows
that the procedures in sections 115-6-14 to -16 pertaining to judicial review of agency action are more detailed than those in most
organic statutes. Indeed, the section in issue, 115-6-16(2), which
provides for stays pending judicial review, contains procedures
more detailed than those found in section 3-16-5(5) of the APAP0
The more detailed provisions in the organic statute should obviously control in this case.
Still, the court's sweeping exclusion of the APA, however
specifically detailed the PUC's organic procedures may be in
some respects, fails to give the problem the particular analysis it
needs. Because the specific conflicts are not recited, the standard
2

In PUC it was held that Sentry Services, Inc. lacked standing because it was not a
"person" aggrieved by possible self-incrimination, the fifth amendment right being inapplicable to a corporation. The PUC's order to produce records was upheld and the
district court was prohibited from staying it. Application of the APA's procedures would
have had no effect on this outcome. Likewise, in North Kiowa the holding that the review
provisions in the Ground Water Management Act applied only to rulemaking by the
districts and that review of individual adjudications should be in the district courts would
be unaffected by the APA.
27
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 115-6-1 to -21 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 115-6-1 to -21 (1963).

"CoLo.
29

REV. STAT. ANN.

§

115-6-1(1) (Supp. 1969).

1d. § 115-6-15(4) (emphasis added).

:"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-5(5) (Supp. 1969). The organic statute adds the requirement of a hearing upon 3 days' notice. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 115-6-16(2) (Supp.
1969).
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"specifically detailed" remains vague and without content, potentially subject to misuse in cases where the organic procedures
are not as comprehensive. In short, the court should have limited
its holding to the particular sections involved and itemized the
detailed requirements in the organic statute which make it exclusively controlling.
B. North Kiowa-Bijou Management District v. Ground Water
Commission
The North Kiowa case substantiates the potential for misuse
inherent in the sweeping standards the supreme court has articulated. It also provides a good example of the possible uses of the
APA that would be lost thereunder. In North Kiowa the court's
analysis of the applicability problem is limited to one summary
paragraph where the APA is dismissed because the Ground Water
Management Act provides "a comprehensive scheme for administering the provisions of that article."'" The specific statutory provision which would now control the disposition of the case on
remand, however, is far from comprehensive and, as a solution to
the problem of the applicable form of judicial review, it leaves
many questions unanswered.3 2 It provides in pertinent part, "Any
person aggrieved by an act of the district board

.

. .

may appeal

the same to a court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days
of said decision." 3 When compared to section 3-16-5 of the APA
only one actual "conflict" appears and that is the provision which
provides 60 as opposed to 30 days in which an appeal can be
34
brought .
There exist, then, large areas where the organic statute is
silent, but where the APA details the necessary procedures. The
obvious proposition in a situation such as this is that the APA
should be used to fill in gaps in the procedures outlined in the
organic statute; in other words, the APA should be accorded the
status of a procedural supplement. For example, the APA, if applied, could take care of such potentially difficult problems as
1'505 P.2d at 380.
2
I n fact the original statute was silent on this point, a circumstance which brings into
question the validity of the "comprehensive scheme" test the court used to exclude the
APA. The court seems in reality to have been acknowledging an after-the-fact amendment
to the organic statute [CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-30(1) (Supp. 1971)] which did
provide for review in the district court. Interview with John Maley, attorney, in Denver,
Colorado, June 12, 1973.
:"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-30(1) (Supp. 1971).
ICOLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-5(4) (Supp. 1969).

COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

what constitutes the record on review, the scope of review, and
the procedures necessary to stay action pending review, among
others."
Using virtually indistinguishable standards-"specifically
detailed" and "comprehensive scheme"-the supreme court has
excluded the APA in two vastly dissimilar statutory contexts
(compare the specificity of the review procedures in PUC with the
mere outline in North Kiowa). The court's opinions seem more a
judicial flex of old muscle in the form of familiar rules of statutory
construction than an accurate reading of the statute as it now
stands. The mere existence of parallel procedures in a specific
statute seems to preclude any consideration of the statutorily
required "conflict." Thus, neither opinion offers a functional construction of the amended language of section 3-16-6. The court's
handling of the issue is an invitation to arbitrary and, given the
judicial predisposition, limited application of the code.
CONCLUSION

Employment of all possible procedural guides within the
APA will, of course, not be necessary in every case. In some instances the scheme provided in an organic statute will prove entirely sufficient.36 The important practical result of giving the
APA wider application is that the more comprehensive provisions
are there if needed; moreover, there is also a far-reaching policy
dividend in that the APA procedures will come closer to being the
standard than they now are. Thus, the APA's use and hence its
value can increase if a broadening interpretation is given to the
new conflict requirement. Implicit in this goal is the imperative
that the judicial branch recognize, insofar as the applicability of
the APA is concerned, that the North Kiowa and PUC opinions
must be recast as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself.
The thrust of the 1969 amendment to section 3-16-6 was to
expand the APA's applicability and use. The statutory conferral
of concurrent jurisdiction joins with the logical meaning of the
language, as well as the expressed intention of its author, to argue
persuasively for that result. Therefore, as a rule, coexisting procedures in the APA and organic statutes should jointly apply in all
instances. Where there is conflict the organic statute should con-Id. § 3-16-5.
"'The review provisions in the organic statute of the PUC come immediately to mind
as one example. COLo REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 115-6-1 to -21 (Supp. 1969).
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trol, but only to the extent of the conflict. Where the organic
statute is silent the APA should supplement it. To this end, the
conflict requirement should be interpreted narrowly to mean actual, specific conflict. If so construed, section 3-16-6 will allow
specialized organic procedures to coexist usefully with the more
general provisions of the APA and, when forced to choose between
them, the Colorado practitioner will have a guideline rather than
a dilemma.
William M. Clowdus

COMMENT
TORTS-RELEASE-Release of One Tort-Feasor Not a Release of
Others When Tort-Feasors Are Independent and Successive
Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet Co., 31 Colo. App. 320, 502
P.2d 87 (1972).
INTRODUCTION

The legal consequence that inheres in finding two or more
wrongdoers to be joint tort-feasors' has long been a vexatious area
for the courts and a popular topic for legal writers. Once "jointness" is established, any or all of the following ramifications may
ensue: (1) joinder of defendants in the same action is possible; (2)
each wrongdoer is liable for the entire damages of the injured
party; (3) satisfaction of a judgment against one releases all; (4)
no contribution is permitted between the joint tort-feasors (unless
changed by statute); or (5) a release of one releases all.2 This last
result, the effect of a release, has experienced a particularly agonizing evolution in this country. The relatively harsh common
law rule which required that a release of one joint tort-feasor was
a release of all3 has been attacked, modified, and finally, in great
part, abrogated in favor of a seemingly more just rule.
According to Dean Prosser, a release is "a surrender of the
cause of action, which may be gratuitous, or given for inadequate
consideration." 4 This definition itself has contributed to some of
the problems with the law of releases.' Where there are multiple
wrongdoers and the victim's cause of action is "extinguished,"
i.e., surrendered,by the release of one, a doctrinaire jurist, historically, would have a difficult time letting the plaintiff proceed
with his case when theoretically it had virtually disappeared into
thin air.
This comment reviews the evolution of the law of releases in
Colorado and examines what appear to be contradictory
developments in analogous situations: Colorado's abrogation of
'Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF, L. REV. 413 (1937).
'1d. at 422-25.
:'See,
e.g., Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 42, 298 P.2d 957, 959 (1956); Pinkham Lumber
Co. v. Woodland State Bank, 156 Wash. 117, 131, 286 P. 95, 100 (1930); 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 711 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 301
(4th ed. 1971).
'W. PROSSER, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
VId. at 301-03.
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the common law rule of releases in Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet, Inc.,' contrasted with its continued application of the common law rule in recent cases of medical malpractice.
I.

COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT

As mentioned above, the effect to be given a release where
there are joint tort-feasors has not escaped theoretical confusion.
The common law rule was based, in part, on the notion that since
there was but a single cause of action against both tort-feasors, a
release as to one of them extinguished the cause of action itself
and necessarily protected the others.7 Although the elements of
jointness never seem to have been too clear, once the label was
attached the courts have had no difficulty reaching a conclusion.
The potential for hardship is apparent. Any time the unwitting
victim of multiple wrongdoers released one of them for what
seemed to him to be a roughly pro-rata share of his damages, the
victim later discovered that he was foreclosed from collecting the
balance of his damages from the other wrongdoers.
The courts have justified the common law rule with such
legal flyswatters as proximate cause,' avoidance of double recovery by greedy plaintiffs,9 the single cause of action fiction, 10 and
others. Fortunately, the common law rule has been discarded to
a great extent in most jurisdictions by statutes abolishing or severely weakening the common law rule," by considering the intent of the parties, regardless of the form of the instrument,' 2 and
by construing what appears to be a release as a covenant not to
3
sue.':
'31 Colo. App. 320, 502 P.2d 87 (1972).
'See, e.g., Cocke v. Jennor, 1614 Hob. 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214, 215 (K.B. 1614); Duck v.
Mayeu, [1892] 2 Q.B. 511, 513; W. PROSSER, supra note 3; Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 407
(1960).
'See, e.g., Poltera v. Garlington, 489 P.2d 334, 335 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied,
Oct. 26, 1971 (not selected for official publication).
'See, e.g., Lamoreux v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 48 Cal. 2d 617, 624, 311 P.2d 1, 5
(1957) (dictum).
"'See note 7 supra.
"See, e.g., N.Y. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW §§ 15-101 to -107 (McKinney 1964); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960); Baer, Effect of Release Given Tortfeasor Causing
Initial Injury in Later Action for MalpracticeAgainst Treating Physician,40 N.C.L. REV.
88 (1961); see also 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414, 1416 n.9 (1959) for a list of jurisdictions with
such statutory enactments.
"See, e.g., Jukes v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 181 Kan. 12, 20, 309 P.2d 692,
699 (1957); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954); see also
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 425 (1960) for a collection of cases on this point.
"McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 358-
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The strict common law rule and the seemingly protracted
period of change can be attributed, at least in part, to a rather
serious and prolonged confusion in the courts between a release
and satisfaction. 4 It is said that "[a] satisfaction is an acceptance of a full compensation for the injury."'" As indicated above,
a release could be gratuitous or given for inadequate consideration. 1 A release, therefore, did not necessarily mean the claimant
was satisfied in fact, but since a release at common law was a
sealed instrument which, by definition, dispelled any questions
as to the adequacy of the consideration, 7 the courts mistakenly
considered a release to be for full compensation." Although the
efficacy of the sealed instrument waned, the confusion in the
courts persisted in the form of the so-called presumption of full
satisfaction.
One of the simplest ways for the courts to avoid the common
law rule is to find that the tort-feasors are independent, concurrent, successive, or any other similarly expressive classification
other than joint. This avenue is appealing in that it circumvents
the centuries of fictions and mysteries that have grown up around
joint tort-feasors. Some courts have, in fact, made use of this
distinction. 9 The simplicity of the logic is attractive, and, indeed,
as to independent wrongdoers, not acting in concert, who were
liable for the same loss, there seems to be no reason to conclude that
a release of one would release the others, except insofar as it was
based upon actual satisfaction of the claim.20

As attractive as this path is, it is not totally free from hazards. The obvious question is: Who are joint and who are independent tort-feasors? Harper and James feel that if construed
strictly, "the words 'joint tort' should be used only where the
behavior of two or more tort-feasors is such as to make it proper
59, 146 A.2d 665, 668-69 (1958). A covenant not to sue, unlike a release, does not release
any of the tort-feasors. Instead of extinguishing the cause of action, it is an agreement not
to enforce it against one or more of the wrongdoers; the cause continues to exist and is
enforceable against the nonparty tort-feasors.
"W. PROSSER, supra note 3.

1:Id.
"See
text accompanying note 4 supra.
'7S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS

FROM WILLISTON'S TREATISE ON THE LAW

OF CONTRACTS § 333A (Rev. ed. 1936).
"SW. PROSSER, supra note 3.

"Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 150 F. Supp. 79, 81 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal.2d 654, 657, 150 P.2d 876, 877 (1944); Valles v. Union Pac. R.R., 72 Idaho
231, 238-39, 238 P.2d 1154, 1159-60 (1951).
'W. PROSSER, supra note 3.
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to treat the conduct of each as the conduct of the others as well."',
In an early work," Dean Prosser notes that there have been several tests for "jointness," ' but that the cases in which he found
them "[lead] to the conclusion that 'joint tort-feasor' means
radically different things to different courts, and often to the
same court." 4 Although he may be correct, his conclusion can
only lead to the further conclusion that to establish independence
the practitioner's approach must be as broad-based as possible in
order to square with the court's attitude on any given day. The
most felicitous approach would seem to be an exclusionary one.
Rather than casting about for a positive rule of law to show independence, one ought to guide the court in scrutinizing the actors
under each of the traditional tests for jointness (concert of action,
common plan, etc.) while pointing out the differences. The more
tests the tort-feasors fail, the more likely independence will be
conclusively established. Whatever the method, the literature
taken as a whole shows a definitive trend away from the original
common law rule in all jurisdictions, albeit to varying degrees.
II.

COLORADO DEVELOPMENT

Colorado has been a long and faithful adherent to the common law rule that a release of one joint tort-feasor releases all."
In fact, in 1959, at the time when most other jurisdictions were
in the process of reexamining the old rule, 6 the Colorado Supreme Court held, in Price v. Baker," that a covenant not to sue
had exactly the same effect as a general release and that it was
the legal effect, not the intent of the parties, that was the control21 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, at 692.
2

Prosser, supra note 1.
"They include:
"ITIhe identity of a cause of action against each of two or more defendants;
the existence of a like, or common duty; whether the same evidence will
support an action against each; the single, indivisible nature of the injury
to the plaintiff; identity of the facts as to time, place and result; whether
the injury is direct and immediate, rather than consequential; responsibility
of the defendants for the same injuria, as distinguished from the same
damnum."
Id. at 413.

"Id.
"Ashley v. Roche, 163 Colo. 498, 431 P.2d 783 (1967); Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39,
298 P.2d 957 (1956); Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943); Denver &
R.G.R.R. v. Sullivan, 21 Colo. 302, 41 P. 501 (1895).
2
See 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414 (1959) for a review of the various approaches.
2143 Colo. 264, 352 P.2d 90 (1959). See also 37 DICTA 121 (1960) and 33 RoCKY MTN.
L. REv. 127 (1960).
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ling element." Recently, however, the Colorado courts have
evinced a change of heart. In 1969, the supreme court finally gave
credence to a covenant not to sue and began circumventing the
common law rule by way of the "intent" approach. 9 Even more
encouraging, the court has recently held that a written instrument whereby a plaintiff agrees not to object to the motion to
dismiss of some of the defendants will not affect the plaintiff's
rights as to the remaining tort-feasors, and the intent of the parties will be given the same effect as if it were a pure covenant not
to sue.: This holding would seem to point toward adoption by the
Colorado courts of the "construction of releases as covenants not
to sue" approach; that is, construing an instrument, whatever its
appearance, in such a way that the plaintiff's rights are most fully
protected and preserved. Indeed, were it not for the medical malpractice situation where the Colorado courts have not budged,'
they would appear to have joined the majority jurisdictions in the
space of three or four short years. By examining a case which is
representative of Colorado's attitude in many release situations,
the inconsistency in the malpractice area becomes evident.
2
III. Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet
Rufina Sanchez, the plaintiff, bought a new car from the
defendant, George Irvin Chevrolet. Under the terms of the contract, the defendant had agreed to secure insurance coverage for
the plaintiff. When Mrs. Sanchez sought insurance payment
through Irvin for a broken windshield she was informed that the
defendant had failed to acquire coverage for her, and she was
denied reimbursement for the loss. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Sanchez' automobile was involved in a collision and her car was taken
to the defendant for repairs. While the car was in the defendant's
custody, the rear wheels and tires were stolen, and the windshield
was broken again. The defendant completed repairs on the car
but refused to return it to the plaintiff until the $954.46 bill
(which included the cost of wheels and tires) was paid. The plaintiff was allegedly unable to pay the bill and was forced to rent a
1143 Colo. at 265, 352 P.2d at 91.
"Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 73-74, 450 P.2d 60, 67 (1969).
"Farmer's Elevator Co. v. Morgan, 172 Colo. 545, 474 P.2d 617 (1970).
:"When the second tort-feasor is an allegedly negligent physician, the Colorado courts
continue to hold that the release of the first wrongdoer thereby protects the doctor. Title
v. Freed, 515 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (not selected for official publication); Poltera
v. Garlington, 489 P.2d 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for official publication).
:'131 Colo App. 320, 502 P.2d 87 (1972).
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car. Three months later, Mrs. Sanchez settled with the ownerdriver of the other car involved in the collision and signed a general release from liability in his favor. She subsequently paid the
repair bill and recovered possession of her automobile. She then
brought an action against the defendant to recover the amounts
which she had paid for the stolen wheels and tires, the broken
windshield, and the cost of the rental car on the basis of defendant's alleged negligence. On the defendant's motion, the trial
court granted summary judgment as to all amounts except the
cost of the original windshield on the grounds that the defendant
was protected, as a matter of law, by the release of the earlier tortfeasor. However, the judgment was reversed and remanded by the
Colorado Court of Appeals which held that, where a plaintiff's
claim involves distinct and separate injuries caused by independent successive tort-feasors, a release of one tort-feasor does not
serve to release all unless the evidence discloses an intent to do
so. 3

The court dealt first with Sams v. Curfman34 and Ashley v.
Roche, 35 on which the trial court relied in granting summary judgment. These cases involved original wrongdoers and subsequently
negligent physicians responsible for aggravation of the victims'
injuries. In both it was held that a general release as to the first
tort-feasors shielded the doctor from liability. The theory was
that the first tort-feasor was the proximate cause of the later
aggravation, presumably because the result was reasonably foreseeable. From this the courts reasoned that once the injured party
settled with the original wrongdoer, full compensation was presumed and there was no longer any cause for concern." In
Sanchez, the court pointed out that the presumption of full compensation, which in any event is rebuttable, did not come into
play because of the nature of plaintiffs claim. The claim involved
"distinct and separate injuries" caused by "independent succes' The release,
sive tort-feasors."37
therefore, was effective only as to
the first tort-feasor who was a party to it unless "the evidence
''
discloses an intent to release both. 3
"Id. at 323, 502 P.2d at 89.
:1111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
1'163 Colo. 498, 431 P.2d 783 (1967).
"See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
'731 Colo. App. at 323, 502 P.2d at 89.
:1Id.

1974
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The court next cited Prosser's law review article,39 which had
been quoted with approval in Bayers v. W 0. W., Inc.,40 to introduce the element of actual satisfaction of the claim as the basis
for a multiparty release', and in order to determine the "jointness" (or lack of it) of the actors.42 Finally, after disposing of the
major elements of the case, the court indicated that while a release such as the one here may be a defense at trial, it is not a
bar to suit as a matter of law.
The reasoning and holding in Sanchez are sound, just, and
not lacking in authority,43 and the court's emphasis of the intent
factor in the face of a general release is a proper and realistic
approach. However, in distinguishing the instant case from
Sams" and Ashley,45 the court could have dealt more forcefully
with the full compensation question. Rather than stating that the
presumption of full compensation is a rebuttable one and not
relevant to the Sanchez case (and thereby giving credence to its
very existence), the court might have been a little less delicate,
exposing the presumption as the fiction that it is and emphasizing the existence vel non of actual satisfaction from the outset.
Instead, the court relied on the "independent successive" tortfeasors rationale found in Ash v. Mortensen.6 This case does
provide relevant language, but one wonders if the court was aware
that Ash was a malpractice case, not unlike Sams and Ashley.
The law review quotations are undoubtedly valid and appropriate, with the exception that in the first-quoted material the author is talking about wrongdoers liable for the same loss and the
court had just determined that Sanchez involved separate and
distinct injuries. Although it is possible to quibble with these
citations, the court eventually reaches what seems to be the right
result. Indeed, had the opposite result been reached, "the repairman not only is excused from negligence, he also has a license to
"'Prosser, supra note 1.
"162 Colo. 391, 396, 426 P.2d 552, 555 (1967).
"Id. at 396, 426 P.2d at 555 (1967). " '[Als to independent wrongdoers, not acting in
concert, who were liable for the same loss, there seems to be no reason to conclude that a
release of one would release the others, except in so far as it was based upon actual
satisfaction of the claim.' " Id.
," 'The question is whether, upon the facts, it is possible to say that each defendant
is responsible for a separate portion of the loss sustained.' " Id.
"See generally W. PRossER, supra note 3.
"1ll Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
'1163 Colo. 498, 431 P.2d 783 (1967).
4824 Cal. 2d 654, 657, 150 P.2d 876, 877 (1944).
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steal because the release of the original tort-feasor follows his
47
every act.

IV.

THE ANALOGY TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

In Colorado, a release of one joint tort-feasor still releases a
subsequent tort-feasor who is not a party to the release if he is
an allegedly negligent physician."
The policy considerations in favor of abrogation of the common law rule in this area, besides the generally unjust and unintended result it effects, are numerous and sound. The rule has
been severly criticized as harsh, unfounded, and not in accord
with the trend in other jurisdictions. 9
It has been aptly pointed out that the old rule (1) provides a
trap for the innocent plaintiff whereby he may be deprived of full
compensation, (2) allows the courts to disregard totally the
language and intent of the parties, (3) rewards the wrongdoer who
makes no attempt to settle at the expense of the one who does,
(4) gives tort-feasors an advantage inconsistent with the nature
of their liability, and (5) stifles compromise since each wrongdoer
wants to wait until the other settles first.A0
When the current trend in other jurisdictions, Colorado's
avowed denial of that trend, and the Sanchez case are considered
together, one begins to wonder if, on its facts, Sanchez is really
very different from malpractice cases like Poltera v. Garlington5 '
and Title v. Freed.5 Arguably not. In Sanchez, there is an original
tort-feasor who actually inflicted the initial damage (injury).
There is a person (doctor), corporate here, to whom the automobile (victim) was taken for repairs (treatment). In the course of
that repair, certain mistakes are made through the repairman's
"7Brief for Appellant at 6, Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet Co., 31 Colo. App. 320,
502 P.2d 87 (1972) (emphasis added).
sTitle v. Freed, 515 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (not selected for official publication); Poltera v. Garlington, 489 P.2d 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for official
publication).
I'DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wash. 2d 357, 418 P.2d 1010 (1966); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075
(1955) (as supplemented); Note, Smith v. Conn: Effect of Release of Original Tortfeasor
as to Subsequently Negligent Physician,6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 335 (1970); Comment, Torts:
Release of Joint and Successive Tort-Feasors in Oklahoma, 15 OKLA. L. REv. 97 (1962).
5"McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (not a malpractice case but
involving identical policy considerations).
11489 P.2d 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for official publication).
12515 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (not selected for official publication).
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(doctor's) negligence resulting in further loss to the plaintiff. 3
In Poltera, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries as the
result of an automobile collision. During the pendency of legal
proceedings against the original tort-feasor, the plaintiff was examined by a physician at the request of the first wrongdoer and
his insurer. After settling with the original tort-feasor, the plaintiff sought relief against the physician for his alleged negligence.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held, in response to plaintiff's
appeal from an adverse summary judgment at the trial court,
that plaintiff's action was indeed barred as a matter of law:
The law is settled in this jurisdiction that, where a person accepts a settlement for injuries with the tort-feasor who caused the
accident resulting in his or her disability and executes a formal
release from any and all causes of action, claims and demands,
damages and expenses growing out of that accident, that person
cannot thereafter recover from a physician for damages resulting
from the alleged negligent treatment of those injuries. The rationale
upon which this rule rests is that the original injuries are held to be
the proximate cause of the additional damages which result from the
purported negligence of the physician against whom recovery is
sought.54

The court of appeals expressed the identical attitude in Title.
In that case, the plaintiff suffered skull injuries in an automobile
accident. Five days after the defendant-surgeon operated on the
plaintiff, the plaintiff lost the use of his left arm. Later the plaintiff settled with the party responsible for the automobile accident
and executed a general release. When the plaintiff appealed from
an adverse summary judgment in his action against the doctor,
the Colorado Court of Appeals, in affirming, stated:
Under these facts Ashley v. Roche . . . and Sams v. Curfman .
are controlling. In the latter case a party injured in an accident sued
the tortfeasor, settled the case, executed a general release, and then
sued the physician for alleged negligence in his treatment of the
resultant injuries, all as in the present case. The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action on the ground that
the release given in the first action released the physician because,
5

'To some, the analogy may be weakened by the fact that the negligent doctor has
personally committed a physical act that has aggravated the injury while the repairman,
in a custodial capacity, has failed to act, leading to further damage. This will not be so
troublesome to the reader who considers the defendant as the law does, as a corporate
"person," and notes that the similarities in the fact situations far outweigh any possible
differences.
1'489 P.2d at 335, citing Ashley v. Roche, 163 Colo. 498, 431 P.2d 783 (1967), and Sams
v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
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"the original injuries are held to be the proximate cause of the added
damages resulting from the negligence and unskillfulness of the attending physician." '

These analyses, based on proximate cause, are typical of
those used by courts applying the old common law rule. Their use
seems dangerous in the law of releases,5 and any such unfortunate theory '7 ought to be used only where nothing else is available. 5

Rather than diving headlong into the quagmire of

proximate cause, one question most effectively answers the conflict better than volumes of precedent: Is it really more reasonably foreseeable that a physician, with years of formal education
and training, will be more unskilled and negligent than an automobile body shop? Framed in this manner, the conflicting results
in the cases are hard to reconcile. The visceral reaction in favor
of abrogation of the common law rule is strong indeed, but there
are other, more persuasive, arguments for an extension of
Sanchez to the Poltera and Title situations.
As has been shown, Colorado has broken with the common
law rule that a release of one joint tort-feasor releases all. This
jurisdiction seems to be leaning towards abolishing the Poltera
rule, but, to date, the development away from the old rule has
taken place in fact situations with which the courts could cope.59
Stating that the traditional rule has absolutely no efficacy may
be too dramatic a step for the Colorado courts to take, but they
may not have to do exactly that. Ash v. Mortensen0 was used by
the Sanchez court to arrive at the conclusion that they were dealing with independent and successive tort-feasors and separate
and distinct claims." In Ash, the plaintiff's injuries were aggravated by a negligent physician and the plaintiff had released the
1515 P.2d at 1150.
"Both counsel in Sanchez relied heavily on Poltera in their briefs to the court of
appeals. The trial court relied on two malpractice cases in granting the summary judgment. It is quite possible that if the malpractice cases are allowed to remain on the books
their inevitable use in other fact situations might well lead to a revival of the old common
law rule in cases that, to date, have denied its efficacy.
5
'See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 236 for an introduction to the nightmare of proximate cause.
56
E.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
"'Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60 (1969), and Bayers v. W.O.W., Inc.,
162 Colo. 391, 426 P.2d 552 (1967) (both dealing with financial loss to the plaintiff);
Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet Co., 31 Colo. App. 320, 502 P.2d 87 (1972) (involving
property damage).
6'24 Cal.2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944).
631 Colo. App. at 323, 502 P.2d at 89.
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original tort-feasor. When the physician attempted to use that
release as a defense, he was thwarted in his effort by the California court finding independence of the wrongdoers and holding the
release to be effective only as to the original tort-feasor. The fact
that the Sanchez court relied heavily on a malpractice case, totally inconsistent with Colorado's own malpractice cases, together with the fact that the Colorado Supreme Court cited Ash
with approval in another recent release case" may well be the
ultimate bridge in the gap between the last vestiges of the common law rule in Colorado and a modern realistic approach to
releases. That is, in the next Poltera or Title, the Colorado courts
can either flatly deny the efficacy of the common law rule or, if
they prefer, find that it does not apply because the tort-feasors
are not joint. In terms of "jointness" in malpractice cases like
Poltera and Title, the problem of separability or inseparability of
the injury"3 may often arise. It may well be a hard factual question, but it should not, as a matter of law, lead to "jointness" and
its unjust consequences. 4 Likewise, with regard to the old common law rule itself, since the identity of cause of action fiction
can be easily avoided by the technically unique (but practically
identical) covenant not to sue," its continued efficacy as a bar to
recovery in the area of releases seems at best a minor obstacle to
a new rule in Colorado.
CONCLUSION

Common sense, reported cases, and legal writers accurately
point out that the vital elements in any release situation are the
intent of the parties and the extent of actual compensation. A
plaintiff should never be barred from pursuing a second tortfeasor by a release of the first unless, by the instrument, he intended to release both or he has been so fully compensated for his
injury that he ought not to be entitled to do so. The use of Ash
by the Colorado courts more likely represents thorough analysis
and thoughtful study of a sister state's precedent than an inad"Bayers v. W.O.W., Inc., 162 Colo. 391, 396, 426 P.2d 552, 555 (1967).
1

Prosser, supra note 1.

"Id. at 434-35.
"Comment, Release of Joint Tort-Feasorsin Texas, 36 TEX. L. REV. 55, 56 (1957).
"See, e.g., Justice Rutledge's excellent opinion inMcKenna v.Austin, 134 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir. 1943); Wecker v. Kilmer, 294 N.E.2d 132 (Ind. 1973) (a malpractice case);
Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075, 1084 (1955); 1F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1
(1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 3,at 304; Note, supra note 49; Comment, supra note 49,
at 99; 3 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151 (1941).
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vertent extraction of appropriate language from a case in direct
conflict with Poltera. Since Poltera was not selected for official
publication, it is persuasive precedent only67 and is not, therefore,
too great a barrier in itself, to a new rule. If the rights of personal
injury victims are to be as fully preserved and protected as the
plaintiff's in Sanchez, and if medical practitioners are to be held
accountable for their negligence, hopefully, at the next
opportunity, the Colorado courts will finally lay to rest the problem raised here. Until that time, the only safe route for the cautious practitioner seeking to fully protect his client's rights is to
have the victim execute a covenant not to sue 8 in favor of the
settling tort-feasor evidencing a clear intent to benefit only that
party and specifically exempting any treating physicians from its
coverage. Such a procedure, requiring technical accuracy by the
well-advised plaintiff and holding great potential injury for the
ill-advised, provides a possible escape from the harsh common
law rule of releases, but, in failing to repudiate the common law
rule completely, lays an unjustified and unfortunate trap for the
unwary.
Daniel M. Fowler
'COLO. App. R.

35(f).

"'Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60 (1969); Title v. Freed, 515 P.2d 149
(Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (not selected for official publication).
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It is only once in a while that a legal treatise appears which
is acknowledged as a truly masterful compilation in one area of
the law. Such a book is A Treatiseon InternationalCriminalLaw.
The work is a daring and critical search to unravel the intricacies
of international criminal law as it presently exists and to probe
into its likely future development. In form, the book is a series of
contributed articles by internationally renowned scholars, edited
by the authors of the Treatise and followed by appended documents. Each chapter explores a given aspect of international
criminal law from a historical and juridical perspective. In addition, each chapter includes relevant treaties and documents, and
draft treaties, proposed statutes, and other recommendations for
change.
Since in a short review it is impossible to do justice to the
breadth of the topics and the richness of the material presented
in these two volumes totaling 1221 pages, only a few general comments will be made here.
Perhaps the most noteworthy characteristic of the book is
that it seeks to develop a wholly new discipline. While the current
limitations of international law in dealing with international
criminal conduct are duly recognized, the book breaks new
ground in offering viable alternatives on national, regional, and
international levels. Compared with most prior works on the subject which are often plagued by narrowly circumscribed parochial
and nationalistic approaches and are consequently of little universal appeal, this treatise is truly international in scope-it contains contributions from 51 internationally renowned authors representing more than 20 countries and almost all the major legal
systems and ideologies in the world.
Obviously, the question of controlling international criminality has been thrust into the forefront of political and legal thinking primarily because of the recently manifested worldwide concern with terrorism and international traffic in narcotics. The
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acceptance that international crime consists of offenses committed against mankind has led to the recognition of the priority of
preserving minimum world order and the necessity of controlling
conduct contrary to the common interest of the world community. The authors make a significant contribution by discussing each area of international criminal activity separately, identifying major problem areas, and offering a viable control system
for such activity. Additionally, they make useful suggestions to
clarify several ambiguous concepts of international law, such as
"aggression," "armed conflict," and "terrorism."
Although the idea of controlling international criminal conduct by the establishment of an international court is not a novel
one, the authors have made this seem plausible by the delineation
of specific offenses, such as air and sea piracy, unlawful use of
certain weapons, international sale of narcotics, kidnapping diplomats, theft of art treasures, and certain common crimes presently grouped under the uneasy label of terrorism. The authors
also offer other proposals which show promise of implementation.
The possibility that a system for controlling international conduct could be devised and effectuated indicates the birth of a new
era of international juridical cooperation. The Treatise seeks to
usher in this new era, with sensitivity and regard for the ideas and
values of all peoples who share the common goal of world public
order.
The two volumes are organized on the basis of a continuum
of responsibility from the state to the individual. Volume I seeks
to ascertain and define for each crime who the participants are,
what the potential scope of their culpability is, and how each
crime is juxtaposed with defenses that may arise, depending upon
the actual role of the participants. By taking this approach, the
authors have taken another step in removing the barriers to the
creation of a viable international criminal law. Hopefully the
book and the ideas it contains will form the basis of seminars and
courses in international criminal law, which at present are being
offered at only a few law schools.
Volume II includes treatment of topics such as extradition
and asylum, theories of jurisdiction, conflict of laws, and judicial
cooperation in penal matters. Individual and state accountability
for war crimes and crimes against humanity is examined. A comparative study of the conflict of laws in international and municipal criminal law is undertaken with reference to both Western
and Socialist countries. Also, the subject of judicial assistance
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and cooperation in penal matters is discussed with reference to
conceptual differences between civil and common law countries.
The last part of Volume II deals with extradition and asylum.
The authors point to major problems in these areas, for instance,
the paucity of workable and binding extradition treaties regarding the surrender of international and national criminals, the
rigid nature of the agreements that do exist, and the excessive
procedural requirements contained in those agreements. These
problems are treated in conjunction with the chronically insoluble issue of dealing with the ideologically motivated'offender.
Here, the interplay is recognized between and among the competing considerations of political justifications and expediency, the
need to punish offenses and not persons, basic human rights in
the treatment of ideologically motivated individuals, and the delicate balance between public order and the freedom of expression.
While avoiding the luxury of lengthy philosophical rhetoric, the
authors allow the reader to appreciate these competing values
through logical and comprehensive factual analysis.
Regarding judicial assistance, the thesis of the authors is not
a simplistic plea for cooperation, but rather a meticulous analysis
of the cooperative system now extant in the international legal
structure. Typical of the problems in this area is the Benelux
Treaty, the product of the Benelux Commission, which took 14
years to be ratified by 3 states and 5 more years to bring into force
an agreement among homogeneous and friendly nations. While
the authors feel that this treaty may "open the road" to more
enlightened international criminal law, the road is, as their own
studies show, replete with problems. An equally fine treatment
of the international recognition of penal judgments is undertaken,
carefully analyzing the consequences of such recognition on the
domestic laws of various member nations.
These two volumes encompass the objective structure of international criminal law with a precision and clarity not found
elsewhere. The comprehensive documentation and a penchant for
detail make this work an invaluable aid for practitioner and academician alike. The editors have succeeded in their efforts to present a logical and cogent analysis of international criminal law.
The traditionally abstract and esoteric approach usually associated with the writing in this field is pleasantly replaced in this
book by a lucid examination of the rights and obligations of defined juridical personalities, such as the individual and the corporation. In particular, these rights are superimposed on a structure
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of international conflict-of-laws issues, giving rise to a workable
framework for discussing and analyzing the rights of an individual entity. Various arenas in which these rights may be exercised
are identified. For instance, while activities in ocean space and
outer space are discussed, several articles deal with activities
taking place within a nation-state. Thus, there is a constant
awareness of the interface between international regulation and
intrastate regulation and the delicate balance existing between
the two. It becomes clear that the protection of rights and the
enforcement of obligations is not a matter of exclusive nationstate or international jurisdiction, but rather a blending of the
two.
Professors Bassiouni and Nanda deserve credit for the production of this treatise which is not only a first of its kind, but
also promises to be a highly influential work in this field of
growing importance.
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